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Abstract 
Many studies examine the determinants of SME capital structure. The effects of both 
firm and institution level factors are well documented but there is still unknown 
influence behind SME capital structure: national culture. Reflecting on the sparse 
evidence on listed firms, this study explores the question whether national culture 
influences decision making which determines the capital structure of unlisted SMEs. 
This is examined both for SMEs as a whole and for three subsamples of micro, small 
and medium firms.  
 
Of Schwartz’s latest (2008) cultural dimensions Embeddedness, Hierarchy and Mastery 
are used in conjunction with a panel data sample (2006-2010) of almost 900,000 
observations from nine countries spread across three continents. The empirical analysis 
is based on a stratified re-sampling approach. The results show that Hierarchy and 
Embeddedness are negatively related to debt levels. However, very limited evidence is 
found that Mastery is positively related to debt.  The effect of culture is consistent in the 
full sample and throughout the subsamples. These results are robust when tested using 
an alternative model, lagged asset values and Hofstede’s cultural values. 
 
These findings provide strong evidence that national culture affects SME capital 
structure. A significant relationship between debt and Embeddedness suggests cultures 
which value security and public appearance usually have lower debt levels. A negative 
relationship between Hierarchy and debt suggests that managers who operate in cultures 
where power, authority and wealth are important cultural values prefer to use less debt 
because taking on debt results in the manager losing some control to debt providers. 
Countries with these cultural values prefer to retain maximum control. 
 
These findings confirm that cross-cultural variation in risk perceptions and control 
issues can cause differences in SME capital structure. The effect of national culture is 
consistent throughout all SMEs in the same country indicating that firms will behave 
collectively with regard to leverage. Because SMEs play such a large role in any 
economy, this could have wider implications for any individual economy. 
 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
ii 
Acknowledgements 
The title of this page may be “Acknowledgements” but, in this case, I think it should be 
called “Apologies”. 
 
I would like to apologise to almost everyone that I have had in my life throughout the 
duration of my MPhil. Firstly, my friends from home who saw me off last October and 
have not heard very much from me since – I promise I will see you all down the barrels 
for a few drinks soon! 
 
I would like to apologise to my family. My poor Dad who doesn’t really see the need 
for higher education and just wants me to get job – Sorry Dad, you might have a while 
to wait yet! My Mum who has had no other option but to listen to me moan about how 
much work I have to do and how difficult it is, almost continuously over the last year. 
Most of the time, I know I sound like a stuck record and I’m sorry but it’s probably not 
going to get better anytime soon!  
 
I would like to apologise to the people I share my office with, who have had to listen to 
me grunting and swearing at my computer whilst trying to decipher ridiculously 
complicated papers, econometric methods and my supervisors handwriting. Most of you 
will be submitting your theses soon so you won’t have to listen to me for much longer. I 
only hope the future PhD students that replace you are just as tolerant. 
 
I would like to apologise to all my friends in Stirling whom I don’t see very much – this 
probably won’t change in the near future, but feel free to bring a coffee to my office at 
any time! 
 
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to apologise to my supervisor, who I don’t 
really think, knew what he was taking on when he agreed to supervise me. He probably 
wasn’t expecting me to be quite as pig-headed or bad-tempered as I actually am. This 
combined with how badly I respond to criticism means that over the last year, he has 
definitely had his hands full. I am very glad you agreed to supervise my PhD before all 
of these more delightful qualities came to light. You’re stuck with me now! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sincere thanks to everyone who has been involved in my MPhil in one way or another 
and particularly those who played a part in arranging my scholarship. I am eternally 
grateful and I don’t know where I would be without you…..  
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
iii 
List of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ ii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ vii 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Capital Structure ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Small and Medium Enterprises ................................................................................ 1 
1.3 National Culture ....................................................................................................... 2 
1.4 Contribution ............................................................................................................. 3 
1.5 Data and Methods .................................................................................................... 3 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................. 4 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ......................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Theories on Capital Structure .................................................................................. 5 
2.1.1 Agency Cost Theory ............................................................................................. 5 
2.1.2 The Trade-off Theory............................................................................................ 7 
2.1.3 The Pecking Order Theory .................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Capital Structure Determinants ................................................................................ 9 
2.2.1 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants ........................................................ 11 
2.2.1.1 Size ................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1.2 Growth ............................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.1.3 Earnings Volatility and Firm Risk ................................................................... 13 
2.2.1.4 Profitability ...................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1.5 Tangibility ........................................................................................................ 14 
2.2.1.6 Liquidity ........................................................................................................... 15 
2.2.1.7 Industry ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.2.1.8 Firm-Level Capital Structure Determinants and Private Firms ....................... 17 
2.2.2 Institutional Capital Structure Determinants....................................................... 18 
2.2.2.1 Legal Systems and Enforcement ...................................................................... 24 
2.2.2.2 Financial Systems ............................................................................................ 20 
2.2.2.3 Tax Systems ..................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.2.4 Macroeconomic Conditions ............................................................................. 23 
2.3 Small and Medium Enterprises .............................................................................. 24 
2.3.1 Characteristics of SMEs ...................................................................................... 25 
2.3.2 The Application of the Capital Structure Theories to SMEs .............................. 27 
2.3.2.1 The Agency Cost Theory ................................................................................. 27 
2.3.2.2 The Pecking Order Theory ............................................................................... 28 
2.3.2.3 The Trade-off Theory ...................................................................................... 29 
2.3.3 SME Capital Structure and Firm-Level Capital Structure Determinants ........... 29 
2.3.4 SME Capital Structure and Institutional Capital Structure Determinants .......... 34 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................... 36 
Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant and  
Development of Hypotheses ......................................................................................... 38 
3.1 Hofstede's Cultural Values ..................................................................................... 38 
3.2 Schwartz's Cultural Dimensions - 1994 and 2008 ................................................. 40 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
iv 
3.3 Cultural Values Applied in a Business Context ..................................................... 45 
3.4 Prior Evidence on Culture and Capital Structure ................................................... 50 
3.5 Hypotheses Development ...................................................................................... 52 
3.5.1 Risk ..................................................................................................................... 54 
3.5.2 Control ................................................................................................................ 56 
3.5.3 Size Categories Within SMEs ............................................................................. 59 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 4 Methodology ................................................................................................ 62 
4.1 Sample Selection: SME Definition and Size Classification .................................. 62 
4.2 Data ........................................................................................................................ 63 
4.3 Cultural Dimensions .............................................................................................. 68 
4.4 Leverage ................................................................................................................. 69 
4.5 Estimation of Independent Variables ..................................................................... 71 
4.5.1 Firm-Level Independent Variables ..................................................................... 71 
4.5.2 Institutional Independent Variables .................................................................... 73 
4.6 Panel Data .............................................................................................................. 76 
4.7 Multicollinearity .................................................................................................... 77 
4.8 Bootstrapping, Clustering and Stratified Sampling ............................................... 80 
4.9 Regression Model .................................................................................................. 85 
4.10 Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................. 86 
Chapter 5 Results .......................................................................................................... 88 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................. 88 
5.2 Univariate Tests ..................................................................................................... 98 
5.2.1 Pearson's Correlation Coefficients ...................................................................... 98 
5.2.2 T-tests .................................................................................................................. 99 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis Results .............................................................................. 103 
5.4 Discussion of Findings ......................................................................................... 108 
5.5 Robustness Tests and Further Analysis ............................................................... 113 
5.5.1 The Tobit Model ............................................................................................... 114 
5.5.2 Lagged Asset Values ......................................................................................... 116 
5.5.3 Hofstede's Cultural Values ................................................................................ 117 
5.5.4 Further Testing: The Relationship Between Culture and Long and Short Term 
Debt ................................................................................................................... 122 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................. 127 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ................................................................................................ 129 
6.1 Summary of the Research Project ........................................................................ 129 
6.2 Contribution ......................................................................................................... 130 
6.3 Implications .......................................................................................................... 130 
6.4 Limitations of the Study ....................................................................................... 132 
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research ......................................................................... 135 
References .................................................................................................................... 137 
Appendices ....................................................................................................................... I 
Appendix 1 Gray's Hypotheses ...................................................................................... I 
Appendix 2 Spearman Correlation Coefficients for the Independent Variables ........... II 
Appendix 3 Tables Showing the Distribution of Excluded Observations by Country. III 
Appendix 4 Spearman Correlation Coefficients between the leverage ratio (LEV) and 
the Independent Variables ........................................................................................... IV 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
v 
Appendix 5 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country............................ V 
Appendix 6 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Micro Firms VI 
Appendix 7 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Small Firms
 .................................................................................................................................... VII 
Appendix 8 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Medium Firms
 ................................................................................................................................... VIII 
Appendix 9 Results of Levene's test when testing for differences in leverage ratios 
across size categories in each country ......................................................................... IX 
Appendix 10 Correlation matrix showing Pearson's correlation coefficients for the 
variables in the bootstrap samples ................................................................................. X 
 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
vi 
List of Figures 
 
3.1 Two-dimensional smallest space analysis diagram showing Schwartz’s cultural 
dimensions from 1994 and their value items. 
3.2 Two dimensional smallest space analysis diagram showing Schwartz’s revised 
cultural dimensions from 2008 and their value items. 
3.3 Diagram showing linkages between cultural dimensions and capital structure 
decisions from Chui et al. (2002). 
3.4 Diagram showing the link between Schwartz’s cultural dimensions and SME 
capital structure. 
4.1 Scatter plot showing the relationship between Hierarchy and Mastery. 
4.2 Scatter plot showing the relationship between Hierarchy and Mastery and the 
number of observations in each country. 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
vii 
List of Tables 
2.1 Prior literature’s empirical findings regarding the capital structure determinants of 
listed firms. 
2.2 Prior literature’s empirical findings regarding the capital structure determinants on 
SMEs. 
4.1 Size classification within SMEs. 
4.2 Number of observations by year and country. 
4.3 Number of observations by country and industry. 
4.4 Number of observations from micro firms by year and country. 
4.5 Number of observations from small firms by year and country. 
4.6 Number of observations from medium firms by year and country. 
4.7 Schwartz’s 2008 cultural values. 
4.8 Firm specific independent variable definition. 
4.9 Institutional variable definition. 
4.10 Pearson correlation coefficients for the independent variables. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics for institutional variables. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables (full sample). 
5.3 Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables (micro firms). 
5.4 Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables (small firms). 
5.5 Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables (medium firms). 
5.6 Pearson correlation coefficients between the leverage ratio and the independent 
variables. 
5.7  Results of the Levene and t-tests when testing for differences in leverage ratios 
between countries. 
5.8 Results of the Levene and t-tests when testing for differences in leverage ratios 
between size categories. 
5.9 Dependent variable: total debt to total assets (LEV). 
5.10 Results of multivariate analysis using the tobit model. 
5.11 Results of multivariate analysis using lagged asset values. 
5.12 Hofstede’s cultural values. 
5.13 Descriptive statistics for Hofstede’s cultural values. 
5.14 Robustness test results using Hofstede’s cultural values. 
5.15 Dependent variable: long term debt to total assets. 
5.16 Dependent variable: short term debt to total assets. 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Capital Structure 
Capital structure literature looks at debt to assets ratios within firms and why firms have 
the debt levels that they do. Borrowing enables investment which allows firms to grow 
by facilitating the purchase of assets. This area of finance literature has spiralled 
outwards since the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) which prompted a 
wide range of research into capital structure. This resulted in the development and 
testing of capital structure theories (Donaldson, 1961; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984), capital structure determinants (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008; Kayo and Kimura, 2011), 
debt maturity (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991; Barclay and Smith, 1995), and speed of 
adjustment of debt proportions (Ozkan, 2001; Huang and Ritter, 2009). The volume of 
literature demonstrates this area is of great interest to both the academic community and 
corporate finance professionals alike.  
This study expands on prior literature by investigating the effect of national culture as 
an SME capital structure determinant. The rationale behind national culture is that 
people in different countries hold certain values with greater or lesser importance than 
those in other cultures and may make different decisions based on these values. People 
manage firms and intuition suggests that national culture will influence their decision 
making. Prior literature finds this holds for several managerial decisions including 
financial reporting (Ding et al., 2005), auditor choice (Hope et al., 2008), dividend 
policy (Shao et al., 2010), foreign market entry (Kogut and Singh, 1988), tax 
compliance (Tsakumis et al., 2007) and compensation practices (Schuler and Rogovsky, 
1998). 
1.2 Small and Medium Enterprises 
This study investigates the effect of national culture on the capital structure of unlisted 
SMEs. SMEs play an important role in any economy and form approximately 99% of 
firms. Their size enables them to tailor their services to specific client which results in 
them exhibiting great heterogeneity both within countries and between countries, in 
terms of not only their capital structure but their operational structure.  As SMEs play 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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such a vital role in any economy, it is important we develop our understanding of their 
operations and their structure, particularly with regard to how they finance themselves.  
Prior literature indicates that SMEs generally apply the pecking order theory and are 
more likely to raise finance for a particular objective rather than specifically to alter 
their capital structure (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). There are several studies 
which focus specifically on SME capital structure determinants (e.g., Van Caneghem 
and Van Campenhout, 2012, Degryse et al., 2012) but there are a limited number of 
cross-country studies in this area (e.g., Hall et al., 2004; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; 
Joeveer, 2012) and these examples focus only on European SMEs leaving a large 
number of SMEs unexplored.  
1.3 National Culture 
National culture can be measured in several ways but the majority of prior literature 
uses either Hofstede’s cultural values (Hofstede, 1980) or Schwartz’s cultural 
dimensions (Schwartz, 1994). This study uses Schwartz’s latest cultural dimensions 
(Schwartz, 2008) to enable empirical examination. These cultural dimensions are 
beginning to appear in finance literature (e.g., Siegel et al., 2011) and provide a more 
recent method of quantifying national culture.  
Prior literature which investigates the relationship between culture and capital structure 
is limited to three papers: Sekely and Collins (1988), Gleason et al. (2000) and Chui et 
al. (2002). However, these papers only examine listed firms. Gleason et al. (2000) and 
Sekely and Collins (1988) both cluster countries together based on cultural similarities 
and differences. They report a connection between capital structure and culture but this 
method prevents the detection of specific cultural values which may affect capital 
structure. Chui et al. (2002) apply Schwartz’s 1994 dimensions but the way they 
develop their hypotheses is different. Although they test individual dimensions, the 
hypothesis developed based on the Mastery dimensions also draws on characteristics 
from the Hierarchy dimension. Schwartz groups his seven dimensions into two opposite 
pairs of wider dimensions: Self-enhancement (Mastery and Hierarchy) vs. Self-
transcendence (Egalitarian Commitment and Harmony) and Openness to Change 
(Conservatism vs. Intellectual and Affective Autonomy) and although Chui et al. (2002) 
tests Mastery and Conservatism individually, the characteristics represented are more 
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reflective of these wider cultural dimensions.  
1.4 Contribution  
The primary contribution of this study is the investigation of the relationship between 
SME capital structure and national culture which until now is unexplored. Although the 
relationship between culture and the capital structure of listed firms is investigated by 
prior literature (Sekely and Collins, 1988; Gleason et al., 2000; Chui et al., 2002), as 
unlisted SMEs are significantly differences to their listed counterparts, it cannot be 
taken for granted that the relationship between culture and capital structure is the same 
across all types of firms. 
Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions are used to quantify culture in this study. These 
dimensions are the most recently developed method of quantifying culture and although 
they are used by Siegel et al. (2011) in a different context, their use in prior literature is 
minimal. This study develops three hypotheses which link risk and control in the 
context of SMEs to both capital structure and cultural dimensions and, uses individual 
cultural dimensions to test each hypothesis.  
Even after conducting sensitivity tests which reflect methods most commonly used in 
the relevant literature, the findings are robust and contribute to prior knowledge by 
confirming that national culture impacts the capital structure through the manager’s 
approach to risk and control issues within SMEs. 
1.5 Data and Methods 
An unbalanced panel data sample of almost 900,000 observations of unlisted SMEs 
from nine countries (China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand and the UK) covering the period 2006 to 2010 is used in conjunction 
with hypotheses generated using the Mastery, Hierarchy and Embeddedness 
dimensions. The unusual data structure requires an atypical method of analysis. The 
data has large numbers of observations from some countries and few from others, 
creating false multicollinearity issues, particularly with the cultural dimensions. To 
solve this, a stratified re-sampling method is employed in conjunction with an OLS 
regression model, allowing the combined testing of all the three dimensions. The 
method of analysis contributes to the development of robust methods for analysing 
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capital structure with unusual panel data structures providing a method of empirical 
analysis where more traditional methods have failed. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter two provides the literature review. 
Chapter three discusses culture as a capital structure determinant and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the methodology and describes the data. Chapter 5 
discusses the empirical results and the thesis finishes with Chapter 6 which discusses 
conclusions drawn from the study. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Capital structure decision making has been examined extensively in academic literature 
since the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958). This paper theorizes that 
under certain conditions, firm value is not affected by its leverage ratio. This indicates 
that higher leverage levels should not lead to reductions in firm value. What followed 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) was a vast quantity of literature trying to determine what 
does affect capital structure, including the development of capital structure theories and 
empirical studies investigating several aspects of capital structure. This chapter begins 
by discussing the capital structure theories (Section 2.1) and then continues by 
discussing the capital structure determinants which have been examined in prior 
literature (Section 2.2). Then, Section 2.3 discusses the specific characteristics of SMEs 
and how these relate to the capital structure determinants. Section 2.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.1 Theories on Capital Structure 
2.1.1 Agency Cost Theory 
Agency costs arise when the owners or a firm are separated from managers. This 
separation means that there is asymmetric information
1
 between owners and managers, 
which the manager can use to their own advantage. A manager’s personal objectives 
can be different to shareholder objectives and managers may seek to satisfy their own 
personal objectives before considering shareholder wealth. It is the cost to the 
shareholder of these actions that is the agency cost. Theoretically, leverage can be used 
to reduce agency costs by placing a certain amount of pressure on managers to perform 
because they are required to meet interest payments. Grossman and Hart (1982) suggest 
this is particularly applicable if the costs of bankruptcy are high for the manager 
personally. 
There are more ways that agency costs can be reduced. If the manager is given a 
number of shares in the firm as part of his remuneration, he becomes a shareholder and 
therefore is more likely to act in the best interests of the shareholders. Moh’d et al. 
                                                 
1
 Information related to a transaction which is not held by all the relevant parties (Sharp, 1990). 
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(1998) find evidence suggesting that managers reduce debt levels and the firm’s default 
risk when their own wealth is tied to the firm. This supports Grossman and Hart (1982) 
and suggests managers will act in the best interests of the firm, when the firm’s 
bankruptcy has a greater impact on their own personal finances.  
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that managers will increase the level of 
firm risk when the firm has debt. If successful, shareholders will receive greater 
dividends but if the project fails, the losses are partially absorbed by the debt provider.
2
 
Managing the firm in this way increases the probability of default and could have 
serious implications for the longevity of the firm. 
Leyland (1998) develops a theoretical model based on several aspects of the firm to 
measure agency costs and concludes that agency costs may not be positively related to 
the optimal level of debt as would be expected based on Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
but there are several limitations to this model. One of the most significant being that the 
effects of asymmetric information are ignored which is a vital part of both the agency 
cost and the pecking order theory
3
 so this model has limited applicability.  
The interests of managers and shareholders can also differ over dividend payments 
when the firm has large cash reserves. A firm is committed to making interest payments 
on debt, whereas, the manager can choose to reduce future dividends and maintain cash 
within the firm (Jensen, 1986). If managers issue low dividends, the share price will 
often drop as a result, reducing the wealth of the shareholders (Jensen, 1986). The 
remaining internal cash is also at the disposal of the manager who may not use this cash 
in the most beneficial way to the shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) suggests that, if the free cash within a firm is reduced, managers often 
reduce their personal benefits. Opler et al. (1999)
4
 find support for this. They find that 
firms tend to accumulate more internal cash when managers are maximizing 
shareholder wealth, i.e. not using it for personal benefits. An increase in the manager’s 
personal benefits could be seen as an agency cost so if these are reduced by leverage, 
                                                 
2
 This is particularly true in countries with weak creditor protection. Debt providers may not be able to 
take legal action to enforce their debt agreements or obtain funds (either the original capital or the interest 
payments) from the borrower. 
3
 This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.3. 
4
 Opler et al. (1999) investigated the determinants and implications of cash holding within U.S. listed 
firms using 85,000 observations from 1952-1994. 
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then this is a benefit of debt. 
In countries with emerging capital markets, there is often wider separation between 
owners and managers of firms than in developed countries, which can result in 
particularly high agency costs. Harvey et al. (2004) find that in such circumstances, 
using leverage to reduce agency costs is important because it “mitigates the loss in firm 
value attributable to the separation of management control and ownership” (Harvey et 
al., 2004:5). Additionally, the authors find that the reduction in agency costs achieved 
by using leverage is more pronounced in firms with limited future growth opportunities 
or large amounts of fixed assets. This study concludes that if agency costs are extremely 
high, the use of leverage to reduce them is particularly important. 
Alves and Ferreira (2011) consider the relationship between capital structure and the 
various types of legal systems. They find shareholder rights are negatively related to 
leverage
5
 suggesting that if shareholders have the power to influence the board of 
directors by, for example, voting rights, the manager may be more inclined to act in the 
best interests of the shareholders although there does not appear to be any empirical 
evidence to support this theory. 
2.1.2 The Trade-off Theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) predict that every firm has an optimal level of debt. This 
optimal level of debt is determined by a “trade-off” between the costs and benefits of 
debt, assuming that a firm’s assets and investment opportunities remain constant.  Once 
the firm calculates its optimal level debt it aims to maintain this whilst in operation. 
This theory may not be as straightforward as this suggests. In practice, a firm’s assets 
and investment opportunities may constantly be changing and, as a result, one would 
expect the optimal level of debt will fluctuate continuously. Maintaining an optimal 
level of debt, where the optimal level of debt is continually changing could be 
problematic, particularly as transaction costs incurred when altering a firm’s debt levels 
could be high and may outweigh the benefits.  
2.1.3 The Pecking Order Theory  
Donaldson (1961) was the first to suggest the order in which firms prefer to finance 
                                                 
5
 The relationship between shareholder rights and leverage is discussed further in Section 2.2.2.1. 
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themselves. According to use internal finance first, and then debt and finally equity 
because, using finance in that order means that any investment is less costly to the 
existing shareholders. Myers (1984) refers to this as the pecking order theory and 
suggests that the firm’s cost of capital increases with asymmetric information. Firms 
that finance themselves with internal finance find this is a more economical way of 
financing themselves compared to obtaining funds from external sources. Once this is 
exhausted, the pecking order theory suggests issuing debt, which is more expensive but, 
as Modigliani and Miller (1958) conclude, has a lesser impact on the existing 
shareholders. Issuing equity is the most expensive option to existing shareholders. 
When equity is issued, often the firm’s share price decreases, reducing the value of 
existing shareholders equity. 
Managers also have to consider that asymmetric information may lead to the newly 
issued shares being undervalued by financial markets and sold at a discount (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). This means the majority of the benefits reaped by the firm would be 
bestowed on the newest shareholders. This further increases the cost of issuing equity to 
existing shareholders. 
There have been several adaptations and expansions made on the pecking-order theory. 
The ‘managerial over-optimism model’ (Heaton, 2002) suggests that managers are over 
confident regarding their own firm and consider their stock constantly undervalued. 
This means they are particularly hesitant to issue equity and more likely to issue higher 
levels of debt to limit the impact on existing shareholders. The ‘windows of 
opportunity’ theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), also referred to as the market timing 
hypothesis, is a conditional expansion of the pecking order theory based on 
circumstances where either debt or equity is less costly and suggests the pecking-order 
should be altered accordingly. This theory suggests firms do not prefer debt or equity 
but simply opt for what is the most economical. 
The trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are often considered as competing 
theories (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Tong and Green, 2007) but there is 
increasing evidence they are applied simultaneously (Fama and French, 2002; Beattie et 
al., 2006; Lemmon and Zender, 2010). The pecking order theory itself, suggests there is 
a level of debt where the benefit of taking debt is outweighed by the risks and the firm 
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should issue equity instead. This point could relate to the optimal level of debt as it 
describes a scenario where the benefits of debt are met by the risks of bankruptcy. 
Combining the two theories, it would seem reasonable to suggest that a firm’s optimal 
debt level is the highest level where the firm’s future operations are not in jeopardy.  
If these two theories are applied simultaneously, what affects the firm’s optimal debt 
level? What factors affect the application of the pecking order theory? Several papers 
have tried to answer these questions by examining capital structure determinants (e.g., 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 
2008). These papers, among others, consider several factors found to affect capital 
structure. The following discussion provides more detail regarding the capital structure 
determinants previous studies have considered and their results.
6
 
2.2 Capital Structure Determinants 
Prior literature divides capital structure determinants into two categories: firm level and 
institution level determinants. Firm level determinants (e.g., firm size, tangibility of 
assets) vary between each individual firm. Previous research examining these 
determinants is conducted on both individual countries and international samples, on 
both listed and private firms.  
Institution level determinants (e.g., legal systems, development of financial markets) 
can also affect capital structure and are tested in numerous prior studies. The existing 
literature considers these variables but there are other potential capital structure 
determinants which have only been considered minimally. The investigation of national 
culture as a capital structure determinant, which is the focus of this study, is one of 
these minimally considered capital structure determinants. 
The two subsections that follow (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) discuss the firm and 
institutional capital structure determinants focusing on empirical evidence from studies 
on listed and private firms separately. The effect of the same capital structure 
determinants on SMEs is discussed later in Section 2.3. 
                                                 
6
 These capital structure theories are generic in their nature and do not specifically refer to any particular 
type of firm. Section 2.3.2 discusses each of these theories in the context of SMEs. 
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Table 2.1 Prior Literature's Empirical findings regarding the capital structure determinants of listed firms 
 Capital Structure 
Determinant 
Related Theories + - Insignificant Findings 
Size Trade-off (+) 
Rajan & Zingales (1995), Booth et al. 
(2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Bevan & 
Danbolt (2004), De Jong et al. (2008), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank & Goyal 
(2009), Kayo & Kimura (2011)  
    
Tangibility Trade-off (+) 
Rajan & Zingales (1995), Bevan & Danbolt 
(2004), Margaritis & Psillaki (2007), De 
Jong et al. (2008),  Frank & Goyal (2009), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Kayo & Kimura 
(2011) 
Booth et al. (2001) Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
Growth 
Trade-off (-) Pecking 
Order (+) 
  Rajan & Zingales (1995), Booth et al. 
(2001), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank 
& Goyal (2009), Kayo & Kimura 
(2011) 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
Risk/Earnings 
Volatility 
Trade-off (-) 
  
Margaritis & Psillaki (2007)  
Booth et al. (2001), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
Profitability  
Trade-off (+/-) Pecking 
Order (-) 
  Rajan & Zingales (1995), Booth et al. 
(2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
Bevan & Danbolt (2004), Margaritis 
& Psillaki (2007), De Jong et al. 
(2008), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank 
& Goyal (2009), Kayo & Kimura 
(2011) 
  
Liquidity Pecking Order (-) 
  Deesomsak et al. (2004), De Jong et 
al. (2008) 
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2.2.1 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants 
Table 2.1 shows the firm level variables along with a brief overview of how these 
variables are linked to the trade-off and the pecking order theories and the evidence 
found by prior literature. This table also presents a summary of empirical evidence from 
prior studies. 
2.2.1.1 Size 
If firms apply the trade-off theory, the expectation is that the optimal level of debt will 
change partially depending on the size of the firm. The risk of bankruptcy is usually 
higher in small firms. Larger firms are usually more diverse, have more stable cash 
flows and therefore are able to service higher levels of debt (De Jong et al., 2008) 
suggesting that the optimal level of debt is higher for larger firms because the 
bankruptcy risk associated with debt is lower. 
Table 2.1 shows that prior empirical studies usually find a positive relationship between 
size and leverage. This is not standard across countries and some international studies 
find a negative relationship between size and leverage (De Jong et al., 2008; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004). Rajan and Zingales (1995) look at the capital structure 
determinants of listed firms in the G7 countries and suggest size could be an inverse 
proxy for default probability but they also say that the relationship between leverage 
and default probability does not completely explain the relationship between size and 
leverage. De Jong et al. (2008) conduct a study examining the capital structure 
determinants of listed firms in 42 countries. They support the argument of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). Deesomsak et al. (2004) also conduct a cross-country study on the 
capital structure determinants of listed firms. They report that the only country in their 
sample of listed firms where there is not a positive relationship between size and debt 
(Singapore) provides governmental support for firms where they are provided capital in 
times of financial distress regardless of their size, thus explaining the abnormal 
relationship between size and capital structure in this country. 
Zimmerman (1983) looks at taxes and firm size and finds that smaller firms pay lower 
tax rates. If tax rates are lower, the debt tax shelter is reduced and debt is less beneficial 
to the firm, reducing the benefits of debt for smaller firms and lowering their optimal 
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debt levels. This suggests tax rate and leverage are positively related and could partially 
explain why smaller firms tend to have lower levels of debt. 
2.2.1.2 Growth  
Firms with high growth potential usually require large amounts of capital to in order to 
fund growth. When external finance is required, firms can either issue debt or equity. In 
accordance with the pecking order theory, debt is preferable to equity but some firms 
may wish to avoid the required interest payments. Interest payments are an expense and 
absorb internal cash that firms with high growth prospects could use to fund growth 
elsewhere. This could lead to firms avoiding debt finance and restricting themselves to 
internal finance. If the firm’s growth projects are successful then they will generate 
internal cash which could then be used to fund further growth. 
Generally, any firm will experience an element of risk with any investment they choose. 
If the risk associated with growth projects is comparatively high and the trade-off 
theory is applied, the firm will have lower optimal level of debt, indicating that growth 
is negatively related to leverage. However, the pecking order theory suggests the 
opposite. Firms will take on debt to fund growth projects once available internal finance 
has been used. 
Prior empirical literature often finds a negative relationship between growth and 
leverage for listed firms (see Table 2.1), implying application of the trade-off theory. 
However, this relationship is not consistent and results vary between countries and 
studies. This could be partially due to different proxies being used to measure growth. 
For example, some studies use change in assets (Chen, 2003), change in sales (Gianetti, 
2003), market to book value ratios (De Jong et al., 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008) or 
capital expenditure (Harvey et al., 2004). There could also be an institutional effect on 
this relationship as a result of government policies. For example, governmental research 
and development grants may be available to some firms and reduce the need for debt. 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) find a significant negative relationship between growth and 
leverage in Singapore and Thailand when considering listed firms in Malaysia, 
Australia, Singapore and Thailand. They suggest this could be because firms with high 
growth prospects for generating intangible assets prefer not to be constrained by debt 
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covenants or committed to servicing high debt levels and prefer to minimize their 
exposure. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also suggests firms with high leverage and growth 
opportunities may invest sub-optimally or accept higher risk projects in order to move 
the wealth of the firm from the debt holders back to the shareholders. If debt providers 
suspect that this will happen, this could increase the cost of borrowing so, in the first 
instance, these firms should choose to fund their operations using internal finance. 
2.2.1.3 Earnings Volatility and Firm Risk  
If a firm makes high risk investments then high earnings volatility is expected. Some 
high risk investments will generate losses and this could render the firm unable to meet 
debt servicing requirements and, in more extreme cases, its creditors could force it into 
bankruptcy. If the firm is a high risk firm and applies the trade-off theory, a low optimal 
level of debt is expected as the firm has a higher bankruptcy risk. The opposite is true if 
the pecking order theory is applied. A high risk firm may issue excess amounts of 
leverage to take advantage of business opportunities they would otherwise forgo. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that contrary to the above discussion it may be the 
firm’s leverage that determines the level of risk. For example, firms with high levels of 
debt may take on higher risk projects. This places the debt holder’s wealth at a higher 
level of risk than would ordinarily be associated with debt holdings. If debt holders 
expect this type of behaviour, this will increase the firm’s cost of debt. However, this 
does not apply to all firms. The opposite may also be true. Firms with low levels of 
leverage may take on high risk projects on the premise that even if these projects fail, 
the firm is not likely to get into financial difficulty. Highly levered firms may opt for 
low risk projects to ensure that they can meet the servicing requirements on their debt. 
Table 2.1 shows there is a sometimes a negative relationship between leverage and risk. 
This suggests firms which opt for high risk projects tend to have less debt, suggesting 
the trade-off theory is applied in this instance. However, the empirical results regarding 
risk and leverage are inconclusive. De Jong et al. (2008) find that in one third of the 
countries in their sample, leverage has a significant, negative relationship with risk but 
the remaining countries have mixed results for this variable. In some countries an 
insignificant relationship is found and in some countries there is a positive and 
significant relationship indicating an institutional factor affects this relationship. 
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There are few empirical studies that specifically consider earnings volatility as a proxy 
for risk. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Deesomsak et al. (2004) did not find a 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also 
suggest that firms may ignore earnings volatility when the costs of entering into 
liquidation are low.  
2.2.1.4 Profitability 
Theoretically, the profitability of a firm could affect capital structure positively or 
negatively depending on which capital structure theory is applied. If the pecking order 
theory is applied one would expect to find a negative relationship on the basis that if 
firms are highly profitable, then they are more likely to have sufficient internal finance 
and not require debt. If the trade-off theory is applied, the opposite is expected. If a firm 
is highly profitable, the firm will be able to meet required interest payments on higher 
debt levels, reducing bankruptcy risk and increasing the optimal level of debt.  
Table 2.1 shows that the empirical studies on listed firms conclude that profitability is 
negatively correlated with leverage, suggesting that firms apply the pecking order 
theory before considering the optimal level of debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found 
that the strength of this relationship increased as firms got larger and suggest this is 
because larger firms issue less equity.  
2.2.1.5 Tangibility 
If a firm has a high proportion of tangible assets, it is expected that the firm will have 
higher debt levels. Firms with tangible assets could use them as collateral when 
obtaining finance. Using collateral can reduce the cost of debt, which in turn reduces 
the risk of debt. Application of the trade-off theory suggests a positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage because if the risks associated with debt are reduced, 
the optimal debt level increases. 
This is supported by the empirical evidence shown in Table 2.1. Lemmon et al. (2008) 
also suggest that firms use collateral to reduce their cost of debt because they find that 
firms’ debt levels are positively related to the proportion of the debt that is secured by 
tangible assets. 
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2.2.1.6 Liquidity 
The liquidity of the firm depends on the amount of internal cash available to deal with 
short term liabilities. If a firm is very liquid, it will probably have large cash reserves 
which are easily accessed and used, when required to meet current liabilities. If firms 
apply the pecking order theory, it is expected that highly liquid firms have less debt 
because they have more internal finance available to subsidise new investments. High 
levels of liquidity could suggest that firms maintain certain levels of cash to be able to 
fund investment quickly without having to resort to external finance which takes time.  
Empirical evidence suggests that liquidity is negatively related to leverage but this 
relationship is rarely tested. De Jong et al. (2008) find a limited number of significant 
results for this variable and also note that the significant results tend to be in countries 
with more advanced economies. Deesomsak et al. (2004) find a stronger negative 
relationship between liquidity and leverage using the same ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities to measure liquidity. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also comment that these 
results indicate application of the pecking order theory.  
2.2.1.7 Industry 
Industry affects a number of firm factors which contribute towards capital structure. 
The most prominent of these is firm risk (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). As discussed above, 
firm risk is a major factor in both the cost of debt and calculating the optimal level of 
debt, and a significant proportion of firm risk is directly attributable to industry (both 
the economic condition of the industry and the industry itself). In extreme 
circumstances, the cost of leverage may be so high that it alters the pecking order theory 
by making equity less expensive than debt. This is expected in industries with high risk 
and growth potential. Industry and individual research and development projects could 
also attract grants and subsidies which may reduce a firm’s requirement for external 
finance and lower debt ratios.  
There is some discussion in prior literature over the importance of industry as a capital 
structure determinant. Myers (1984) suggests that industry may not be a significant 
capital structure determinant because any differences in capital structure are more likely 
to be caused by firm specific factors. Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) find evidence which 
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supports Myers (1984) and conclude that industry is not as important as firm specific 
factors. Prior studies which conclude industry is not an important capital structure 
determinant tend to be older studies, suggesting that improvements in methods and data 
have enabled more thorough testing. 
Despite Myers (1984) and Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), more recent results (e.g., Kayo 
and Kimura, 2012) find that industry does play an important role in capital structure 
decisions. Angelo and Masulis (1980) develop a theoretical model based on optimal 
levels of debt and suggest the debt tax shield varies between industries. As this is an 
important benefit of debt, this could result in variations in the optimal level of debt 
dependent on industry. 
Prior literature suggests managers have been known to use the industry leverage median 
as a benchmark for an optimal level of debt for their firm (Frank and Goyal, 2009) and 
this measure is often used to capture industry in empirical studies which provides 
further evidence that industry is a significant capital structure determinant. But, if 
managers do consider the industry median when choosing their capital structure, this 
would be one of several factors taken into consideration.  
Mackay and Phillips (2005) look at the relative importance of industry to firm level 
financial decisions and find there is wide variation in debt levels within industries and 
although industry is considered, higher priority is given to other factors. So, although 
Mackay and Phillips (2005) acknowledge that industry does play a role in determining 
capital structure, they find some support for Myers (1984) and Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993). 
Not all empirical studies use industry medians to capture industry when looking at 
capital structure determinants but several do (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Flannery 
and Rangan, 2006 and Frank and Goyal, 2009).  Some studies use industry dummy 
variables (e.g., Mackay and Phillips, 2005, De Jong et al., 2008, Antoniou et al., 2008) 
and some use more unusual ways of determining industry classifications, (e.g., Kayo 
and Kimura, 2011, use a model based on the levels of dynamism and munificence of the 
industry) but regardless of the method used, more recent empirical results generally find 
that industry does play a significant role in determining capital structure. 
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2.2.1.8 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants and Private Firms 
Private firms can be any size but they are not listed. The relationship between firm level 
capital structure determinants and capital structure appears to be very similar in these 
firms, although, there is a limited amount of empirical evidence. Brav (2009) looks at 
the capital structure and financing of both public private firms in the UK and Goyal et 
al. (2011) look at public and private companies from a sample including observations 
from eighteen European countries. These studies focus on firm level capital structure 
determinants and find similar results to those described above, but there are some 
differences.  
The positive relationship found between tangibility and leverage in listed firms is 
stronger in private firms suggesting that private firms use collateral to reduce their cost 
of debt, because the option of turning to financial markets is unavailable. Once firms 
are able to use financial markets, the cost of debt becomes more competitive and the 
benefit of using collateral becomes redundant.  
Brav (2009) and Goyal et al. (2011) both find the relationship between firm size and 
leverage is weaker in private firms than for listed firms. Goyal et al. (2011) suggest this 
is caused by high transaction costs incurred by private firms. This indicates that private 
firms are less likely to strictly apply the trade-off theory and that the capital structure 
determinants which are linked with the trade-off theory will have weaker relationships 
with leverage in private firms because these firms are less able to maintain an optimal 
level of debt. Goyal et al. (2011) argue that the strong negative relationship they find 
between leverage and profitability indicates that private firms are more likely to apply 
the pecking order theory. 
Private firms with high growth opportunities could have particularly high levels of debt 
because these firms are likely to require large amounts of finance and they cannot off-
set increases in leverage by issuing equity. Although there tends to be a negative 
relationship between growth and leverage in listed firms, the opposite is expected in 
private firms. Goyal et al. (2011) find that this is true. None of the available studies on 
the capital structure determinants of private firms consider liquidity or risk as capital 
structure determinants.  
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Despite the relationships between firm level determinants and capital structure, De Jong 
et al. (2008), Deesomsak et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. (2008) all suggest that 
although firm level factors play an important role in capital structure, these factors do 
not fully account for capital structure choices. This tells us that there must also be 
institution level capital structure determinants contributing to the capital structure 
decision. 
2.2.2 Institutional Capital Structure Determinants  
Institutional capital structure determinants affect all firms from the same country in the 
same way. Institutional determinants include examples such as legal systems, financial 
markets, taxation and the macro-economic conditions of a country. These variables 
have the same response for all the firms within any given country. In prior literature, 
there has been some discussion about the importance of institutional variables. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) conclude that, overall, firm leverage is fairly similar across 
international boundaries. However, they also say that firms in Japan and Continental 
Europe generally have higher debt levels than those in Anglo-American countries but 
the international differences in capital structure are small. However, the countries in 
their study are similar in terms of their economic development. The small differences 
found by Rajan and Zingales (1995) may be exacerbated in samples with greater 
international differences. Booth et al. (2001) look at listed firms from developing 
countries and compare the capital structure of these firms with the sample Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) use. They find evidence that there is little variation in capital structure 
between countries, indicating that institutional factors have a limited effect on capital 
structure. 
However, Booth et al. (2001) make the assumption that the effect of firm specific 
variables is equal in all countries when testing institutional variables. De Jong et al. 
(2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2004) show this is not true. De Jong et al. (2008) suggest 
that institutional factors could explain why the relationships between firm level capital 
structure determinants vary across countries suggesting that institutional factors can 
have an indirect effect on capital structure. Booth et al. (2001), among others, ignores 
this indirect effect and the differing relationships between capital structure and firm 
level capital structure determinants across countries which may give the impression that 
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institutional variables are less significant than they actually are. 
More recent studies on listed firms (e.g., Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008; 
Antoniou et al., 2008), conclude that institutional variables play an important role in 
capital structure. Antoniou et al. (2008: 87) conclude by saying “the capital structure 
decision of the firm is not only the product of its own characteristics, but is also the 
result of the environment and traditions in which it operates”.  
However, there are instances where their effects may not appear significant depending 
on the variation between countries in the sample. For example, if the countries in a 
particular sample are all in the EU, they are likely to have similar financial and legal 
characteristics. A more global approach is required to obtain a more accurate 
representation of the effect of institutional factors. The following discussion comments 
on each institutional capital structure determinant and its effects. 
2.2.2.1 Legal Systems and Enforcement 
The effect of a country’s legal system on capital structure is two-fold. First, the type 
and development of a legal system can affect capital structure and secondly, the 
enforcement of the legal system can also affect capital structure. 
There are two main types of legal systems: common law and civil law. A common law 
system is developed through precedence in the courts and civil law relies on statutes 
predetermined by governmental bodies. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) look at capital 
structure determinants in European firms and find evidence the type of legal system 
does have an impact on capital structure and the development of a country’s legal 
system can play a major role in capital structure decision making. 
Alves and Ferreira (2011) examine how legal systems affect capital structure using a 
sample of listed firms from 30 countries. They also find a connection between legal 
systems and leverage and report a negative relationship between shareholder rights and 
leverage. If shareholder rights are greater, then investors feel more protected which 
could reduce the cost of equity capital to the firm.  
Firms in countries with greater creditor protection and enforcement of legal systems 
may take on less debt because their creditors have greater rights to press them into 
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bankruptcy if they do not meet required interest payments. Taking on debt in these 
environments increases bankruptcy risk, lowering the optimal level of debt. De Jong et 
al. (2008) find evidence of a negative relationship between leverage and creditor right 
protection supporting this, but the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) unlike De Jong et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between creditor right 
protection and leverage. They suggest that creditors may be more willing to lend money 
if they have sufficient protection, should the borrower get into financial difficulty. Bae 
and Goyal (2009) investigate the relationship between legal protection and the size, 
maturity and interest rate spread on bank loans in 48 countries and find that in countries 
with weaker creditor protection, banks reduce loan amounts, shorten loan maturities and 
increase interest rate spreads to protect themselves against defaulters. This would 
suggest a positive relationship between enforcement and leverage which agrees with the 
results Deesomsak et al. (2004) find. 
Based on this, one would expect a greater impact on private firms. If creditor right 
protection is weak then debt financing should be more expensive. Due to greater 
asymmetric information, private firms generally pay a premium on debt financing 
regardless, so once this is incorporated into the cost of debt, debt is expected to be 
particularly expensive. Goyal et al. (2011) finds that private firms, in these 
circumstances, are dependent on professional relationships with banks and other 
financial institutions because they can often help reduce the cost of debt. 
Alves and Ferreira (2011) find leverage and corruption are positively related. They 
suggest that this may be because potential shareholders are not comfortable investing in 
firms in countries where the relationships between firms, government agencies and 
justice is not clearly defined which leaves firms no other option but to issue debt. 
2.2.2.2 Financial Systems 
Although leverage is partially determined by the manager’s capital structure choice, it is 
also partially determined by the availability and cost of finance to the firm. The 
financial systems within a country include stock and bond markets, and banks. Listed 
firms are able to obtain external finance from both financial markets and banks, 
whereas private firms are usually limited to borrowing from banks.  
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Bond Markets: It would be expected that if the bond market in a country is well 
developed then the cost of debt will be more competitive. This should lower the cost of 
debt, resulting in lower interest payments, thus lowering the level of risk to the firm. If 
the firm applies the trade-off theory, the optimal level of debt for firms with access to 
developed bond markets would be higher. Where the pecking order theory is applied a 
positive relationship is also expected. If debt is more readily available and more 
competitively priced, firms may be willing to issue more debt when external finance is 
required.  
The empirical evidence generally supports the theory. De Jong et al. (2008) and 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) both find firms with access to developed bond markets 
tend to have higher debt ratios. Contrary to these findings, Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
report a negative relationship.  De Jong et al. (2008) use a two stage process accounting 
for variations in the relationships between firm level variables across countries. 
However, this method gives all of the observations from the same country the same 
figure for the dependent variable when testing institutional determinants which could 
limit the predictive ability of the model.  
Stock Markets: Based on capital structure theory, a highly developed, easily accessible 
stock market would have a negative relationship with firm debt levels. If equity finance 
is easily accessible and more competitively priced, firms may prefer to issue equity 
which could alter the pecking order. If a firm issues equity instead of debt, should the 
firm enter financial difficulties, it can reduce dividend payments to suit its financial 
position. This may be particularly applicable to firms with high growth prospects who 
prefer not to be constrained by having large amounts of interest payment requirements. 
Generally, the empirical evidence for listed firms supports the theory (Deesomsak et al. 
2004; Kayo and Kimura, 2011). However, De Jong et al. (2008) find insignificant 
results suggesting that further investigation may be required.  
On reflection, the findings of prior literature are not as straightforward as they might 
suggest from a practical perspective. Generally, if there is a developed bond market 
then it is highly likely there will also be an equivalent stock market and strong creditor 
protection. If this is the case then the positive and negative relationships between these 
variables and leverage contradict each other which could identify why the empirical 
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evidence is inconclusive. 
Generally, a country is either bank-orientated or capital market-orientated. This 
separates countries into two categories; one where lending is primarily facilitated by 
financial markets and another, where banks are the main source of finance (Beck and 
Levine, 2002; Antoniou et al., 2008). The ownership structure of firms is often more 
concentrated in bank-orientated economies because firms are unable to, or prefer not to 
raise finance using financial markets. The opposite is also true. Firms in capital market 
orientated economies usually have a less concentrated ownership structure because they 
are able to easily issue equity or debt using financial markets (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
The discussion in Section 2.1.1 suggests that debt can be used to reduce agency costs to 
shareholders. It is more likely that agency costs will be incurred if the firm has a less 
concentrated ownership structure with many detached shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As debt can be used to reduce agency costs, this suggests that firms in 
a country where there is a capital market-orientated economy should have higher debt 
levels, despite the idea that a capital market-orientated economy would suggest better 
developed financial markets and increased equity finance use. If a firm operates in a 
bank-orientated economy, then a more concentrated ownership structure would be 
expected. When the ownership structure of the firm is concentrated, there is a higher 
possibility that the manager will be a major shareholder. Moh’d et al. (1998) found that 
managers reduce the debt levels in their firms when their own personal wealth is tied to 
the firm thus indicating that firms in bank-orientated economies are more likely to have 
lower levels of debt than those in capital market-orientated economies. This connection 
between ownership structures, the agency theory and debt levels, provides an 
alternative explanation to why empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Antoniou et al. (2008) test for differences in capital structure between bank-orientated 
and capital market-orientated institutions and find that there are significant differences. 
The problem with this study is that differing sources of finance may have acted as a 
proxy for something else, and although differences between these two types of 
economies are found, it may not be this which is making the difference. It could be the 
ownership structure of the firm.  
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2.2.2.3 Tax systems 
Most industrialised institutions have what Swoboda and Zechner (1995) describe as a 
classical tax system where interest payments are tax deductible at the corporate level. 
This debt tax shelter is an important benefit of debt and benefits of debt play a major 
role in determining the optimal debt level described by the trade-off theory. The greater 
these benefits are, the more likely the firm is to have high debt levels. Graham (2000) 
finds that the tax shelter can be worth approximately 9% of the company value so being 
able to maximise the debt tax shelter could significantly impact the value of the firm. 
Corporate taxation systems vary between countries. So too will the value of the debt tax 
shield. This means that firms in different countries will have different optimal levels of 
debt. Graham (2003) finds that firms often act in a conservative manner with regards to 
debt and do not fully employ the available tax shelter. This could indicate that they 
prefer to minimise their bankruptcy risk or they make use of other, non-debt tax shields 
which also vary across countries. Blouin et al. (2010) reinvestigate the evidence 
presented by Graham (2003) and find that the marginal benefit of debt decreases as the 
amount of debt increases and in fact, the benefits of increasing debt levels are much 
lower than prior literature suggests. They conclude that the majority of firms have tax-
efficient capital structures. 
Although the tax system itself is specific to each institution, how the manager makes 
use of the tax system is firm specific. Graham (2003) reviews tax related research and 
comments that prior literature usually finds that tax does effect capital structure 
decisions but the actual effect on capital structure is minimal. Bartholdy and Mateus 
(2011) look at debt and taxes of private firms and to an extent, agree but they also find 
that although small, it is significant so should not be ignored.  
2.2.2.4 Macroeconomic Conditions 
The economic conditions of a country change over time depending on market cycles. 
When an economy is expanding, firms are more likely to be able to expand, 
unemployment will decrease and the general population will have increased spending 
power. When spending is high, this increases turnover in firms, resulting in higher 
profit levels which can either be distributed to the shareholders or reinvested into other 
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projects. If firms have high profit levels, it would be expected that they will have high 
levels of internal finance. The application of the pecking order theory suggests firms 
will use internal finance primarily thus, suggesting firms have lower debt levels. When 
the economy is shrinking, firms are less likely to have large amounts of internal cash. 
Their turnover will likely have decreased, and debt often becomes more expensive due 
to financial market conditions. This could alter the pecking order, making equity less 
expensive than debt, reflecting the windows of opportunity theory (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002).  
Firms that apply the trade-off theory may respond differently to macroeconomic 
conditions than those applying the pecking order theory. During a period of economic 
expansion, debt is often more competitively priced and more readily available. If firms 
are more profitable and debt is cheaper due to market conditions, it would be reasonable 
to predict that firms may take on more debt because the risk associated with it is 
reduced if interest payments are lower. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) conduct a study on the capital structure of listed firms and 
macroeconomic conditions and find that firms will issue debt or equity depending on 
market conditions providing empirical evidence supporting the windows of opportunity 
theory. Hackbarth et al. (2006) develop a theoretical model on capital structure, credit 
risk and macroeconomic conditions which suggests that firms will generally be able to 
borrow more in a ‘boom’ period. They go on to say that a firm’s debt capacity can be as 
much as 40% larger than when an economy is shrinking. 
Levy and Hennessy (2007) develop and test a model which explains financing 
throughout the business cycle, but to reduce the effect of agency costs, they stipulate 
that the manager must be a major shareholder. They find that firms tend to increase 
their debt levels when an economy is expanding but economic contractions have a less 
pronounced effect in terms of lowering the debt levels. They also find that leverage 
ratios for more constrained firms tend to remain flatter throughout the business cycle.  
2.3 Small and Medium Enterprises 
SMEs are the focus of this study. This subsection discusses SMEs, their characteristics 
and their connection to the capital structure theories and determinants discussed above. 
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The effect of culture on the capital structure of SMEs is currently unexplored. It cannot 
be assumed that empirical tests on SMEs will provide the same results as those 
conducted on listed firms as there are important differences between the two types of 
firms. Hall et al. (2004:712) say that “SMEs will demonstrate greater inter-country 
variability than large firms” and suggest this is because SMEs are unable to access 
financial markets and are not subject to the same level of international scrutiny. Welsh 
and White (1981), state that small businesses are not simply, small, big businesses. 
SMEs have different organisational structures to listed firms and are often managed by 
a major shareholder indicating that the capital structure determinants described above 
may affect capital structure differently. If this is the case then national culture may also 
affect capital structure differently. SMEs can be divided into three subsamples; micro, 
small and medium and due to the large sample size, the relationship between culture 
and capital structure in these subsamples is examined separately.  
The majority of prior capital structure literature focuses on listed firms. This is largely 
due to the vast amount of information available on these firms. Literature which focuses 
on SMEs is becoming more extensive as data availability improves. Nevertheless, 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009: 319) describe SMEs as “important engines of economic 
growth”. SMEs play a vital role in any economy and make up the majority of firms in 
any country. Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout (2012) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) 
both state that SMEs make up approximately 99% of firms
7
 and are responsible for 
approximately two-thirds of the total turnover and employment in Europe. Although the 
majority of the countries used in this study are outside Europe, there is no reason to 
suggest that these proportions do not apply in other parts of the world. 
2.3.1 Characteristics of SMEs  
SMEs are defined by several factors. One of the most significant differences is that the 
manager is often a major shareholder. Ang (1991) says owners have undiversified 
portfolios and the majority of their personal wealth is tied to the SME. SMEs are often 
firms where an entrepreneur has started their own business. Over time this business has 
grown or at least continued to operate. Additionally, it may have been passed down 
through generations within the same family.  
                                                 
7
 Ghobadian and Gallear (1996) state that within SMEs, Micro firms make up approximately 91.4% of 
SMEs. 
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Cassar and Holmes (2003) look at Australian SMEs. They discuss the ability of SME 
managers to successfully manage their firms. They suggest that managers of smaller 
businesses may have constrained management skills, limited knowledge of the available 
sources of finance and operate “without access to appropriate professional advice” 
(Cassar and Holmes, 2003:124). This could be a particularly important issue in family 
firms as they are more likely to incur intergenerational transfer problems (Ang, 1992) 
where the succeeding manager inherits the role, often regardless of their own personal 
experience and objectives. Fuller-Love (2006) conduct a literature review exploring 
managerial development within SMEs and comment that managers of small firms are 
more likely to be influenced by their education and background and not necessarily 
make the most appropriate managerial choices. SMEs generally have a short life 
expectancy (Ang, 1992) and if the manager’s knowledge and skill set are limited, this 
could play a major role in determining a firm’s life expectancy. 
In terms of their business structure, SMEs are normally very straightforward and have 
few rules and regulations that they must comply with (Ghobadian and Gallear, 1996). A 
more straightforward business structure also allows managers to be flexible and make 
operational changes when required without having to be held accountable to 
shareholders, enabling them to respond to marketplace demands quicker and more 
efficiently.  
There is less separation between managers, customers and low level employees (Torres 
and Julien, 2005), allowing for better communication between the three groups. This 
means that SMEs can tailor their services to meet the needs of specific clients allowing 
them to develop their products or services in a very specific way (Torres and Julien, 
2005; Jordan et al., 1998). This results in large heterogeneity within SMEs and can 
enable them to specialise in areas where larger firms may not be able to which could 
result in them having significant proportions of their specialised markets (Stanworth 
and Curran, 1976). Due to their close proximity, SMEs, their clients and suppliers are 
often able to develop strong relationships which can be largely beneficial to the firm. 
Kinnie et al. (1999) say that the stability of an SME’s profit can often be largely 
dependent on these relationships. In the event of these relationships disintegrating, this 
could significantly, adversely affect the firm’s future profitability and operations. 
Particularly, because on average, SMEs have lower profit margins because they operate 
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in more competitive marketplaces (Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). 
This subsection demonstrates that there are important differences between SMEs and 
listed firms. This could indicate their capital structure policies are different to those of 
larger firms. The capital structure theories (discussed in Section 2.1) may not apply or 
may apply differently to SMEs, and the capital structure determinants (discussed in 
Section 2.2) may not have the same effect on these firms. The following subsections 
discuss the capital structure theories and determinants, and their effects on SME capital 
structure. 
2.3.2 The Application of the Capital Structure Theories to SMEs  
2.3.2.1 The Agency Cost Theory 
SMEs are often managed by a major shareholder so it is expected that they have lower 
agency costs. Debt can be used to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
but this is not necessary to the same extent in most SMEs because agency costs are 
already low. Moh’d et al. (1998) finds support for this in that managers whose own 
wealth is tied to the firm tend to have lower debt levels. It is also true that managers 
who will suffer personally if the firm gets into financial difficulties are likely to perform 
better (Grossman and Hart, 1982). It is expected that if the manager’s personal wealth is 
strongly connected to the success of the firm, particularly as the managers of SMEs 
often have undiversified portfolios (Ang, 1991), this would also result in reduced 
agency costs. A reduction in agency costs is a significant benefit of debt and if the 
benefits of debt are reduced, so too would the optimal level of debt. 
SMEs may suffer from principal agency costs. These arise when the manager is a major 
shareholder and operates the firm in a way that reflects this which can be at the expense 
of minority shareholders. In contrast to the discussion above Ang (1992) argues that 
SMEs may suffer from greater levels of agency costs as the manager may forgo 
investment opportunities to avoid issuing debt, despite the potential for the investment 
opportunity to be beneficial. Ang (1992) also suggests the reason why managers avoid 
debt may be to ensure they retain complete control of their firm. Boyd and Gumpert 
(1983) interview SME owner/managers and find that one of the most important benefits 
to the manager, of having his own firm is “freedom in decision making”. This could 
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indicate disregard for the minority shareholders’ investment. If this is the case, agency 
costs to other shareholders, excluding the manager could be high.  
2.3.2.2 The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory predicts that the cost of capital increases with asymmetric 
information (Donaldson, 1961). SMEs tend to be more opaque than listed firms because 
listed firms are required to produce publically available annual reports including their 
audited financial statements. SMEs are not required to meet the same reporting 
standards and are often much younger than listed firms, therefore lacking in reputation 
and history. 
These differences render SMEs more opaque than listed firms, thus they tend to suffer 
from higher levels of asymmetric information (Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 
2012). When an external finance provider is evaluating a firm as a potential investment 
and there are high levels of asymmetric information, the finance provider may expect a 
higher return as the risk, from their perspective, is greater. Scherr et al. (1993) find that 
banks often see SMEs as more risky to lend to than listed firms and this could be 
partially attributable to asymmetric information levels. As a result, any debt issued to 
SMEs may be more expensive than debt available to listed firms.  
Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) consider Vietnamese SMEs to examine SME capital 
structure in a transitional economy. They consider the importance of relationships with 
banks and find that if there is a strong relationship between a bank and an SME, the 
SME can usually borrow larger amounts. A strong relationship between a bank and an 
SME suggests there will be less asymmetric information and a greater level of trust, 
enabling the bank to lend higher amounts and providing further evidence that 
asymmetric information plays a significant role in SME capital structure. 
Potential equity investors may also expect an above normal rate of return if they 
perceive a higher level of risk. As there is a limited amount of information available 
regarding the firm’s financial positions, the level of risk potential investors perceive 
will be comparatively high. This could result in the initial issuance being undervalued, 
making this a particularly expensive option for existing shareholders. 
Based on the higher cost of debt and the even higher cost of equity, it would seem more 
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important for SMEs to follow the pecking order theory. Both Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Fama and French (2002) conclude that if the costs of asymmetric information are 
high then it is particularly important that firms follow the pecking order theory to 
minimize the cost of capital. 
2.3.2.3 The Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory suggests an optimal level of debt calculated by “trading off” the 
risks and benefits of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). The most significant 
difference between listed firms and SMEs where the trade-off theory is concerned is 
transaction costs. Listed firms have in the past issued or repurchased debt or equity to 
alter their capital structure without having any immediate need for capital (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003), but for SMEs, the transactions costs involved with altering their capital 
structure are significantly higher because they do not have access to financial markets 
(Hall et al., 2004). These costs could outweigh the benefits of maintaining an optimal 
level of debt. 
This could indicate that SMEs find strictly applying the trade-off theory futile to them. 
However, they will still have an optimal debt level, so although it would not be 
expected they would alter their capital structure solely to meet their optimal debt level, 
Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) find that SMEs, when they require external 
finance, choose this finance in a way that allows them to slowly work towards 
achieving their optimal debt level, even if this takes long periods of time. 
Based on the transaction costs associated with altering SME capital structure and the 
high levels of asymmetric information between SMEs and finance providers, the 
pecking order theory appears to fit these firms better. However, it is also expected that, 
when SMEs need to obtain external finance, they will use this as an opportunity to 
move towards their optimal debt level. 
2.3.3 SME Capital Structure and Firm Specific Capital Structure Determinants 
The majority of the firm specific variables discussed in Section 2.2.1 are also proven to 
affect the capital structure of SMEs. The exception to this is liquidity which does not 
appear to have been empirically tested as a capital structure determinant of SMEs. A 
summary of prior literature’s findings is shown in Table 2.2. Generally, the 
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relationships between the firm level determinants and the capital structure of SMEs are 
similar to those of listed firms. However, as SMEs are more likely to apply the pecking 
order theory (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008), stronger relationships are 
expected between the capital structure determinants linked to the pecking order theory 
and leverage than those connected to the trade-off theory. This is supported by the 
evidence shown in Table 2.2. When there is a theoretical connection between both the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory and a capital structure determinant, the 
empirical literature finds evidence that suggests SMEs follow the pecking order theory. 
The most significant difference between listed firms and SMEs in terms of the firm 
level capital structure determinants is growth. In listed firms, a negative relationship is 
reported but in SMEs a positive relationship is reported in most studies. A positive 
relationship indicates application of the pecking order theory, suggesting that firms 
borrow to finance projects that will enable the firm to grow.  
Michaelas et al. (1999) say that growth often creates a need for resources which may be 
unsatisfied by internal finance. SMEs, particularly, may not have sufficient internal 
finance to support growth projects (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). This leaves them no 
option but to seek external finance. Evans (1987) shows that small firms often have 
higher growth rates than large firms so despite their financing restrictions, SMEs are 
still able to increase their size.  
Risk and growth can be closely linked in the sense that high growth projects are often 
high risk. If growth is positively related to leverage, it would be reasonable to expect 
that risk would also be positively related to leverage. However, Table 2.2 shows mixed 
results for this relationship. This may be because each study uses data from different 
countries and unaccounted for institutional factors may affect this relationship or it may 
be because this capital structure determinant is linked to the trade-off theory which is 
not strictly applied by SMEs.  
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Table 2.2 Prior literature's empirical findings regarding the capital structure determinants of Small and Medium Enterprises 
Capital Structure 
Determinant 
Related Theories + - Insignificant Findings 
Size Trade-off (+) 
Michaelas et al. (1998), Cassar & Holmes 
(2003), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Nguyen & 
Ramachandran (2006),  Daskalakis & Psillaki 
(2008), Psillaki & Daskalakis (2009), 
Degryse et al. (2012), Psillaki & Daskalakis 
(2009) 
Van Caneghem & Van Campenhout 
(2012) 
  
Tangibility Trade-off (+) 
Van Caneghem & Van Campenhout (2012), 
Degryse et al. (2012), Sogorb-Mira (2005), 
Psillaki & Daskalakis (2009), Daskalakis & 
Psillaki (2008), Michaelas et al. (1998) 
Cassar & Holmes (2003), Nguyen & 
Ramachandran (2006) 
  
Growth 
Trade-off (-) 
Pecking Order (+) 
Van Caneghem & Van Campenhout (2012), 
Degryse et al. (2012), Sogorb-Mira (2005), 
Daskalakis & Psillaki (2008), Michaelas et al. 
(1998), Cassar & Holmes (2003) 
  
Nguyen & Ramachandran (2006) 
Risk Trade-off (-) 
Michaelas et al. (1998), Nguyen & 
Ramachandran (2006) 
Psillaki & Daskalakis (2009) Cassar & Holmes (2003) 
Profitability  
Trade-off (+) 
Pecking Order (-) 
  Van Caneghem & Van Campenhout 
(2012), Degryse et al. (2012), 
Sogorb-Mira (2005), Psillaki & 
Daskalakis (2009), Daskalakis & 
Psillaki (2008), Michaelas et al. 
(1998), Nguyen & Ramachandran 
(2006), Cassar & Holmes (2003) 
  
Age Trade-off (+) 
  Van Caneghem & Van Campenhout 
(2012), Michaelas et al. (1998), 
Chittenden et al. (1996), Romano et 
al. (2000), Hall et al (2004) 
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The relationship between tangibility and leverage for SMEs is positive, but this 
relationship is stronger in SMEs. As SMEs do not generally have access to financial 
markets and suffer from increased levels of asymmetric information, debt is often more 
expensive. Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout (2012) find results that suggest 
collateral is vital for mitigating agency problems between the firm and the lender, thus 
reducing the lender’s risk and the firm’s cost of debt. Sogorb-Mira (2005), Chittenden 
et al. (1996) and Hall et al. (2000) all comment that the positive relationship between 
tangibility and leverage is much stronger when only long term debt is included in any 
empirical analysis, indicating that tangible assets are used as collateral when firms 
borrow over long time periods. This also indicates that short term debt is less likely to 
be secured and therefore, more expensive. 
De Jong et al. (2008) find that the relationship between leverage and tangibility 
diminishes when financial markets come into play, suggesting that financial markets 
make the cost of debt more competitive. This option is not available to unlisted SMEs 
so to reduce their cost of debt they have no alternative but to use collateral.  
The relationship between firm size and leverage is usually positive. However, Van 
Caneghem and Van Campenhout (2012) find a negative relationship. This could be 
related to the size of SMEs within the sample. A positive relationship is expected in 
small and medium firms but in micro firms this may not be the case. Micro firms in 
their initial periods after commencing trading may have to borrow to commence trading 
and develop their business to the point where it has established itself and become 
profitable, at which point it would be reasonable to expect that they will start to repay 
their debt. If this is the case, then a negative relationship between size and leverage is 
expected for micro firms. Based on the descriptive statistics provided by Van 
Caneghem and Van Campenhout (2012), the firms in their sample appear to be micro 
SMEs so this could explain why their results differ from other studies. 
Table 2.2 shows that the relationship between leverage and profitability is negative as 
would be expected if SMEs apply the pecking order theory. Degryse et al. (2012) looks 
at the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the capital structure of Dutch SMEs 
and find that SMEs which are highly profitable use their profits to reduce debt. They 
also find that SMEs are more likely to repay short term debt than long term debt and 
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suggest this is because short term debt is more expensive and can be amortized more 
easily. 
As previously discussed, industry is a significant influence on capital structure. 
However, Jordan et al. (1998) find evidence that industry is not an important factor in 
SME capital structure. They argue that SMEs are often so specialized and operate in 
niche markets that wider industry influences on capital structure are limited. Hall et al. 
(2000) and Degryse et al. (2012) find that despite there being great heterogeneity within 
industries, industry does play an important role in SME capital structure. Degryse et al. 
(2012) also comment that although industry is significant, the intra-industry variation 
indicates that many other factors are also important.  
Additionally, the age of the firm is tested as an SME capital structure determinant. This 
variable is not considered in studies on listed firms. However, it could be linked to both 
the trade-off and the pecking order theories. If the firm is older it may be more 
established and have less information asymmetries so its cost of debt is lower. When 
the cost of debt is lower, the trade-off theory suggests the optimal debt level is higher. 
However, the empirical evidence on SMEs has conclusively finds a negative 
relationship (see Table 2.2). This indicates that young firms are not able to facilitate 
growth without leverage so in a firm’s early years, it will borrow in order to establish 
itself, suggesting the application of the pecking order theory. Once the firm matures, it 
will then start to reduce its debt levels. The relationship between age and capital 
structure could be similar to that between size and capital structure as very small firms 
borrow in their initial periods (when they are very small) and then they repay the debt 
as they become more mature (increase in size). Then once firms become large (more 
like the size of a listed firm) they borrow more in accordance with the trade-off theory 
and increase debt levels. 
When considering the firm level capital structure determinants and the capital structure 
theories for SMEs, the empirical results indicate the application of the pecking order 
theory with greater consistency than the trade-off theory. This is in line with 
expectations when taking into consideration the high levels of asymmetric information 
which probably increases the cost of external finance. Additionally, as the transaction 
costs associated with altering a firm’s capital structure are high then the application of 
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the trade-off theory is limited because the cost of maintaining an optimal debt level will 
outweigh the benefits. Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) find evidence to support 
this and say that despite finding evidence that firms apply a funding source hierarchy, 
they also find that greater trust is placed in firms that aim to reach a target level of 
leverage.  
2.3.4 SME Capital Structure and Institutional Capital Structure Determinants 
This subsection changes the focus of the discussion from firm level variables to 
institutional variables. Like the firm level capital structure determinants, the effect of 
the institutional determinants is expected to be similar to that of listed firms although 
some differences are expected. However, both cross-country studies and prior literature 
which investigates the effect of institutional factors on SME capital structure are scare. 
Hall et al. (2004) look at the capital structure of SMEs from eight European countries. 
Although, they do not empirically examine institutional capital structure differences, 
they comment that the differences found in leverage ratios and variation in the effect of 
the determinants between countries indicates that institutional factors play a role. 
However, they do not investigate which institutional factors or what impact they have.  
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) and Psillaki and Daskalakis, (2009) both consider the 
impact of country and firm factors on SME capital structure. They both conclude that 
firm level capital structure determinants play a more important role in determining SME 
capital structure than institutional factors. However, these two studies only consider 
European countries. Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) compare the capital structure of 
SMEs in only two countries: France and Greece. This severely limits the scope of the 
study. They say that both countries have similar legal systems and are both subject to 
trends in the regulation of their banking systems as part of EU law. Psillaki and 
Daskalakis (2009) look at a slightly wider sample from four European countries 
(France, Greece, Italy and Portugal) but these countries are also subject to similarities, 
again limiting the scope of the study.  
Joeveer (2012) evaluates the effect of institutional variables on small firms’ capital 
structure, comparing listed firms against unlisted firms using a sample of ten western 
European firms. Joeveer (2012) finds a positive relationship between macroeconomic 
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conditions and leverage suggesting firms borrow more during periods of economic 
growth. Michaelas et al. (1999) only use data from the UK but considers 
macroeconomic conditions, finding long term debt is positively related to changes in 
economic growth. However, during periods of recession, they also find that SMEs are 
more likely to have higher levels of short term debt which subside as economic 
conditions improve.  
Joeveer (2012) also looks at institution level SME capital structure determinants and 
looks at the effect of corruption, shareholder and creditor right protection. This paper 
finds that creditor right protection is negatively related to leverage suggesting that when 
creditors have greater rights over the SME, SMEs are less likely to borrow. They also 
find shareholder right protection is negatively related to leverage suggesting that the 
manager of an SME will borrow less, in order to protect the wealth of the shareholders 
and prevent them taking any action against the manager. Finally, the corruption index 
was found to be positively related to leverage, suggesting that SMEs feel more 
comfortable borrowing when there is less evidence of corruption. 
Further to the capital structure determinants more traditionally tested, Romano et al. 
(2000) conduct a survey on SMEs in Australia, more specifically, family firms and how 
they finance themselves. They find evidence that family control and business objectives 
are closely associated with debt. They also suggest that behavioural factors (e.g., the 
need for an owner to be in control) can also effect capital structure decisions. Michaelas 
et al. (1998) argue that capital structure is a result of internal and external factors 
combined with managerial behaviour and Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) find 
evidence that manager behaviour can be important in obtaining short term finance.  
This indicates that the capital structure of an SME is not only the result of firm and 
institutional factors, but is also influenced by the manager’s behaviour, the business 
objectives they have developed and their determination to achieve their business 
objectives. National culture plays an important role in collective behaviour. It can 
determine the importance of a range of characteristics and values which can result in a 
variety of different actions, both in organisations and an individual’s daily life.  
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter begins by discussing the capital structure theories: the agency theory, the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Based on this discussion, prior literature 
suggests that firms often apply aspects of both the trade-off and the pecking order 
theories simultaneously. Following on from this, prior studies which have empirically 
tested several capital structure determinants are then discussed. The most commonly 
tested capital structure determinants are firm size and tangibility which are both 
positively related with debt and firm growth, firm risk and profitability, which are 
usually found to be negatively related with debt. Section 2.2.2 discusses institution level 
capital structure determinants and concludes that legal systems and strength of 
enforcement, macroeconomic conditions, financial systems and tax systems can all, also 
affect the debt levels within firms. This chapter then continues by discussing SMEs 
(Section 2.3) and the specific characteristics that differentiate them from other firms. 
The discussion then turns to the capital structure determinants and how these 
specifically affect SMEs. Section 2.3 concludes that there are some differences between 
the capital structure of SMEs and that of listed firms. SMEs are generally more likely to 
apply the pecking order theory than the trade-off theory. The discussion in Section 2.3.3 
indicates that the relationships between debt and the previously tested capital structure 
determinants reflect this. 
The review of the prior literature presented in this chapter indicates that prior studies on 
the capital structure determinants of SMEs have generally focused on firm level factors 
(e.g., Michaelas et al., 1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Nguyen 
and Ramachandran, 2006; Degryse et al., 2012; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 
2012) and very few use samples from more than one country (i.e., Hall et al., 2004; 
Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). Those which look at 
institution level capital structure determinants are scarcer (i.e., Joeveer, 2012). The 
present study complements these prior studies in the following way. Currently, the 
effect of national culture on SME capital structure is unexplored. There are three studies 
(Sekely and Collins, 1988; Gleason et al., 2000; Chui et al. 2002) which look at the 
effect of national culture on the capital structure of listed firms (discussed in the 
following chapter). However, as a result of the characteristics of SMEs, the known 
capital structure determinants can affect the capital structure of these firms differently 
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when compared to their listed counterparts so it cannot be assumed that the role of 
culture will be consistent across all types of firms. Hence, this study contributes to prior 
literature by empirically testing the effect of national culture on the capital structure of 
SMEs. 
The next chapter focuses on national culture and how it has been quantified in order 
enable empirical testing in various contexts. The discussion then turns to prior literature 
which has used these methods of quantification in both a managerial and regulatory 
context. The chapter continues by focusing on literature which investigates the 
relationship between culture and the capital structure of listed firms and closes with a 
section developing the hypotheses to test in this study. 
Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant and Development of 
Hypotheses 
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Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant 
and Development of Hypotheses 
Hofstede (1980) was one of the first to attempt to quantify culture. He defines culture as 
“Collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from those of another. Culture in this sense, is a system of collectively held 
values” (Hofstede, 1980:21). He claims that people develop values and thought 
processes as a result of their home life as a child. These values are then reinforced 
during education and later on, during working life.  
Cultural values affect people and it is people that are the managers of firms. The 
manager of a firm is responsible for the decision making within the firm so intuition 
would suggest that cultural influences could affect managerial decision making. Prior 
literature in the business management discipline considers several managerial decisions 
which are effected by culture, some of which are discussed in Section 3.3. 
The following subsection discusses methods of measuring culture, firstly Hofstede’s 
cultural values, followed by Schwartz’s cultural dimensions (1994 and 2008). 
Subsequently, the discussion changes to the culture’s influence on managerial decision 
making (Section 3.4). Section 3.5 provides the hypotheses development. Section 3.6 
concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Hofstede’s Cultural Values 
Hofstede conducts a survey on employees from forty countries from the same 
multinational firm between 1968 and 1972. He uses the responses to develop his 
cultural values: Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Individualism and 
Masculinity. These cultural values are intended for use within organisations but also 
apply when dealing with wider cultural issues. 
Uncertainty Avoidance: This cultural value measures a culture’s ability to deal with an 
uncertain future. The higher the uncertainty avoidance value is, the greater the need for 
absolute truth and the greater lengths people will go to in order to reduce or protect 
themselves against future uncertainty. This value combines rule orientation, 
employment stability and stress. It is human nature to attempt to cope with the 
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uncertainties of the future, often through the use of religion, technology, insurance or 
law making. In a business context this could indicate that firms will protect themselves 
through the use of insurance, attempting maintain low risk operations or carrying out 
thorough due diligence on any proposed investments. 
Power Distance: This cultural value considers the level of equality or lack thereof 
within an organisation. It incorporates prestige, wealth and power and evaluates a 
supervisor’s decision making style and a subordinate’s views and opinions regarding 
disagreements with supervisors. This can be directly applied in organisations and more 
specifically, to the distribution of power between employees and an employer. A high 
score in this cultural value indicates great separation between superiors and 
subordinates. 
Individualism: This cultural value considers the relationship between the individual and 
the prevailing collective in any given cultural area. It looks closely at the manner in 
which people live and work together (nuclear families, extended families or tribes) and 
if individualism is accepted or considered as type of alienation. In organisations, a high 
individualism value indicates that employees work on a more individual level and a low 
value would signify employees work together and the firm takes responsibility for the 
collective unit. 
Masculinity: A high score in this cultural value represents a culture where people are 
more assertive and value advancement, earnings and training. In a business context 
these values could lead to an aggressive, competitive work place. The opposite of 
masculinity is femininity which is more nurturing and values a friendly atmosphere, 
physical conditions and cooperation. Employees working in organisations in countries 
with low Masculinity values are more considerate of one another and work together 
harmoniously. 
Hofstede and Bond (1988) later add a fifth cultural value: Confucian Dynamism. This 
cultural value measures the long or short term orientation of a culture by considering 
society’s time perspective towards the gratification of people’s needs. Short term 
orientation suggests that people value immediate gratification whereas long term 
orientation values virtuous living with thrift and persistence as key values. Applying 
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this to organisations, in a country with low Confucian Dynamism, a manager may 
prioritise short term profit or growth objectives which could jeopardize the longevity of 
future operations. 
Hofstede’s dimensions, despite a number of criticisms,8 are applied by a wide range of 
researchers owing to their “clarity, parsimony and resonance with managers” (Kirkman 
et al., 2006:286). Hofstede’s dimensions enable a comprehensive and straightforward 
means of dimensionalizing and quantifying national culture (Shackleton and Ali, 1990; 
Triandis, 1982). However, this does not mean the study of culture should end here. 
Schwartz endeavoured to build on Hofstede’s cultural values and created his own 
cultural dimensions. 
3.2 Schwartz’s Cultural Dimensions – 1994 and 2008 
Schwartz’s 1994 cultural dimensions build on Hofstede’s cultural values and provide an 
alternative method of quantifying culture. Hofstede’s cultural values are based on 
culture in organisations whereas Schwartz takes a more general approach. He views 
culture as “the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, and values 
prevalent among people in a society” (Schwartz, 2006:138). Schwartz’s earlier cultural 
dimensions are developed based on prior cultural theory and he uses his survey results 
to empirically test them. 
Schwartz (1994) uses survey data from 38 countries and consists of a more diverse 
range of respondents than Hofstede’s survey.9 Schwartz surveys university students and 
school teachers. Hofstede himself claims that cultural values are installed during 
childhood, reinforced throughout education so Schwartz’s choice of subjects seems 
ideal. 
Schwartz’s original survey takes place between 1988 and 1992 and consists of 56 value 
items, each followed with a short description of their meaning (Schwartz, 1992). 
Respondents receive the survey in their native language and rate the importance of each 
value item as a guiding principle in their own life. Schwartz takes value items from 
                                                 
8
 Criticisms and limitations of Hofstede’s cultural values are discussed further in Section 6.4. 
9
 Hofstede only surveyed people from one international, high-technology company so respondents are 
generally skilled professionals. 
Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant and Development of 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
41 
sources around the world to prevent a Western bias and captures individuals’ responses 
from every inhabited continent. Of the original 56 value items, only 44 are directly 
connected to the theory of cultural orientations and are found to have similar meanings 
across countries. These value items are then sorted into the relevant dimensions and the 
mean scores of each value item is combined to calculate the dimension score for each 
country. 
Schwartz’s 1994 dimensions are designed to capture culture’s influence on the daily 
decision making of individuals. They are created in an integrated non-orthogonal 
system, which explains his use of the two-dimensional smallest space diagram to 
illustrate his dimensions. In contrast, Hofstede’s dimensions are conceptualised as 
individual level dimensions (Schwartz, 2006) rendering Hofstede’s cultural values 
disjointed or disconnected whereas Schwartz’s cultural dimensions provide a more 
encompassing view of culture. 
Schwartz’s original cultural dimensions were Hierarchy, Conservatism, Harmony, 
Egalitarian Commitment, Intellectual Autonomy, Affective Autonomy and Mastery. 
Figure 3.1 shows which value items belong in each dimension and how the dimensions 
relate to each other. They are loosely created as three pairs of opposites: Conservatism 
vs. Autonomy (Intellectual and Affective), Mastery vs. Harmony and Hierarchy vs. 
Egalitarian Commitment. These dimensions can also be classified into two wider pairs 
of dimensions: Self-enhancement (Mastery and Hierarchy) vs. Self-transcendence 
(Egalitarian Commitment and Harmony) and Openness to Change (Conservatism vs. 
Autonomy). These broader dimensions allow culture to be analysed on another level, 
depending on what is most appropriate for the study in question. Chui et al. (2002) uses 
these wider cultural dimensions when investigating culture as a capital structure 
determinant in listed firms.
10
 The following paragraphs provide further discussion on 
each cultural dimension. 
Mastery: In a culture with a high Mastery score, individuals place value in mastering 
the social environment through self-assertion. Value items in this dimension include 
Ambitious, Independent, Capable, Daring and Choosing own goals. People in cultures 
with high Mastery values are expected to pursue their own personal objectives in a 
                                                 
10
 Chui et al. (2002) is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4. 
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daring and aggressive manner and this behaviour is considered normal within society.  
 
 
 
 
 
Harmony: Harmony is the opposite dimension to Mastery and contains the value items 
World of Beauty, Protecting Environment and Unity with Nature. A high score in this 
dimension indicates that people have no particular stance regarding individuality or 
collectivism. People with these values oppose those who wish to change the world 
through self-assertion and exploitation of people and resources.  
Hierarchy: Value items in this dimension include Wealth, Social Power and Authority. 
This dimension has a high score when there is a clear hierarchical system within 
Figure 3.1. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis diagram, 
showing Schwartz’s cultural dimensions from 1994 and their value 
items. Schwartz (1994:102) 
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society. The distribution of power and resources is unequal, with those at the top 
receiving the majority and having considerable influence and social power over others. 
The inclusion of the value item Humble in this dimension demonstrates that those at the 
top of the hierarchy accept the system and those at the bottom respect it and do not 
challenge it.  
Egalitarian Commitment: This dimension consists of the value items Equality, Social 
Justice, Responsible and Honest and is the opposite dimension to Hierarchy. It 
represents a culture where individuals are more equal. Individuals will pursue their own 
personal interests but will also demonstrate a voluntary commitment to promoting the 
welfare of the less fortunate, perhaps by undertaking charity work or contributing 
towards charitable campaigns.  
Conservatism: This dimension is directly opposite the Autonomy dimensions below and 
includes the value items Family Security, Respecting Tradition, Politeness and Self 
Discipline. Cultures with high Conservatism scores, value close knit, harmonious 
relationships within their communities. The individual’s personal objectives coincide 
with the objectives of the group and individuals avoid actions or inclinations which may 
cause disturbance in the traditional order. 
Intellectual and Affective Autonomy: High values in these dimensions represent a 
culture where the individual pursues their own personal objectives. Affective 
Autonomy includes the value items; Varied Life, Exciting Life, Pleasure and Self-
Indulgent and focuses on the idea of self-gratification. Individuals aim to improve their 
own quality of life by satisfying their own personal objectives. Cultures with high 
Intellectual Autonomy (Value items include Broadmindedness, Creativity and Curious) 
seek self-satisfying intellectual stimulation and hedonism.
11
 
Previous research suggests that Schwartz’s cultural dimensions capture more aspects of 
national culture than Hofstede’s (Ng, 2007; Steenkamp, 2001). Steenkamp (2001) finds 
that Schwartz’s 1994 dimensions capture elements of culture that Hofstede’s omit. For 
example, the Hierarchy and Egalitarianism dimensions. This additional aspect to 
Schwartz’s dimensions suggests they are able to explain greater cultural variation than 
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 The pursuit of personal pleasure. 
Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant and Development of 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
44 
Hofstede’s cultural values. Schwartz and Ros (1995) find that while Hofstede 
categorises Western European countries and the United States as individualistic 
cultures, these countries have significantly different values in six of Schwartz’s cultural 
dimensions.  
Schwartz (2005) comments, when discussing Hofstede’s work, that major cultural 
changes have taken place in the last twenty years and may render Hofstede’s cultural 
values inapplicable in today’s society. Although changes in cultural values take place 
slowly (Schwartz, 2008), they are significant and periodic alterations to any 
quantification of culture is required. Based on this argument, Schwartz (2008) expands 
his original value survey. He combines previous survey results with more recent data 
from 75 countries, collected between 1993 and 2007. Using this more recent data he 
revises his original dimensions. The revised 2008 dimensions are shown in Figure 2.2. 
The 2008 dimensions are very similar to those from 1994. The larger number of 
countries enables Schwartz to generate scores for his dimensions for additional 
countries. The methods he uses for analysing survey data are similar to those used in 
1994 but the additional data results in different means for each value item and 
consequently, different scores for each dimension. 
The dimensions themselves change slightly between 1994 and 2008. There are two 
noticeable differences between them: Conservatism in the 1994 dimensions is renamed 
Embeddedness in the 2008 dimensions and Egalitarian Commitment from the 1994 
dimensions is now entitled Egalitarianism. The underlying value items in these 
dimensions are almost identical so although these dimensions have changed their 
names, the cultural values they represent, do not change.  
When comparing Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the value items within each dimension do 
not generally change but there are a few which have moved from one dimension to the 
another (e.g., Influential has moved from Hierarchy to Mastery and Freedom has 
moved from Egalitarian Commitment to Intellectual Autonomy). A further, more subtle 
difference is that the two smallest space diagrams are organised differently. In both 
diagrams each dimension is adjacent and opposite the same dimensions but the latest 
diagram is almost a mirror image of the previous one. Schwartz (2008) does not provide 
insight into why this is the case.  
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The present study employs Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions to quantify culture 
when considering it as a capital structure determinant as they include the widest range 
of countries, and are calculated using Schwartz’s latest methods and most recent data. 
3.3 Cultural Values Applied in a Business Context 
Economists are often reluctant to view culture as a possible determinant of economic 
phenomena. It could be argued that culture and its possible effect on economic 
discourse is so vague that defining and testing hypotheses is difficult (Guiso, 2006). 
Despite this, through the application of cultural values, dimensions and clustering, 
culture is tested and found relevant as a determinant of several managerial and 
regulatory decisions. 
Culture affects the decision making of people and the managers of organisations are 
people. This makes it reasonable to suggest that culture could affect a variety of 
decisions including those made within firms. High or low values in a particular 
Figure 3.2. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis diagram, showing 
Schwartz’s revised cultural dimensions from 2008 and their value items. 
Schwartz (2008:66) 
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dimension may manifest in certain characteristics that could influence decision making 
within firms.  
Gray (1988) links culture to the development of accounting systems. He identifies four 
societal values (Professionalism, Uniformity, Conservatism and Secrecy) and uses 
combinations of Hofstede’s cultural values to develop a hypothesis for each societal 
value. These hypotheses can then be used to predict certain characteristics within a 
country’s accounting systems.12  
These hypotheses are created on a theoretical basis and are tested empirically by Salter 
and Niswander (1995). This paper uses data from 29 countries and concludes that not 
only do they have significant explanatory power for accounting practices, the strength 
of the hypotheses increases in countries with more developed financial markets and 
taxation rules.  
The literature investigating the effect of culture on a variety of managerial decisions 
usually takes one of three approaches. Prior studies either apply Hofstede’s cultural 
values, Schwartz’s cultural dimensions or Gray’s hypotheses. Alternatively some prior 
studies have grouped countries into culture clusters, but when doing so it is common to 
base the culture clusters on Hofstede’s cultural values. 
First, Kogut and Singh (1988) look at the relationship between culture and foreign 
market entry modes. They examine 228 entries into the United States market, based on 
the choice between acquisition, wholly owned greenfield and joint venture. They 
develop two hypotheses, the first focusing on the cultural distance between the US and 
the origin of the investing firm and the second on attitudes towards Uncertainty 
Avoidance within a culture. They find evidence supporting both of their hypotheses, 
concluding that culture does effect this managerial decision. 
Subsequently, Harrison et al. (1994) use Power Distance, Individualism and Confucian 
Dynamism from Hofstede’s values to investigate differences in organisational design, 
management planning and control systems. They survey 800 organisations in Anglo-
American and East Asian countries and find that Anglo-American nations place greater 
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 A more detailed description of Gray’s hypotheses can be found in Appendix 1. 
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emphasis on decentralisation and responsibility centres whereas East Asian cultures 
focus more on group-centred decision making. 
Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) investigate the impact of culture on methods of managing 
human resources, more specifically, compensation practices. They create four 
hypotheses based on status, performance, social benefits and programs. They use 
Hofstede’s cultural values and cross-sectional data from 24 countries to test them. 
Although they do not find conclusive results for all of their hypotheses, they do find 
sufficient evidence to be able to conclude that culture  can influence some aspects of 
human resource management, particularly status and employee benefits. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) look at the effect of distance, language and culture on 
intra-country stockholdings and trades. They specifically consider the trading of Finnish 
stock because Finnish investors can be divided into two distinct cultural groups: 
Swedish and Finnish speaking. These two groups not only have different languages, 
they have different cultures so this study examines cultural differences within one 
country. They find that investors are more likely to invest in Finnish firms which are in 
the same cultural group as the investor, communicate in the investor’s language and 
have chief executives of the same cultural background. 
Kwok and Tadesse (2006) examine the relationship between the predominant financial 
system in a country and culture. They look at the financial systems of 41 countries. 
Using Hofstede’s cultural values they find that countries with high Uncertainty 
Avoidance scores are more likely to have bank-based financial systems. This could be 
because financial markets are associated with higher levels of uncertainty regarding 
future cash flows, whereas bank finance tends to be more predictable. 
Nabar and U-Thai (2007) investigate the relationship between culture and earnings 
management using a sample of 30 countries and Hofstede’s cultural values. They find 
that countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance scores tend to have higher levels of 
earnings management. This suggests investors in cultures with high Uncertainty 
Avoidance prefer firms to meet their expectations and firms are more likely to manage 
their earnings in accordance. Despite this, they also conclude after supplementary 
analysis that Uncertainty Avoidance is associated with earnings discretions but not 
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earnings smoothing which implies that where possible managers choose accounting 
policies which minimizes shocks to investors but they do not resort to unfavourable 
methods. 
Tsakumis et al. (2007) investigate the effect of culture on tax compliance. They use 
Hofstede’s cultural values to investigate the effect culture has on tax evasion and 
compliance. They develop four hypotheses, one for each of the cultural values and find 
that Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance are positively related to tax evasion 
and Individualism is negatively related to tax evasion. There is also some weak 
evidence that Masculinity is positively related to tax evasion. They conclude that 
countries are more likely to have high levels of tax evasion if they have high 
Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance and low Individualism. 
Culture is also linked to auditor choice. Hope et al. (2008) use Gray’s secrecy 
hypothesis
13
 to investigate the effects of culture on auditor choice, more specifically, 
the choice between a ‘big four’ auditor and a smaller firm. They present evidence that 
using smaller audit firms usually indicates that the audit will be lower quality and 
therefore, less invasive. Using a sample from 37 countries, they find evidence that 
countries classified as more secretive prefer to use smaller audit firms. They went on to 
say that their results indicate a link between national culture and financial reporting 
quality. 
Culture is also linked to the success of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Chakrabarti et al. (2009) uses Hofstede’s cultural values to measure the cultural 
distance between the acquirer and the acquired. Using a sample of 800 cross border 
acquisitions between 1991 and 2004, they find that mergers and acquisitions tend to 
perform better in the longer term when they come from countries that are very different 
compared to culturally similar acquisitions. When there is greater cultural disparity the 
acquirer tends to be more selective in the deals they opt for and perform more thorough 
due diligence. Although it could be argued that the better performance is a result of the 
increased due diligence and not culture, the increased due diligence performed by 
managers, shows that they acknowledge cultural differences can effect operations, when 
                                                 
13
 This hypothesis predicts that countries with high Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance and low 
Individualism and Masculinity will be more secretive. 
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making business decisions. 
Shao et al. (2010) examine the relationship between culture and dividend policy, using 
Schwartz’s 1994 dimensions. They use a sample from 21 countries and find that 
countries with high Conservatism scores usually pay higher dividends and countries 
with high Mastery scores tend to pay out lower dividends. They explain this by 
suggesting that countries with high Mastery scores prefer the firms they have invested 
in to reinvest and potentially increase the capital value of their investment rather than 
distributing large dividends. However, cultures with high Conservatism values prefer 
firms to distribute earnings because there is less risk to the investor, despite there being 
lower growth prospects.  
Siegel et al. (2011) look at the effect of culture on personal investments from an 
international perspective. This study considers how the distance between Egalitarianism 
values
14
 affects international investment. Egalitarianism is a dimension that values 
social justice. A high score in this dimension indicates low tolerance towards market 
power abuses and a desire to protect the less powerful. They find that Egalitarianism 
can influence the cross-border flow of various types of investment. They find that 
people tend to invest in countries with similar Egalitarianism scores to their own 
implying that people prefer to invest in countries with similar opinions regarding social 
justice. This paper also finds evidence that those who do not consider this evidence are 
more likely to suffer loses to their investment portfolios.  
Culture is also linked to financial reporting in prior literature on several occasions post 
Gray (1988). Zarzewski (1996) investigate the effects of culture on accounting 
harmonization. They collect data from 256 companies from seven countries to 
investigate the effect of Gray’s secrecy hypothesis and find that culture affects 
underlying disclosure practices but they find no evidence that suggests culture hinders 
accounting harmonization. Jaggi and Low (2000) consider the relationship between 
culture and financial disclosures. They apply Hofstede’s cultural values to a sample of 
964 firms from 37 countries and test the effect of culture, market forces and legal 
systems on financial disclosures. They find that culture has no impact on financial 
disclosures in common law countries but they find mixed results from code law 
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 Egalitarianism is from Schwartz’s 2008 dimensions. 
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countries, suggesting that culture affects financial disclosures in certain circumstances. 
Ding et al. (2005) look at the differences between national Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
and whether they can be partially attributed to culture. They conduct a survey which 
compares local GAAP to IFRS in 52 countries. They record their results in two indexes: 
One measures the absence of specific rules on recognition/measurement or disclosure, 
the second measures divergence from IFRS by recording inconsistencies that could lead 
to differences for many or some enterprises. They use Hofstede’s cultural values and 
Schwartz’s cultural dimensions and find evidence that culture is related to their 
divergence index but not their absence index. 
The above literature shows that culture does affect several decision making processes 
regarding both management and regulatory issues so it is reasonable to suggest that 
culture could affect the capital structure. The next sub-section discusses prior literature 
which focuses on the effects of culture on the capital structure of listed firms. 
3.4 Prior Evidence on Culture and Capital Structure 
Empirical evidence linking culture to capital structure is very scarce and this 
relationship is only tested in listed firms. The earliest study examining the potential link 
between culture and capital structure is Sekely and Collins (1988). This study puts 
countries into cultural groups based on the Broek and James models (Broek and Webb, 
1973; James 1976). These two studies group countries into cultural realms
15
 based on 
the composition, arrangement and integration of particular traits within the country. 
Cultural realms enable the study of culture through the evaluation of similarities and 
differences within, and between them. Apart from the out-dated dataset and reliance on 
the Broek and James models, which are also outdated, the interpretation of the results of 
this study is limited. Clustering countries can only establish a connection between 
capital structure and culture. It cannot provide an indication of which cultural values 
effect capital structure and in what way.  
Subsequent to Sekely and Collins (1988), this issue is revisited by Gleason et al. (2000) 
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 The cultural realms used by Sekely and Collins (1988) study are: Anglo-American, Latin American, 
West Central Europe, Mediterranean Europe, Scandinavia, Indian Peninsula and South East Asia. 
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who look capital structure and culture using Hofstede’s dimensions. This study uses a 
cross-sectional sample from 1994 of 198 retail firms from fourteen European countries. 
The countries are arranged into clusters, based on Hofstede’s cultural values and the 
variation between and within the cultural groups is tested. This paper concludes there is 
a significant relationship between the capital structure of retail firms and culture, but 
like Sekely and Collins (1998) the methodology prevents any further analysis into 
which cultural values might affect capital structure and in what way. 
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Figure 3.3 Diagram showing linkages between the Cultural Dimensions and Capital 
Structure Decisions from Chui et al. (2002)
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Chui et al. (2002) is the most recent paper which looks at the relationship between 
culture and capital structure using Schwartz’s 1994 cultural dimensions. This study is 
the most similar to the present study. This paper considers listed companies from 22 
countries (including China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Taiwan and Thailand which 
are all used in this study) using cross-sectional data from 1996. They also use data from 
1991 and 1994 but only for robustness purposes. This paper predicts that listed firms in 
cultures with high Mastery and Conservatism scores will have lower levels of debt 
based on Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows the links between the Conservatism and 
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Mastery
16
 dimensions and the decision making process behind capital structure policy. 
Relevant value items from each dimension are used to predict the effect that the 
dimensions have on the use of debt finance in capital structure. Chui et al. (2002) 
highlights items such as preserving public image, security and conformity, harmonious 
working relationships from Conservatism and retaining control and greater emphasis on 
individual success from Mastery. These qualities all lead to decision making that 
suggests managers will avoid debt financing. Chui et al. (2002) conclude their 
hypotheses are correct; listed companies in countries with higher values for the 
Conservatism and Mastery cultural dimensions appear to have lower levels of debt. 
The latest study in this area is Chui et al. (2002) and this study uses cross sectional data 
which is almost twenty years old. One of the aims of this investigation is to expand on 
these conclusions and explore the connection between culture and capital structure 
further. This study uses a more recent, large, panel data sample. It uses the most recent 
cultural dimensions and considers unlisted SMEs instead of listed firms, which are the 
subject of previous studies. The next section provides the development of the 
hypotheses to be tested in this study. This section uses risk and control to develop 
connections between the cultural dimensions and the capital structure of SMEs in order 
to develop hypotheses which enable the empirical testing of the relationship between 
culture and SME capital structure. 
3.5 Hypotheses Development 
Chui et al. (2002) provide some evidence that some cultural dimensions are relate to the 
capital structure of listed firms. This and the ample evidence that the capital structure 
theories and determinants can have different effects on the capital structure of SMEs 
than listed firms (Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Van Caneghem and Van 
Campenhout, 2012) indicate that it cannot be assumed that culture effects capital 
structure in SMEs the same way it does listed firms. Thus, culture’s influence on the 
capital structure of SMEs remains unknown. 
There are two key issues to be taken into consideration when testing cultural 
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 Although Chui et al. (2002) refer to Mastery throughout their study they actually test the Self-
Enhancement dimensions from Schwartz’s wiser cultural dimensions which is Mastery and Hierarchy 
combined. 
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dimensions as SME capital structure determinants. The first is what drives managers’ 
decisions regarding capital structure. Second, is to consider which of these decision 
drivers could be connected to the manager’s culture and are not fully attributable to the 
capital structure theories and determinants commonly tested. Prior literature suggests 
that risk (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009) and control 
(Romano et al., 2001; Nyguman and Ramachandran, 2006; Nini et al., 2009) are two 
significant factors behind the capital structure decision making process of managers. 
Additionally, risk and control are both areas which vary between cultures (Hofstede, 
1980; Schwartz, 1994; Bontempo et al., 1997; Bhimani, 1999).  
Figure 3.4 is a flow diagram showing the links between Schwartz’s cultural dimensions 
and the debt ratios of SMEs. This diagram provides an overview of the following 
discussion. It shows the relevant value items within each dimension, the characteristics 
they are likely to bring out in a manager and the resulting effect for the SME and its 
leverage ratios. 
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3.5.1 Risk 
The application of the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are both connected 
to risk tolerance. The trade-off theory suggests that every firm has an optimal level of 
debt where the risks and benefits of debt are balanced. The pecking order theory 
suggests a maximum proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure before the firm 
risks bankruptcy. This optimal or maximum debt level varies depending on several firm 
factors including what the manager perceives as an acceptable level of risk. 
SMEs are usually dependent on debt finance when internal finance is insufficient (Van 
Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). A high debt level increases the volatility of 
earnings (Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009) and therefore, firm risk which in the context of 
SMEs is particularly important because risk is directly associated with SME failure 
(Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). SMEs tend to be less developed and diversified, which 
means they are generally less able to absorb a period of poor performance (Joeveer, 
2012) so managers’ attitude towards risk can play a vital role in SME survival. 
Within SMEs, the manager is usually a major shareholder and his personal wealth is 
usually linked very closely to the success of the firm. On that basis, when making 
capital structure decisions the manager’s personal attitude and perceptions of risk are 
particularly relevant. Small business owners tend to have high levels of risk tolerance as 
their entrepreneurial nature renders them in a position where they take on uninsurable 
risk of business failure (Deakins, 1996). However, a manager perception of risk in each 
business decision will vary greatly. If a high risk is perceived, they may not increase the 
firm’s debt levels and may bypass investment in projects which would enable the firm 
to grow. As growth is important to SMEs, this could have long term ramifications for 
the success of the firm.  
The above discussion is relevant given that it has been well established in sociology 
literature that cross-cultural differences in risk perception and attitudes to risk are 
significant (McDaniels and Gregory, 1991; Palmer, 1996; Bontempo et al., 1997; 
Weber and Hsee, 1998; Renn and Rohrmann, 2000). Moreover, it is found in prior 
capital structure literature that risk is an important capital structure determinant (De 
Jong et al., 2008; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). Thus, it is inferred that culture could 
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affect debt levels though managers’ risk tolerance and therefore, capital structure.  
However, the direction of the effect of specific cultural dimensions may vary. One 
needs to reflect on the particular value items within specific cultural dimensions and 
then examine the relationship between each individual cultural dimension and capital 
structure. Upon closer examination of the three pairs of dimensions created by Schwartz 
in 2008 and their value items, it becomes clear that Mastery and Embeddedness are the 
two cultural dimensions most closely associated with risk. 
As shown in Figure 3.1 above, the value items in Mastery (e.g., Capable, Ambitious, 
Choosing own Goals and Daring) emphasize self-assertion (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 
2008). Managers of SMEs in countries with high Mastery values are expected to be 
more driven, ambitious and prepared to do what is necessary to achieve their objectives 
which may include growing the firm because this is so important to SME survival. As a 
result, it is expected that managers of SMEs in cultures with high Mastery values have 
more aggressive business strategies and are more willing accept a greater level of risk. 
It is expected that they have higher debt levels in order to increase growth levels and 
achieve the objectives of the firm. These more ambitious and daring managers will not 
be afraid of the risk that accompanies high debt levels. They will see debt finance as an 
opportunity to obtain capital which can be used by the firm to meet its objectives rather 
than as a threat. Based on this, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H10: There is no relationship between the debt levels of SMEs and the Mastery value of 
the country the SME originates from. 
H11: There is a positive relationship between the debt levels of SMEs and the Mastery 
value of the country the SME originates from. 
Contrary to the features of Mastery, Embeddedness has value items which indicate that 
a high value in this dimension could reduce a manager’s risk tolerance. The value items 
within Embeddedness, such as, Security, Preserving Public Image and Self-discipline 
imply that managers are not only increasing firm risk (and their own personal wealth, 
which is usually the case with SMEs) by issuing debt, managers are risking their 
relationships with the firm’s clients, employees and creditors.  
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Countries with high Embeddedness scores attach great importance to maintaining close-
knit, harmonious relationships (Schwartz, 2008) and SMEs are often dependent on a 
small number of clients and suppliers and form strong relationships with them. The 
stability of an SME’s profitability is dependent on these relationships (Kinnie et al., 
1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002) so if SMEs enter into financial difficulties it may be 
that these relationships are severed and managers may be unable to re-develop them. 
This could be a particularly important factor if the other shareholders are family 
members. In this case, the manager not only risks, their own personal wealth but that of 
the entire family by having large proportions of debt in the SME’s capital structure. 
These factors suggest that managers acting in countries with high Embeddedness values 
prefer to maintain their firm’s stability and security and issue less debt, even if this 
means opting out of opportunities which could benefit the firm in the long term but 
involve increasing the firm’s debt levels. Thus, it would be reasonable to predict that in 
countries with high Embeddedness scores, managers have a more conservative attitude 
to debt because the risks involved are high and therefore, they will choose to have lower 
debt levels in their capital structures. Chui et al. (2002) predict and find this for listed 
firms based on the links shown in Figure 3.3 above, it is an empirical question whether 
this is also the case for SMEs. The following hypotheses are tested: 
H20: There is no relationship between the debt levels in SMEs and the Embeddedness 
value of the country the SME originates from. 
H21: There is a negative relationship between the debt levels in SMEs and the 
Embeddedness value of the country the SME originates from. 
3.5.2 Control 
The other major capital structure decision driver considered in the present study is 
control (Chava and Roberts, 2008). This is particularly relevant to SMEs as the 
manager is often a major shareholder and the smaller the firm is, the more likely this is 
to be true (McConaughy et al., 2001). When SMEs issue debt, they are required to 
comply with the conditions of the loan. These conditions are usually in the form of debt 
covenants which are specified by the finance provider. These can include restrictions on 
operations, future borrowing or require certain profit levels to be met. As the manager’s 
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personal wealth is closely related to the success of the firm, it is expected that managers 
will be reluctant to relinquish any control of their firm (Nyguman and Ramachandran, 
2006) and prefer to avoid any outside influences. 
SMEs usually suffer from high levels of asymmetric information (Van Caneghem and 
Van Campenhout, 2012) which is an important component of the pecking order theory 
(Myers, 1984). This means that finance providers often feel they are taking a 
comparatively greater risk lending to an SME (Scherr et al., 1993), and they are more 
likely to increase the cost of the debt to the firm, limit the amount of debt, or impose 
more restrictive covenants, in order to protect the capital they have provided.  
Chava and Roberts (2008) and Berlin and Mester (1992) both acknowledge that control 
is given to creditors in the event of debt covenants being broken. Nini et al. (2009) find 
evidence that creditors exert the control they obtain when managers break debt 
covenants and can play an active role in corporate governance. Having debt covenants 
in loan agreements is particularly important in countries where creditor protection is 
strong because, in the event of a debt covenant being broken, there is a higher risk of 
the manager losing some control over the firm and the firm facing bankruptcy (Bae and 
Goyal, 2009). This shifts control of the firm away from managers and into the hands of 
the debt providers. Vickery (1989:206) says “Control is an emotionally charged subject, 
since the majority of owner-managers are highly motivated by a desire for 
independence”. Vickery (1989) goes on to say that owner-managers may develop a 
more cautious business model in order to defend their independence. This suggests 
firms with managers who prefer to maintain complete independence from finance 
providers and control over their firms have lower debt levels in their capital structures.  
It could also be argued that firms give away control when they issue equity but issuing 
equity is rarely an option for SMEs and SME manager/owners often strongly oppose 
any dilution of ownership (Holmes et al., 2003). Usually the manager/owner determines 
the level of control given to the new shareholders and who the new shareholders are. 
This shows that SMEs would be under less external control or certainly less unwanted 
external control, should they issue equity instead of debt. 
There is also the possibility that the managers of SMEs may put control aversion aside 
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if it is perceived to be essential to the firm’s growth. Growth rates of SMEs are often 
relatively high and growth is often perceived to be essential to the survival of the SME 
(Berggren et al., 2000). Higher growth rates usually create a need for resources which 
cannot be satisfied by internal finance (Michaelas et al., 1999). SMEs in particular, 
often lack the sufficient internal finance to support growth projects (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002). This means that although the expectation is that SMEs use external 
debt finance, this may not be the case in all SMEs. Romano et al. (2001) say that capital 
structure is a result of several behavioural factors, for example, a manager’s need to be 
in control. If the level of control required by managers depends on behavioural factors 
and behavioural factors are subject to cultural influences, then cultural influences could 
result in some managers having a greater need to maintain control of their SMEs which 
indicates they would use debt finance to a lesser extent. 
Both Hofstede and Schwartz have cultural values or dimensions which are associated 
with control demonstrating that the level of control required by individuals varies 
between cultures. Bhimani (1999) and Harrison and McKinnon (1999)
17
 provide further 
evidence that culture effects the level of control required by individuals in certain 
circumstances, as does Hsu (1981) and Ji et al. (2000). 
Of Schwartz’s 2008 dimensions, the dimension most closely associated with control is 
Hierarchy (based on the value items Wealth, Social Power and Authority). A high score 
in this dimension represents a culture where there is a clear hierarchical system within 
society, with an uneven distribution of resources and a small number of individuals who 
have power and control over the majority. In a business context, the firm manager is at 
the top of the hierarchy and will exert authority over the firm and its employees. 
The Hierarchy dimension could have greater influence on the managers of SMEs than 
listed firms. SMEs tend to have simplified business structures (Ghobadian and Gallear, 
1996) and the manager is usually in close proximity to the daily operations of the firm 
(Torres and Julien, 2005). This indicates that they have a greater level of control over 
                                                 
17
 Bhimani (1999) and Harrison and McKinnon (1999) both investigate the relationship between national 
culture and differing control systems. However, this research can be controversial (Baskerville, 2003; 
Hofstede, 2003; Baskerville-Morely, 2005) because prior studies in this area make differing assumptions 
regarding what exactly constitutes a control system. This renders results incomparable and difficult to 
interpret. 
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all aspects of the SME and may be particularly reluctant to relinquish control to 
outsiders due to the ties between the firm’s success and the manager’s personal wealth. 
As taking on debt means giving away an element of control over the firm, it is expected 
that managers in countries with high Hierarchy scores will have less debt in their capital 
structures. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H30: There is no relationship between the debt levels in SMEs and the Hierarchy value 
of the country the SME originates from. 
H31: There is a negative relationship between the debt levels in SMEs and the 
Hierarchy value of the country the SME originates from.  
3.5.3 Size Categories within SMEs 
SMEs can be divided into three size categories: micro, small and medium. The 
characteristics that distinguish SMEs from larger, listed firms become more prolific as 
the size of the SME decreases. This being the case, the hypotheses proposed above may 
hold to differing degrees or may not hold across all three size categories. Reflecting on 
this, the present study not only explores whether specific cultural dimensions are a 
capital structure determinant but also proceeds by evaluating the effect of culture on 
each size category.  
The managers of SMEs from a variety of countries and industries, with a variety of 
different sizes of firms are expected to have great variation in their managerial skill 
levels and their ability to manage their firms. Berryman (1982) provides evidence from 
several prior studies that lack of managerial competence and behavioural aspects of the 
owner/manager are generally responsible for SME failure and a significant proportion 
of SMEs enter financial difficulty in their first two years,
18
 i.e., when they are small, 
indicating that inexperienced, new managers may be responsible for this. 
Managers of smaller firms are likely to be entrepreneurs who are very knowledgeable 
regarding the particular product or service they provide but may lack managerial 
knowledge, experience or access to professional advice regarding decisions like capital 
                                                 
18
 Perry and Pendelton (1983: 13) estimate that “50% of new small businesses fail within the first two 
years” and “only 20% of new small businesses survive ten years.” 
Chapter 3 The Role of Culture as a Capital Structure Determinant and Development of 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
60 
structure (Ang, 1991). Managers of smaller firms may not be aware of the pros and 
cons of debt. The more experienced manager who has the skills to make important 
managerial decisions will be better equipped to do so and is better expected to act in a 
manner best suited to the firm. Furthermore, a manager with a lower managerial skill 
levels may be more susceptible to cultural influences on their behaviour compared to a 
manager who is equipped with the necessary skills and experience. As a result, it would 
be reasonable to predict that the effect of the cultural dimensions may vary between size 
categories. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter begins by discussing Hofstede’s cultural values, their development and 
what behaviour each cultural value represents. Drawing on the way these values were 
developed and on the criticism they receive from relevant literature (e.g., Sivakumar 
and Nakata, 2001), these cultural values are now considered outdated. Thus, the 
discussion then turns to Schwartz’s cultural dimensions. Schwartz’s cultural dimensions 
capture slightly different aspects of culture and were developed much more recently 
using more recent data. Considering these features, it is considered more appropriate for 
this method of quantifying culture to be used in this study.  
Following on from this, the discussion then turns to prior literature which has 
investigated the effect of culture on various managerial and regulatory decisions. This 
review concludes that culture does affect managerial decisions (e.g., companies’ 
compensation practices, dividend policy, foreign market entry modes). Based on this, it 
would be reasonable to expect that it would also influence capital structure. Thus, the 
discussion then turns to the three prior studies which have examined the effect of 
culture on the capital structure of listed firms (Sekely and Collins, 1988; Gleason et al., 
2000 and Chui et al., 2002). These studies conclude that the capital structure of listed 
firms is affected by the culture in which they operate. The results of these papers, 
combined with the discussion in Chapter 2, which indicates that there are differences 
between the capital structure determinants of SMEs and listed firms, suggest that the 
effect of national culture on the capital structure of SMEs could be different to that of 
listed firms, calling for investigation. 
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The chapter finishes with the development of hypotheses section. Three hypotheses are 
developed by using risk and control issues to connect the capital structure of SMEs and 
to various characteristics represented by Schwartz’s cultural dimensions: Mastery, 
Embeddedness and Hierarchy. These hypotheses enable empirical testing of the 
relationship between SME capital structure and national culture, not only using the full 
sample, but using each of the subsamples of micro, small and medium firms. 
The next chapter presents the data which is used to test the hypotheses developed in this 
chapter and discusses the empirical strategy used. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology of the present study. Section 4.1 discusses the 
definition of SMEs used in this study. Section 4.2 provides descriptive tables showing 
the structure of the data. Section 4.3 presents the individual country scores for the 
cultural dimensions. Subsequently, the definitions of the dependent and independent 
variables are discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 and Sections 4.6 to 4.9 provide a detailed 
description of the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Section 4.10 provides 
concluding remarks. 
4.1 Sample Selection: SME Definition and Size Classification 
SMEs are small and medium sized enterprises but their exact size definition is not 
globally consistent. There are several different organisations which set their own 
individual criteria for identifying SMEs. McMahon et al. (1993:9) say “small 
enterprises are easier to describe than to define in precise terms” but this does not mean 
that governmental bodies do not try to do so for the purposes of accounting and 
taxation. For example, EU law defines SMEs using guidelines presented by the 
European Commission (EC). However, individual member states may not apply this in 
all aspects relating to the firm. In fact, sometimes even within one country different 
bodies’ use their own measurements. For example, the Department of Trade and 
Industry in the UK defines SMEs and sub-groups within SMEs using only the number 
of employees, but Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) uses number of 
employees, turnover and balance sheet total. Yet the definition varies slightly even 
within HMRC as it depends on which area of corporation tax is being applied. 
As a starting point, this study uses the definition set out in the UK Companies Act 2006 
(hereafter CA 2006). More specifically, the CA 2006 provides criteria for the number of 
employees (maximum 250), turnover (maximum £25.9 million) and total assets 
(maximum £12.9 million) an SME is permitted to have in order to be classified as an 
SME. Additionally, it states that to qualify as an SME, the company must satisfy two or 
more of these requirements. During data collection, for the present study, the number of 
employees for each firm was unavailable for the majority of observations. So, in order 
to be classified as an SME, the firm’s turnover and total assets must be equal to or 
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below the maximum limits. 
Nevertheless, the CA 2006 only defines small and medium enterprises without 
providing a specific definition for micro firms. As a result, this study applies the CA 
2006 guidelines to define small and medium firms and, in order to define a micro firm, 
the EU guidelines issued in 2005 are also applied (EC, 2005). These guidelines provide 
maximum turnover, number of employees and balance sheet total figures like the CA 
2006. However, the figures for defining micro firms are in Euros instead of GBPs. The 
maximum turnover (€2million) and total asset figures (€2million) are converted to 
GBPs based on the exchange rate on 31
st
 December 2006. This date is chosen because 
the CA 2006 is dated 2006 and results in the turnover and total asset figures being of 
the corresponding value. Table 4.3 summarises the criteria a firm must meet in order to 
be included in size category for this study. 
 
4.2 Data  
The sample is collected from FAME (UK observations) and ORIANA (all other 
countries) which both are Bureau Van Dijk platforms. As a result, the data used in the 
study is limited to what was available in these databases at the time of the data 
collection. The original sample included observations from eleven countries, covering 
the period from 2006 to 2010 and had 1,364,546 observations. The countries chosen for 
this study are selected based on three criteria: 1) They must be included in Schwartz’s 
cultural dimensions; 2) There must be sufficient available data on unlisted SMEs within 
each country; and 3) the countries included must represent a diverse mix of cultures. 
Observations with missing values, non-actively trading observations, financial firms 
and all firms that met the size requirement but were listed on a stock market were 
subsequently removed leaving 898,046 observations. Within this sample, Australia and 
Size Classification Annual Turnover Total Assets
Medium ≤ £25.9m ≤ £12.9m
Small ≤ £6.5m ≤ £3.26m
Micro ≤ £1.35m ≤ £1.35m
This table shows the maximum annual turnover and total asset figures for each size 
classification. For a firm to be classified in a particular category it must meet both the 
Total Assets and Annual Turnover figures.
Table 4.1 Size Classification within SMEs
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Hong Kong were left with very few observations (30 and 8 respectively).
19
 Given that 
the number of 30 and 8 observations were too small for drawing any conclusions about 
the effect of culture on capital structure in these countries, these observations were 
excluded leaving a final sample of 898,008 observations from nine countries. Table 4.2 
shows the distribution of these observations by year and country. 
 
The number of observations is fairly consistent over the first four years but drops in 
2010 with zero or few observations in some countries. In some countries, the number of 
observations drops significantly over time. For example, observations from Thailand 
decrease from 11,674 in 2006 to 5,946 in 2007, 2,522 in 2008 and 0 in 2009 and 2010 
and observations from China drop from 73,500 in 2009 to 63 in 2010. The number of 
observations for all countries is lower in 2010 than the previous years. This is likely due 
to the time when the data was collected (beginning of 2011). It is highly probable that 
most of the SMEs would not have produced their financial statements for 2010 at that 
time and/or the databases are not been updated accordingly. However, there is 
significant variation in some countries in other years. This makes the panel particularly 
unbalanced. In fact, the average number of observations per firm is 2.6. This could be 
partially attributable to the comparatively high death rates and turnover of SMEs (Perry 
and Pendleton, 1983). A large number of SMEs have relatively short periods in 
operation which could explain why the average number of observations is only 2.6. 
                                                 
19
 In the original sample, Australia had 6,077 observations and Hong Kong had 2,180. Of the Australian 
observations, 2,335 were listed and the majority of the remaining observations were excluded due to 
missing values required by the regression models. Of the observations from Hong Kong, 2,097 were 
listed, leaving only 83 unlisted observations. When observations with missing values are removed from 
the sample, only 8 remain. 
Country
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
China 115,368 105,748 76,423 73,500 63 371,102
Japan 36,242 56,621 76,833 78,234 47,456 295,386
Korea 16,031 16,408 18,630 14,865 8,909 74,843
Malaysia 119 26 23 24 1 193
New Zealand 6 19 49 44 1 119
Philippines 561 428 685 823 0 2,497
Taiwan 131 130 132 108 18 519
Thailand 11,674 5,946 2,522 0 0 20,142
UK 29,737 28,571 27,862 29,463 17,574 133,207
Total 209,869 213,897 203,159 197,061 74,022 898,008
Year
Table 4.2 Observations by Year and Country
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Table 4.2 also shows that there is a wide range in the number of observations for each 
country with China having the highest (371,102) and New Zealand (119) the lowest. 
The low number of observations from some countries (New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Taiwan) means that the sample used only makes up a small proportion of 
the total population of SMEs from these countries. This means that there is an increased 
possibility the observations in the sample, from these countries, may not be fully 
representative of all of the SMEs in these countries. Tests were conducted using only 
the five countries with the higher numbers of observations (China, Japan, Korea, 
Thailand and the UK) but were unsuccessful due to multicollinearity discussed in 
Section 4.7 and 4.8. This, and the preference to maintain the greatest cultural diversity 
within the sample lead to all nine countries being included, despite the issues within the 
sample.  
As Section 2.2.1.7 discusses, industry type can play a significant role in determining a 
firm’s capital structure. Considering this, the present study applies the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) for dividing the observations between 
industries. This classification system was developed for the purposes of collecting and 
analysing statistical data replacing the Standards Industrial Classification (SIC) system 
(US Department of Commerce website, 2012). Since its development and adoption in 
1997, it has been widely used not only by governmental agencies but also in academic 
literature (e.g., King and Santor, 2008; Kolasinski, 2009 and Bae et al., 2011) 
demonstrating its appropriateness for this study. Table 4.3 shows the industry code for 
each industry and how the observations are distributed within each country.  
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China Japan Korea Malaysia
New 
Zealand Philippines Taiwan Thailand UK Total
11 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 152 623 595 3 0 2 0 113 2,586 4,074
21
Mining, Quarrying, Oil & Gas 
Extraction
13,542 329 193 2 0 10 0 168 307 14,551
22 Utilities 4,830 132 275 0 0 30 6 111 223 5,607
23 Construction 133 191,779 12,783 3 1 111 60 1,111 23,939 229,920
31 Manufacturing 345,737 22,776 27,416 89 20 902 185 5,301 15,678 418,104
42 Wholesale Trade 1,916 22,569 13,616 43 43 545 215 3,508 11,454 53,909
44 Retail Trade 303 9,622 1,017 8 0 432 1 1,344 7,871 20,598
48 Transportation & Warehousing 515 5,457 2,668 11 5 92 6 998 5,455 15,207
51 Information 79 2,348 3,881 12 11 49 7 211 1,945 8,543
53 Real Estate & Rental & Leasing 26 8,020 2,630 1 6 43 0 2,760 12,896 26,382
54
Professional, Scientific & Technical 
Services
393 10,586 4,115 15 11 120 34 1,820 8,760 25,854
55
Management of Companies & 
Enterprises
0 0 5 1 9 9 0 87 1,998 2,109
56
Admin & Support & Waste 
Management & Remedial Services
721 8,424 2,970 3 4 58 5 1,006 20,255 33,446
61 Educational Services 1 234 246 0 0 8 0 58 1,009 1,556
62 Healthcare & Social Assistance 0 7,011 722 0 7 22 0 95 2,523 10,380
71 Arts, Entertainment & Recreation 49 651 248 0 2 6 0 101 2,682 3,739
72 Accommodation & Food Services 57 1,595 525 0 0 43 0 899 4,920 8,039
81
Other Services (Except Public 
Administration)
2,644 3,230 928 1 0 15 0 362 8,568 15,748
92 Public Administration 4 0 10 1 0 0 0 89 138 242
371,102 295,386 74,843 193 119 2,497 519 20,142 133,207 898,008
NAICS 2007
Total
Table 4.3 Observations by Country and Industry
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This table shows that the sample firms operate in a wide range of industries. The 
industries with the largest number of observations are construction and manufacturing. 
The majority of the construction firms (191,779) are from Japan. This industry 
represents approximately two thirds of the Japanese observations. The majority of the 
observations from Chinese firms are manufacturing firms (345,737). These figures 
mean that using a control variable for industry is particularly important because, if this 
is omitted, the differences in leverage between countries may partially result from the 
difference in the industry status of the firms rather than institutional factors. 
After applying the CA 2006 and the EU guidelines to define SMEs, as described above, 
the observations are divided into three categories: micro, small and medium firms. The 
following tables (4.4, 4.5 and 4.6) show the number of observations in each size 
category for each year.  
Micro firms make up approximately half of the sample (451,083), small firms 
approximately one third of the sample (284,027) and medium firms, the remainder 
(162,898). These tables show that the issues with the data described above regarding the 
number of observations from each country are consistent throughout the subsamples 
and the empirical analysis must be developed to account for this.
20
 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 
show that there are very few observations of micro and small firms in New Zealand so 
when each size group is looked at individually, New Zealand is excluded from tests 
using only micro and small firms.  
 
                                                 
20
 The empirical methods used are described in Section 4.8. 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
China 54,471 40,001 16,111 18,373 12 128,968
Japan 23,435 38,909 49,872 48,010 26,832 187,058
Korea 9,874 9,899 10,022 7,341 3,630 40,766
Malaysia 46 10 7 8 0 71
New Zealand 0 2 4 2 0 8
Philippines 4 0 18 49 0 71
Taiwan 31 26 31 25 4 117
Thailand 10,972 5,251 1,688 0 0 17,911
UK 18,635 17,827 16,713 14,654 8,284 76,113
Total 117,468 111,925 94,466 88,462 38,762 451,083
Table 4.4 Micro Firms: Observations by Year and Country
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4.3 Cultural Dimensions  
As previously discussed, this study uses Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions to 
quantify culture. The numerical figures for the three dimensions being tested are shown 
in Table 4.7. 
Although Schwartz states that the numerical value for each cultural dimension ranges 
between -1 and 7 the majority of the numerical values fall within a much narrower 
range as is shown in Table 4.7. These scores do not change over time so regardless of 
the year of the observation, every observation from the same country has the same 
value for each dimension. This table shows that Embeddedness ranges from 3.27 for 
New Zealand to 4.35 for Malaysia, Mastery ranges from 3.76 for the Philippines to 4.41 
for China and Hierarchy from 2.25 for Malaysia to 3.49 for China, thus demonstrating 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
China 43,741 46,039 36,285 32,279 18 158,362
Japan 9,202 12,720 18,656 20,454 13,542 74,574
Korea 5,025 5,060 6,404 5,333 3,332 25,154
Malaysia 38 4 4 4 0 50
New Zealand 1 5 14 15 0 35
Philippines 66 14 114 216 0 410
Taiwan 39 43 45 37 7 171
Thailand 551 542 676 0 0 1,769
UK 5,691 5,321 5,087 4,699 2,704 23,502
Total 64,354 69,748 67,285 63,037 19,603 284,027
Table 4.5 Small Firms: Observations by Year and Country
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
China 17,156 19,708 24,027 22,848 33 83,772
Japan 3,605 4,992 8,305 9,770 7,082 33,754
Korea 1,132 1,449 2,204 2,191 1,947 8,923
Malaysia 35 12 12 12 1 72
New Zealand 5 12 31 27 1 76
Philippines 491 414 553 558 0 2,016
Taiwan 61 61 56 46 7 231
Thailand 151 153 158 0 0 462
UK 5,411 5,423 6,062 10,110 6,586 33,592
Total 28,047 32,224 41,408 45,562 15,657 162,898
Table 4.6 Medium Firms: Observations by Year and Country
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enough cultural variation to enable empirical testing. Schwartz (1994) presents 
evidence that there is no correlation between the three dimensions used in the present 
study
21
 although these dimensions have negative relationships with their opposite 
dimensions as shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 so, one of the objectives of the empirical 
analysis is to test all three cultural dimensions in the same model with the control 
variables.  
 
4.4 Leverage 
There are several options that can be used to measure leverage. Prior literature focusing 
on SMEs uses a variety of ratios, in fact some prior studies use multiple ratios in order 
to provide some depth and add robustness to their results. The leverage ratio options 
available include long term debt to total assets, total liabilities to total assets and total 
debt to total assets.
22
 In addition, some prior studies (e.g., Hall et al., 2004; Beck et al., 
2008) have looked at the determinants of different types of financing within the firm 
using a range of ratios which capture each aspect. For example, Michaelas et al. (1999), 
Sogorb-Mira, (2005) and Hall et al. (2004) all use both short term debt and long term 
debt to total assets and Beck et al. (2008) uses a range of methods to capture different 
types of finance.  
                                                 
21
 Using Schwartz’s 2008 dimensions for 80 countries the R squared values for these dimensions are as 
follows: Mastery/Hierarchy 0.157; Mastery/Embeddedness 0.007; Embeddedness/Hierarchy 0.258 which 
confirms they are not related. 
22
 These ratios use book values but another possible option is the market value of debt and/or equity. 
Some prior studies have used ratios which include market values as either an alternative to book value or 
additionally (e.g., Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Antoniou et al. 2008). This option is not appropriate for this 
study as only unlisted SMEs are included in the sample. 
Table 4.7 Schwartz's 2008 Cultural Values
Country EMB MAS HIER
China 3.74 4.41 3.49
Japan 3.49 4.06 2.65
Korea 3.68 4.21 2.90
Malaysia 4.35 3.91 2.25
New Zealand 3.27 4.09 2.27
Philippines 4.03 3.76 2.68
Taiwan 3.82 4.00 2.69
Thailand 4.02 3.88 3.23
UK 3.34 4.01 2.33
From Schwartz's 2008 Cultural Dimensions: EMB, Embeddedness; MAS, 
Mastery; HIER, Hierarchy
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There are advantages and disadvantages to each ratio. There a limited number of studies 
which use long term debt to total assets (e.g., Hall et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008). 
However, Hall et al. (2004) looks at the determinants of both long and short term debt 
and De Jong et al. (2008) use multiple debt ratios and do not solely rely on this one. 
This suggests that although it is a valid measure of capital structure, it is not suitable as 
the sole measure of capital structure in any given study. This could be because it only 
captures one type of finance. Cassar and Holmes (2003) say that long term debt when 
compared to short term finance is more fixed and has greater contractual obligations 
and screening requirements.  This may deter SMEs from long term debt and may 
encourage them to seek other forms of external finance which is easier to obtain. 
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) and Van Caneghem and 
Van Campenhout (2012) all use total liabilities to total assets as their dependent 
variable. Winborg and Landstrom (2000) suggest SMEs use financial bootstrapping
23
 to 
meet their financial resource needs. Furthermore, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2009) argue 
that liabilities, such as leasing, accounts payable and receivable and trade credit are all 
important means of finance for SMEs which is why they consider this broader 
definition. However, using total liabilities does not capture the debt to equity ratio and, 
although financial bootstrapping may be applied by several firms, there is no evidence 
to suggest it is used by all SMEs. Therefore, from the perspective of capturing capital 
structure in the most representative manner, this ratio may not be the most appropriate. 
The present study investigates capital structure which generally refers to how the firm 
finances itself. If only long term debt is used other aspects of how the firm finances 
itself (i.e., short term debt) is ignored. This would be a significant limitation 
considering that short term borrowing is very important in smaller firms (Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006; Garcia-Teruel and Marinez-Solano, 2007; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008). If total liabilities to total assets is used other aspects of financial 
statements (e.g., trade creditors), which are not directly relevant to capital structure are 
included. Considering these, and in line with Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Degryse et 
al. (2012), this study uses the ratio of total debt to total assets.  
To enhance the study and act as robustness tests, further tests are conducted splitting the 
                                                 
23
 Methods employed by SMEs to gain finance through informal or short term resources, for example, 
through absorbing resources from customers, suppliers and the owners own personal finance. 
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total debt ratio into long and short term debt ratios. Long term debt is defined as long 
term debt and long term leases or more generally any debt which is repayable in over 
one year. Short term debt includes short term loans and overdrafts which are generally 
payable in the next twelve months. Both are divided by total assets. This is done to 
provide a more in-depth analysis into the relationship between the cultural dimensions 
and debt levels in SMEs and contributes to prior literature which has merely explored 
the relationship between culture and capital structure and does not expand on this to 
explore the relationship between culture and different types of debt. 
4.5 Estimation of Independent Variables 
This subsection defines the independent variables used in the analysis, beginning with 
the firm level variables and then moving onto the institution level variables.  
4.5.1 Firm-Specific Independent Variables 
Because there is large variation in the size of firms, these independent variables are 
based on ratios, where possible, which standardises the measures and allows for a more 
direct comparison of the effects of those capital structure determinants used as control 
variables, regardless of the firm’s size. All of the variables are estimated using book 
values. The ratios used to define the firm-specific variables are shown in Table 4.8. The 
ratios selected and described below were chosen based on data availability and prior 
literature’s findings. 
In order to capture size, prior literature uses either the natural logarithm of turnover or 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Previous studies which use the natural logarithm of 
turnover tend to examine listed firms (e.g., De Jong et al., 2008; Kayo and Kimura, 
2011) although there are some which look at SMEs (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007; 
Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). The majority of studies conducted on SMEs use the 
natural logarithm of total assets (e.g., Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Van Caneghem and 
Van Campenhout, 2012; Degryse et al., 2012). As SMEs are the focus of this study, the 
natural logarithm of total assets is used to capture firm size (SIZE).  
Profitability measures the amount of profit the firm makes in relation to its size. The 
ratios prior literature uses to capture profitability vary slightly but the most common are 
earnings before interest and tax (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2009), operating profit (De 
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Jong et al., 2008) or net income before tax (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008), all over total 
assets regardless of whether the studies are on listed firms or SMEs. This variation does 
not appear to cause any variation in the results, as profitability is consistently negatively 
related to leverage in SMEs. This study uses operating profit over total assets (PROF) 
as, at the time of data collection, the operating profit figure was available for the highest 
number of observations.  
The tangibility of a firm is also used as a control variable. Prior literature, considering 
both listed firms and SMEs consistently uses the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
(TANG) as a proxy for tangibility (De Jong et al., 2008; Deesomsak et al., 2004; 
Antoniou et al., 2008; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012; Sogorb-Mira, 2005) 
so this ratio is also applied here. 
 
Firm risk can be measured in several different ways. Prior literature uses measures 
including the standard deviation of operating income (De Jong et al., 2008), the 
Firm 
Characteristic
Variable Name Ratio
Prior Studies which have used this 
measure
Leverage LEV Total debt over total assets
Antoniou et al. (2008), Margaritis &
Psillaki (2009), Cassar & Holmes
(2003), Degryse et al. (2012), 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
Titman & Wessels (1988) Michaelas
et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2004), Sogorb-
Mira (2005), Degryse et al (2012)
Profitability PROF Operating profit over total assets
Kayo & Kimura (2011), De Jong et al.
(2008), Antoniou et al. (2008)
Risk RISK
The squared deviation of each 
year's earnings before taxes from 
the period average
Psillaki & Daskalakis (2009),
Castanias (1983), Mackie-Mason,
(1990)
Tangibility TANG Fixed assets over total assets
De Jong et al. (2008), Sogorb-Mira
(2005), Van Cangehem & Van
Campenhout (2012), Booth et al.
(2001), Hall et al. (2004)
Growth GROW
Increase in total assets over total 
assets
Hall et al. (2004)
Liquidity LIQ
Current assets over current 
liabilities
De Jong et al. (2008)
Industry IND Industry median
Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery
and Rangan (2006), Goyal et al.
(2011), Frank and Goyal (2009)
Table 4.8 Firm Level Variables 
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standard deviation of annual earnings before taxes (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007), 
Altman’s Z score, altered by Mackie-Mason (1990) (Kayo and Kimura, 2012) and the 
standard deviation of the return on assets (Booth et al., 2001). For this study, risk is 
defined as the squared deviation of changes (based on first differences) in each year’s 
earnings before taxes from the period average (RISK). This measure is used by 
Castanias (1983), Mackie-Mason (1990) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009). 
Firm growth is also measured in several different ways in prior studies. Some studies 
use the ratio of the market value of the firm to total assets (De Jong et al., 2008), the 
annual percentage change in sales (Hall et al., 2004) or earnings (Psillaki and 
Daskalakis, 2009), capital expenditure (Harvey et al., 2004) or total asset growth (Chen, 
2003). The latter is chosen for this study (GROW) based on data availability allowing 
for the maximum number of observations in the analysis. Other measures would reduce 
the number of observations significantly. 
Although the pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship between liquidity 
and capital structure but there are a limited number of prior studies which empirically 
test this relationship. Deesomsak et al. (2004) and De Jong et al. (2008) use the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities to define liquidity and it is this ratio that the present 
study uses (LIQ). 
Industry is the final firm level variable. Each observation is allocated a number based 
on the two digit NAICs classification system. Then all of the observations are pooled 
across all five years and then divided into groups based on the NAICs codes. An 
industry leverage median is then calculated for each industry group of observations. 
Once this process is complete for all of the NAICs codes, a new variable is created 
where each observation is assigned the industry leverage median based on its NAICs 
code (IND). This means that instead of using industry dummy variables, one variable is 
used to capture the effect of industry on capital structure. This method is used in several 
studies including Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Frank and 
Goyal (2009). 
4.5.2 Institutional Independent Variables 
As Section 2.2.2 discusses, institutional variables can play a significant role in capital 
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structure and they must be included in the analysis. Table 4.9 shows the definitions of 
the institutional variables used in this study.  
All of the institutional independent variables which relate to legal systems were 
collected from La Porta et al. (1998).
24
 The legal variables from this study have been 
used in several prior empirical studies (e.g., De Jong et al., 2008 and Alves and 
Ferreira, 2011). The institutional variable which is used to capture legal systems is 
divided into two parts. Firstly, there is one binomial categorical variable which captures 
whether a country has a code or civil/common legal system. Secondly, there is a 
variable which measures the enforcement of those legal systems and the extent to which 
providers of finance are protected by that legal system. This variable incorporates 
shareholder rights, creditor rights, the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system and 
the level of corruption within a country, which are all proven capital structure 
determinants (Alves and Ferreira, 2011, De Jong et al., 2008; Deesomsak et al., 2004). 
These measures are combined into one variable because they are often related and, if 
included in the same model as four separate variables, cause multicollinearity issues.
25
 
De Jong et al., (2008) use a similar method to measure standardized enforcement. They 
use the same measures of the efficiency of the judicial system and corruption and two 
other measures of enforcement to calculate an average measure of enforcement of legal 
systems within a country.  
Although the present study uses different measures to include creditor right protection 
and shareholder right protection the principle is very similar. The variable which is used 
to capture how well finance providers are protected within a country (STPRO) is 
calculated as follows: 
      
                   
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Although aware of Spamman (2010) and the indexes generated in this paper, the decision was made to 
use only indexes from La Porta et al. (1998). Not all required indexes were available from Spamman 
(2010) and, as they were being used to generate a composite index, it seemed appropriate to use all the 
indexes from the same paper despite La Porta et al. (1998) being the older of the two. 
25
 Preliminary analyses using all four variables separately were found to be unstable and have abnormally 
large standard errors, suggesting that some of these variables are related to each other. Pearson 
correlation coefficients calculated confirmed this. 
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Table 4.9 Institutional Variables Definition 
Country Characteristic Variable Name Description 
Legal Tradition LEGTRA 
Identifies the legal origin of the present 
legal system within a country (La Porta et 
al. 1998). Zero represents a code law 
system and one represents a civil law 
system. 
Judicial System JUD 
Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity 
of the legal environment as it effects 
business" (La Porta et al. 1998: 1124). 
Scores range between zero and ten with 
low scores indicating lower efficiency 
levels. 
Creditor Rights CRED 
An index aggregating different creditor 
rights. Values range between zero and four. 
One is added to the value each time a 
country satisfies one of the four criteria 
(see La Porta et al. 1998 for full details) 
Shareholder Right Protection SHARE 
Shareholder right protection, an index 
aggregating different shareholder rights as 
defined by La Porta et al. (1998). Values 
range from zero to five. One is added each 
time a country satisfies one of the five 
criteria. 
Corruption CORR 
Measure of assessment of the corruption in 
government (La Porta et al. 1998). Scores 
range from zero to ten. Lower scores 
indicate that government officials are more 
likely to demand special payments in the 
form of bribes and that corruption is a 
problem within a country. 
Standardised Enforcement and  
protection for finance providers 
STPRO 
The mean value of the standardized values 
JUD, CRED, SHARE and CORR 
Bond Market Development BDMK 
Total bond market capitalisation (private 
and public) as a percentage of GDP  
La Porta et al. (1998) does not include China in their study but states that China used numerous 
examples from the German legal system during its modernisation. The average value for the 
countries with a German origin legal system was used for the variables values collected from La 
Porta et al. 1998. 
To capture the development of a country’s financial systems, bond market development 
is used. This variable is captured as bond market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 
as in De Jong et al. (2008) and Kayo and Kimura (2012). This is the total of both 
private and public bond market capitalization, except in the case of New Zealand which 
does not have an active private bond market. Hence, only the public bond market 
capitalisation figure is used for this country.  This variable is captured from the World 
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Development Indicators.
26
  
4.6 Panel Data 
As indicated above, panel (or longitudinal) data is used in this study. This is a 
combination of cross sectional and time series data and includes multiple observations 
for each firm and these observations are collected annually. Despite some prior studies 
using cross sectional data (e.g., Chui et al., 2002; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), more recent 
studies (Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2012; Degryse et al., 2012; Sogorb-Mira, 2005) have 
chosen to use panel data. 
Panel data can provide a superior analysis when compared with cross sectional or time 
series data and offers a number of advantages. These advantages are outlined by Baltagi 
(1995) and Wooldridge (2013) as follows: 
 Controls for unobserved firm characteristics, thus permitting conclusions to be 
drawn from heterogeneous samples. 
 Provides a more informative dataset with more variability, less co-linearity 
between variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency in terms of 
standard errors of coefficients. 
 Enables the measuring of effects which may not be detectable in pure cross 
sectional or time series data (e.g., panel data can measure lags in behaviour or the 
result of a particular decision that would not be found in cross-sectional data) 
 Permits the testing of behavioural models while avoiding biases that result from the 
aggregation of firms or individuals. 
Although panel data provides a more thorough analysis, it requires more sophisticated 
modelling techniques. Given that there are multiple observations for each firm, the 
observations are not fully independent and there is likely correlation between the error 
terms. This is controlled for in the statistical analysis (see Section 4.8).  
 
 
                                                 
26
 The World Development Indicators are compiled from officially recognized international sources. 
They present the most current and accurate global development data available (www.WorldBank.org, 
2013). 
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4.7 Multicollinearity 
After several univariate tests, it became clear that any traditional regression model 
containing the required independent variables would suffer severely from 
multicollinearity and generate very high variance inflation factor (VIF) figures.
27
 This 
was particularly true of the cultural dimensions and the institutional variables 
preventing the testing of multiple dimensions in the same model and requiring the 
exclusion of multiple institutional control variables to reduce multicollinearity and 
generate a stable model. This would significantly reduce the quality and validity of the 
statistical analysis.  
Table 4.10 is a correlation matrix showing the Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
independent variables.
28
 This table shows the strength of the relationships between the 
independent variables. Paying particular attention to the correlation coefficients of the 
cultural dimensions, it appears that there are strong relationships between them. This 
not only prevents the testing of multiple cultural dimensions simultaneously but results 
in the effect of each dimension being indistinguishable from the effect of others. 
However, Schwartz (1994) and Schwartz (2008) both indicate that there are only 
correlations between opposite pairs of dimensions. Of the three dimensions included 
none are opposite pairs so these correlation coefficients appear very high and prompt 
further investigation. As an example, Figure 4.1 shows a scatter plot using one point for 
each of the nine countries in the dataset comparing Mastery and Hierarchy. Upon 
inspection of Figure 4.1, there does not appear to be a relationship between these 
variables. 
                                                 
27
 The VIF measures the degree to which each explanatory variable is explained by the other explanatory 
variables. Traditionally multicollinearity is not considered to be a problem if the VIF figures are below 10 
(Ding et al. 2005) although below 5 is preferable (Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). 
28
 Appendix 2 is also a correlation matrix showing the Spearman correlation coefficients. This table 
provides further evidence of the relationships between the independent variables. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
EMB HIER MAST SIZE RISK PROF TANG GROW LIQ IND LEGTRA STPRO BDMK
EMB 1.000
HIER 0.900 1.000
MAST 0.701 0.922 1.000
SIZE 0.145 0.230 0.291 1.000
RISK -0.065 -0.034 0.003 -0.101 1.000
PROF 0.071 0.128 0.168 -0.089 0.035 1.000
TANG 0.015 0.022 0.020 0.099 -0.014 0.033 1.000
GROW 0.085 0.091 0.097 0.132 0.010 0.067 -0.025 1.000
LIQ 0.061 -0.014 -0.075 -0.089 -0.036 0.012 -0.100 -0.013 1.000
IND -0.634 -0.763 -0.777 -0.311 -0.015 -0.171 -0.017 -0.083 0.077 1.000
LEGTRA -0.469 -0.533 -0.531 -0.157 0.148 0.082 0.063 -0.057 -0.003 0.256 1.000
STPRO -0.729 -0.429 -0.242 -0.009 0.054 0.001 -0.003 -0.074 -0.134 0.268 0.224 1.000
BDMK -0.451 -0.544 -0.577 -0.166 -0.132 -0.256 -0.079 -0.054 0.063 0.629 -0.346 0.234 1.000
Table 4.10 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Independent Variables
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Figure 4.1 Scatter plot showing the relationship between Hierarchy and Mastery 
 
The above scatter plot shows the relationship between Hierarchy and Mastery using nine points. Each 
point represents one country in the sample. R squared equals 0.20. 
Nevertheless, Table 4.10 shows that for these two variables, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient equals 0.92 but when the R
2 
value is calculated based on nine points (one for 
each country) it equals 0.20. So what is causing the difference between the R
2 
values? It 
is the uneven number of observations in each country. Figure 4.2 shows the same 
scatter plot as Figure 4.1 but also includes the country and number of observations 
beside each point. The points with the highest numbers of observations (i.e., UK, Japan, 
Korea and China) create a line imitating a positive relationship between the two 
variables, although this is not a true linear relationship. If the number of observations 
from each country was equal, there would be a more balanced representation of the 
cultural dimensions from different countries limiting the presence of multicollinearity in 
a regression model. 
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Figure 4.2 Scatter plot showing the relationship between Hierarchy and Mastery 
and the number of observations in each country 
 
The above scatter plot shows the uneven number of observations in each country and demonstrates that 
the countries with the highest number of observations are forming a line which imitates a positive 
relationship between these variables although as it can be seen from Figure 3.1, there is no significant 
positive relationship between these two variables. R squared equals 0.92. 
4.8 Bootstrapping, Clustering & Stratified Sampling 
The issues with the data described in Section 4.2 and those regarding the false 
multicollinearity discussed in Section 4.7 result in the failure of more traditional 
empirical methods, so the combination of bootstrapping, clustering and stratified 
sampling is used. This section explains what these methods are and why they are 
appropriate for this study. It could also be argued that the cultural dimensions should be 
tested individually. This may solve the multicollinearity problem but it raises another 
issue. Going back to example of the relationship between Mastery and Hierarchy, if one 
of these dimensions is found to be a significant determinant of capital structure, then the 
other would likely be found to be significant with a similar coefficient due to the high 
correlation between them. This means it is impossible to determine which cultural 
dimension is having the effect on leverage. This is particularly a problem with these 
two dimensions because Mastery is predicted to have a positive relationship with 
leverage and Hierarchy is predicted to have a negative relationship. If they were tested 
in separate models using the full sample, it is impossible to find results to support both 
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H1 and H3. Additionally, the idea of using country average leverage ratios is 
considered. This was rejected because it was felt that reducing such a large number of 
observations to a small number of country average values would negatively impact on 
the significance of the results of the study and not fully utilize the relatively large 
sample. 
It could be argued that the countries with the fewest observations should be removed 
and the study should proceed without them because there is a greater likelihood that the 
observations from these countries are not wholly representative of the country they 
originate from because they are few in number. However, if New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan are all excluded, this would further reduce the 
number of countries in the sample from nine to five. This significantly reduces the 
cultural diversity within the sample and limits the ability of the sample to be used to test 
for cross-country variations in capital structure.  
However, it is also true that, if the countries with the lowest numbers of observations 
are removed, the multicollinearity between Hierarchy and Mastery becomes real and 
not consequential of the distribution of the observations. This is because, as discussed 
in Section 4.7, the countries with the highest number of observations have a positive 
relationship, regardless of the relationship between the dimensions outside the sample. 
Preliminary tests show that removing the countries with few observations from the 
sample results in reduced cultural diversity and if only the countries with higher 
numbers of observations are used, then the false multicollinearity is no longer false and 
the model suffers from instability and inflated standard errors.
29
  
Even though the inclusion of New Zealand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan 
means that a less traditional method of empirical analysis is used, it is for these reasons 
that the empirical analysis proceeded with these countries included in the sample. 
One potential solution to the false multicollinearity problem is to make the number of 
                                                 
29
 A random effects model conducted using only observations from China, Japan, Korea, Thailand and 
the UK suffered severely from multicollinearity (mean VIF 502.80, highest VIF 3,290.76). Due to 
multicollinearity the standardised enforcement variable was excluded and there were five correlation 
coefficients over 0.70 when looking at pairs of country level variables. Acknowledging the 
multicollinearity issues caused by the uneven numbers of observations in each country, the test was 
repeated using a random sample of an even number of firms from each country. These results also 
suffered from multicollinearity and the standardised enforcement variable was also excluded. The VIF 
figures (mean 255.09, highest 1,715.38) are lower but are still too high for the model to be stable. 
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observations in each country equal. However, this would mean excluding the majority 
of the data. New Zealand is the country in the sample with the fewest number of 
observations (119) and this would mean using 1,071 (119 multiplied by nine countries) 
observations instead of 898,008. 
However, using an equal number of observations would mean excluding over 99% of 
the sample and adversely impact on the significance of the results. Thus, in order to 
solve the multicollinearity problem and also deal with the issues inherent to panel data, 
the present study applies the bootstrap re-sampling method to clustered observations 
randomly selected from stratified samples from within the data. The steps involved in 
this technique are described below. 
As discussed above, in panel data sets residuals may be correlated across firms or 
across time which can render ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates biased and result 
in over or under estimation of the true variability of coefficient estimates (Drukker, 
2003; Petersen, 2009). Clustering is a technique which groups together the observations 
from one particular firm. This recognises that the observations from the same firm are 
not independent and computes standard errors and test statistics that are robust to any 
form of serial correlation or heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Standard stratified sampling is a sampling method in which the data is divided into 
strata and then a fixed number of observations (or clusters of observations) are 
randomly selected from each stratum for testing. It is usually applied when different 
subsets of the population are sampled with different frequencies which results in a 
sample which is not representative of the population
30
 (Wooldridge, 2010). Stratified 
sampling is used in several prior studies from a range of areas within finance literature, 
including Altman (1968), Gilson (1989), Opler and Titman (1994), Uzzi and Gillespie 
(2002), Ayyagari et al. (2010) where a particular group of observations is under or over 
represented. In the present study, the strata are the countries and the uneven number of 
observations from each country results in an under or over representation of each 
country in any statistical tests.  
                                                 
30
 This is not necessarily the case for the sample used in this study. The sample is representative of the 
population of firms available from the Bureau Van Dijk database. Although there is no complete certainty 
that these firms are representative of the population of SMEs within the country, it is assumed that this is 
the case. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
83 
The stratified sampling method is altered slightly to account for the data being panel 
data. If 100 observations were randomly selected from each country, out of the 
countries with the larger numbers of observations, the likelihood of selecting two 
observations from the same firm is small. This would result in the loss of the benefits 
obtained from using panel data over cross-sectional data. In order to solve this, 
clustering is used as part of the sampling process. Instead of 100 observations from 
each country being selected, 50 firms and all of the observations from those firms are 
randomly selected from each stratum.  
However, this does raise another issue. The number of observations from each firm is 
not equal. The data covers a five year period and the number of observations per firm 
ranges from one to five. If these methods are employed in order to eliminate the 
multicollinearity caused by the uneven number of observations from each country, does 
clustered stratified sampling not also result in an uneven number of observations from 
each country? The answer to this question is yes. However, the number of observations 
from each firm, and as a result each country, will not be equal, but even in the worst 
case scenario (the random sampling selects 50 firms with one observation from one 
country and 50 firms with 5 observations each so 250 observations for another country) 
multicollinearity is not present. 
The non-parametric bootstrap is a resampling approach developed by Efron (1979). 
Bootstrapping treats the observed sample as the population and repeatedly tests smaller, 
bootstrap samples from within the population in order to generate its own sampling 
distribution. This type of analysis does not lead to traditional asymptotic inference, but 
is used to obtain a portrayal of the sampling properties using the sample data itself 
(Greene, 2000). That is, it uses the distribution of the results of the various iterations 
from which to obtain statistical inference for the population. It then uses backwards 
elimination to develop a parsimonious predictive model (Austin and Tu, 2004) and 
reports coefficients and standard errors calculated using the following methods as 
described by Amemiya (1986).  
1. Firstly, the model is specified based on the entire sample and the error term is 
calculated for each observation using the following formula, where εt is the error 
term of the vector, yt is the dependent variable and β is the model estimator. 
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2. The bootstrap now calculates the empirical distribution function,31 F of {εt}.  
3. Next, {   
 } is generated based on t = 1, 2, …, T repetitions of i = 1, 2, …, N 
observations. These standard errors from the repeated iterations of the model using 
the bootstrap samples are collected.  
4. Using these standard errors and F, the following formula is calculated: 
   
            
  
5. The model estimator   
  that minimizes the following formula is estimated:  
     
 
 
   
       
                    
6. Finally, the distribution of     is approximated by the empirical distribution function 
of {  
 } 
Ordinarily, the bootstrap selects random bootstrap samples from within the full sample. 
However, in this study, the bootstrap will select bootstrap samples based on the 
stratified sampling method described above. Bootstrapping has become increasing 
popular as a method of analysing data, largely due to advances in statistical software 
and increased computing power (Davison et al., 2003). It can improve inference based 
on asymptotic theory generated from more traditional testing methods and is often used 
to refine any inference made from the usual asymptotic theory (Li and Wang, 1998; 
Wooldridge, 2010).  
Wu (1986) advises against the use of bootstrapping as an independent method where 
there is no exchangeable component within a model (e.g., heteroskedasticity, 
generalized linear models) as it can result in biased estimators or inconsistencies in 
results. This study, applies both OLS and random effects models
32
 to the data. When the 
two sets of results were compared, the random effects model exhibited marginally 
smaller standard errors but significantly higher levels of bias in the coefficients. On that 
                                                 
31
 The empirical distribution function or cumulative distribution function is used to compute probabilities 
for continuous random variables. It gives “the probability of a random variable being less than or equal to 
any specified real number” (Wooldridge, 2013:840). 
32
 The random effects model was chosen over the fixed effects model as the most appropriate method. 
The fixed effects model uses the variation of an independent variable within each firm to estimate the 
“fixed effect” an omitted variable may have on the dependent variable. The cultural dimensions have no 
variation at firm level and when used in a fixed effects model are excluded from the results rendering this 
model inappropriate.  
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basis, the OLS model is deemed most suitable. Brownstone and Valletta (2001) 
commented that bootstrapping can be used independently to generate statistical 
inference when more traditional methods are not suitable which appears to be the case 
in this study. 
To summarize, the combination of clustering, stratified sampling and bootstrapping 
allows the testing of all three cultural dimensions and control variables without 
subjecting the model to multicollinearity, whilst dealing with the lack of independence 
of between observations from the same firm, and without reducing the number of 
observations in the analysis. This analysis divides the data into nine strata (countries) 
and through the application of bootstrapping, uses the observations from 50 randomly 
selected firms from each stratum. The bootstrapping then runs the regression model on 
the randomly selected firms using 1,000 repetitions.
33
  
4.9 Regression Model 
In order to test the hypotheses developed in Section 3.5, an OLS regression model is 
employed in conjunction with the techniques described above. LEV is the dependent 
variable and the cultural dimensions, firm level and institution level factors are the 
independent variables. 
                                                    
                                            
                 
The model above is used to test the full sample and the subsamples of micro, small and 
medium firms. The only difference between the models for the full sample, micro, small 
and medium firms is the industry variable. As the industry leverage median is used, the 
industry leverage median is calculated for the full sample, micro, small and medium 
firms separately. 
                                                 
33
 Between 200 and 500 repetitions is usually sufficient to obtain accurate standard errors where 
bootstrapping is being used as a robustness check (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Where multiple 
regression models and confidence intervals are being calculated over 1,000 repetitions is required (Efron, 
1982). This study conducted the bootstrap analysis multiple times using various numbers of repetitions. 
The results were consistent at 250, 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 5,000 repetitions. In order to use a number of 
repetitions that falls within the recommend range whilst minimising the time required to conduct each test 
1,000 was the number of repetitions chosen for each test. 
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Additional variables which captured the effects of macroeconomic conditions, stock 
market development and tax rate are excluded from the regression model because, 
despite the findings of prior literature which suggest that these variables can have an 
effect on the capital structure of firms, in this study, this is not the case. Macroeconomic 
conditions are defined as GDP growth rates, as used by De Jong et al. (2008) and Kayo 
and Kimura (2012). Stock market development is captured as stock market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, also used by De Jong et al. (2008) and Kayo and 
Kimura (2012) (both captured from WDI) and the country’s highest marginal corporate 
tax rate is used to capture the effect of the debt tax shield as used by Frank and Goyal 
(2009). 
They were all found to be highly insignificant, therefore not contributing towards the 
predictive ability of the model, and merely inflating standard errors. Upon further 
investigation into these variables, and those included in the model, the discovery is 
made that some variables, particularly the institution level variables, exhibit high levels 
of bias. The removal of the very insignificant institutional variables (which also exhibit 
the highest levels of bias) reduces the bias in the remaining estimators, therefore not 
only reducing the standard errors, but reducing bias in the model.  
4.10 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter begins by providing the definition of an SME for the purposes of this 
study. This is unlisted firms which meet the size criteria set out by The Companies Act 
2006. Additionally, the EU SME definition is used when dividing the SMEs into micro, 
small and medium firms. Following on from this, tables are presented which show the 
structure of the sample. The data is from nine countries and covers the period 2006 – 
2010. This section highlights that with the limitations of the data. More specifically, the 
number of data points varies greatly between countries (China has 371,102 observations 
and New Zealand has 119) and across time (In 2006 there are 209,869 observations and 
in 2010 there are 74,022).  
The discussion then moves on to defining the dependent and independent variables 
which are used in the empirical analyses. These variables are based on those used in 
prior studies on the capital structure of SMEs where possible or listed firms where this 
is not. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
87 
After defining the variables, the empirical methods are described. This study uses a 
clustered stratified re-sampling method in conjunction with an ordinary least squares 
regression model to account for the uneven number of observations in the sample from 
each country. The uneven number of observations causes a false multicollinearity issue 
between the cultural dimensions. The stratified re-sampling method evens out the 
number of observations from each country in the empirical testing which eliminates the 
false multicollinearity.  
The following chapter proceeds with the empirical results of the study obtained by 
using the methods described in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 Results 
 
 
 
 
88 
Chapter 5 Results 
This chapter presents the results and discussion of the empirical analysis. It begins by 
presenting descriptive statistics (Section 5.1), followed by univariate tests (Section 5.2). 
Then, the results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
Finally, robustness tests using the tobit model, lagged asset values as the denominator 
of independent variables, Hofstede’s cultural values as an alternative to Schwartz’s 
cultural dimensions and further testing using alternative debt ratios are presented in 
Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the institutional variables including the 
cultural dimensions. This table shows summary statistics for the full sample and each 
subsample of SMEs. The institutional variables have the same value for all observations 
within the same country, regardless of the firm’s size category. The variation in the 
descriptive statistics between subsamples is caused by the variation in the number of 
observations from each country. These descriptive statistics tables have the same 
number of observations as the following empirical analysis which is lower than the 
number of observations presented in Chapter 4.  
In order to reduce the effect of outlying observations on the descriptive statistics, the 
univariate tests and the multivariate analysis two methods are used. Firstly, variables 
are winsorised at the one and the ninety-nine percentiles. Secondly, a regression model 
is calculated and so too are the residuals. Any observation with a residual of more than 
two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals is removed from the sample.
34
 
                                                 
34
 The number of excluded observations from tests on the full sample is 29,324 and from the subsamples 
of micro, small and medium firms, 21,837, 10,970 and 6,460 respectively. To ensure that the removal of 
outlying observations does not remove all observations from one or multiple countries, tables were 
created which show the excluded observations by country from each sample tested (Appendix 3). 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Variables 
Sample Firms 
EMB HIER MAST LEGTRA CORR SHARE CRED JUD STPRO BDMK 
(N)   
Full Sample Mean 3.60 3.00 4.21 0.17 8.03 3.21 2.53 8.87 5.42 1.01 
(868,684) 1st Quartile 3.49 2.65 4.06 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.00 8.54 5.31 0.44 
  Median 3.68 2.90 4.21 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.33 8.54 5.31 0.49 
  3rd Quartile 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.53 4.00 3.00 10.00 5.88 1.99 
  SD 0.17 0.46 0.18 0.37 1.06 1.08 0.68 1.44 0.80 0.72 
Micro Mean 3.58 2.90 4.16 0.21 8.04 3.40 2.56 8.92 5.44 1.14 
(429,246) 1st Quartile 3.49 2.65 4.06 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.00 8.54 5.31 0.48 
  Median 3.49 2.65 4.06 0.00 8.53 4.00 2.33 10.00 5.88 0.55 
  3rd Quartile 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.53 4.00 3.00 10.00 5.88 2.04 
  SD 0.17 0.43 0.17 0.41 1.15 1.09 0.72 1.66 0.89 0.75 
Small Mean 3.64 3.14 4.27 0.08 7.97 2.92 2.43 8.75 5.35 0.91 
(273,057) 1st Quartile 3.49 2.65 4.06 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.00 8.54 5.31 0.44 
  Median 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.33 8.54 5.31 0.49 
  3rd Quartile 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.53 4.00 2.33 10.00 5.88 1.18 
  SD 0.14 0.43 0.17 0.27 0.95 0.95 0.52 1.19 0.68 0.68 
Medium Mean 3.61 3.05 4.24 0.20 8.13 3.18 2.60 8.93 5.48 0.82 
(156,438) 1st Quartile 3.49 2.65 4.06 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.33 8.54 5.31 0.48 
  Median 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.03 2.33 2.33 8.54 5.31 0.49 
  3rd Quartile 3.74 3.49 4.41 0.00 8.53 4.00 3.00 10.00 5.88 1.02 
  SD 0.17 0.49 0.19 0.40 1.00 1.12 0.77 1.13 0.69 0.63 
Outlying observations more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed from the sample before these statistics are 
calculated. The data relates to the total period examined. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.9 on page 75. 
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The majority of the numerical values for Schwartz’s cultural dimensions range between 
2.5 and 4.5. The mean values for Embeddedness, Mastery and Hierarchy are 3.60, 4.21 
and 3.00 and the standard deviations are 0.17, 0.18 and 0.46 respectively. The majority 
of the data is collected from South East Asia which might have resulted in very similar 
cultural dimensions scores but these figures indicate that, despite this, there is sufficient 
cultural diversity to test for the effect of culture on capital structure in the sample used. 
The descriptive statistics show that over 75% of the data belongs to countries which 
have code law systems. This is because Korea, China and Japan all have code law 
systems and these countries have many observations. Despite this, the number of 
countries with each type of legal system is divided fairly evenly. Four countries 
(Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand and the UK) have civil law systems and five 
countries (China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan) having code law systems.  
Bond market development may be the same for each observation in the same country 
but this institutional variable changes depending on the year of the observation. Japan 
has the highest value of any country for this variable (with a mean of 2.01 over the total 
period). This value is almost double that of Korea (1.09) which has the second most 
developed bond market suggesting that companies in Japan could have high debt ratios. 
New Zealand has the lowest mean value for bond market development (0.15). New 
Zealand does not have a private bond market so this figure only includes the public 
bond market which explains why it is so low compared with the rest of the sample. 
As explained in Section 4.5.2, corruption, shareholder rights, creditor rights and the 
efficiency of the judicial system variables are combined into one variable which 
captures the enforcement of legal systems and protection of those who provide finance. 
The mean of the four values is STPRO. The possible values for this variable range 
between 0 and 7.5 but most values are between 5 and 6. This suggests that, in this 
sample, protection and enforcement are relatively high.  
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Country (N) LEV SIZE PROF TANG RISK GROW LIQ
Total Mean 0.214 13.486 0.106 0.393 0.464 0.293 2.988
(864,929) 1st Quartile 0.000 12.605 0.005 0.169 0.000 -0.069 0.903
Median 0.000 13.529 0.045 0.358 0.082 0.108 1.346
3rd Quartile 0.397 14.486 0.134 0.585 0.576 0.416 2.400
SD 0.299 1.407 0.267 0.263 0.696 0.755 6.392
China Mean 0.004 13.892 0.160 0.405 0.503 0.356 2.364
(370,869) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.126 0.019 0.204 0.000 -0.082 0.829
Median 0.000 13.845 0.066 0.385 0.000 0.136 1.147
3rd Quartile 0.000 14.650 0.187 0.582 1.920 0.513 1.839
SD 0.037 1.077 0.286 0.242 0.844 0.845 5.292
Japan Mean 0.426 13.207 0.011 0.363 0.308 0.222 3.467
(237,557) 1st Quartile 0.125 12.245 -0.031 0.155 0.006 -0.064 1.140
Median 0.411 13.196 0.014 0.328 0.253 0.127 1.761
3rd Quartile 0.668 14.175 0.054 0.543 0.507 0.366 3.139
SD 0.329 1.377 0.170 0.244 0.294 0.530 6.273
Korea Mean 0.302 13.407 0.080 0.375 0.459 0.435 4.601
(73,753) 1st Quartile 0.078 12.619 0.028 0.146 0.000 -0.009 1.057
Median 0.258 13.333 0.070 0.310 0.188 0.154 1.703
3rd Quartile 0.492 14.161 0.126 0.577 0.509 0.481 3.572
SD 0.253 1.129 0.145 0.271 0.647 0.929 9.176
Malaysia Mean 0.073 14.118 0.071 0.257 0.195 0.140 2.456
(192) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.142 0.013 0.052 0.000 -0.107 0.925
Median 0.009 14.208 0.043 0.182 0.018 0.042 1.243
3rd Quartile 0.093 15.242 0.128 0.418 0.126 0.225 1.746
SD 0.126 1.365 0.179 0.233 0.481 0.590 6.619
Mean 0.126 15.157 0.088 0.336 0.486 0.189 2.494
1st Quartile 0.000 14.502 0.022 0.077 0.000 -0.071 0.935
(118) Median 0.000 15.349 0.072 0.287 0.000 0.080 1.541
3rd Quartile 0.195 15.944 0.149 0.510 0.676 0.199 2.227
SD 0.213 0.897 0.194 0.287 0.786 0.723 3.383
Philippines Mean 0.103 15.095 0.057 0.301 0.037 0.077 2.767
(2,445) 1st Quartile 0.000 14.622 0.007 0.105 0.000 -0.110 0.984
Median 0.000 15.309 0.041 0.242 0.000 0.055 1.307
3rd Quartile 0.136 15.831 0.096 0.448 0.000 0.248 2.129
SD 0.178 0.948 0.168 0.240 0.115 0.424 6.172
Taiwan Mean 0.189 14.414 0.056 0.324 0.040 0.220 1.749
(509) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.630 0.003 0.108 0.000 -0.128 0.807
Median 0.151 14.631 0.030 0.291 0.000 0.046 1.089
3rd Quartile 0.301 15.664 0.090 0.504 0.035 0.364 1.519
SD 0.192 1.499 0.191 0.245 0.084 0.715 3.528
Thailand Mean 0.104 11.504 0.017 0.454 0.271 0.232 9.412
(18,555) 1st Quartile 0.000 10.258 -0.028 0.101 0.000 -0.075 0.833
Median 0.000 11.335 0.026 0.406 0.000 0.045 1.954
3rd Quartile 0.055 12.551 0.102 0.811 0.217 0.304 8.063
SD 0.222 1.497 0.233 0.355 0.564 0.782 15.909
UK Mean 0.340 13.193 0.185 0.428 0.733 0.195 1.892
(124,931) 1st Quartile 0.091 11.694 0.018 0.127 0.088 -0.081 0.719
Median 0.279 13.247 0.080 0.368 0.332 0.020 1.146
3rd Quartile 0.534 14.897 0.243 0.714 1.920 0.206 1.803
SD 0.287 1.897 0.359 0.326 0.785 0.748 3.854
Outlying observations more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed from
the sample before these statistics are calculated. The data relates to the total period examined. The variable
definitions are provided in Table 4.8 on page 72.
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Specific Variables (Full Sample)
New 
Zealand
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Country (N) LEV SIZE PROF TANG RISK GROW LIQ
Total Mean 0.284 12.448 0.079 0.384 0.498 0.214 3.542
(429,761) 1st Quartile 0.000 11.843 -0.009 0.156 0.000 -0.095 0.890
Median 0.111 12.625 0.036 0.338 0.167 0.066 1.413
3rd Quartile 0.513 13.237 0.119 0.578 0.663 0.336 2.765
SD 0.356 1.050 0.272 0.269 0.684 0.660 7.551
China Mean 0.002 13.003 0.091 0.371 0.543 0.177 2.275
(128,932) 1st Quartile 0.000 12.580 0.012 0.173 0.000 -0.113 0.834
Median 0.000 13.072 0.048 0.343 0.000 0.052 1.141
3rd Quartile 0.000 13.522 0.118 0.541 1.920 0.341 1.788
SD 0.027 0.677 0.191 0.236 0.864 0.610 5.074
Japan Mean 0.473 12.355 -0.002 0.364 0.339 0.207 3.937
(172,122) 1st Quartile 0.125 11.719 -0.066 0.154 0.000 -0.093 1.086
Median 0.439 12.456 0.007 0.327 0.262 0.103 1.819
3rd Quartile 0.729 13.090 0.054 0.548 0.550 0.357 3.484
SD 0.388 0.962 0.210 0.247 0.348 0.555 7.279
Korea Mean 0.278 12.683 0.071 0.362 0.523 0.410 6.189
(40,278) 1st Quartile 0.064 12.206 0.022 0.152 0.034 -0.021 1.195
Median 0.215 12.729 0.063 0.293 0.206 0.133 2.202
3rd Quartile 0.452 13.230 0.119 0.542 0.587 0.453 5.108
SD 0.253 0.752 0.156 0.259 0.695 0.911 11.093
Malaysia Mean 0.090 12.685 0.016 0.293 0.167 0.078 3.613
(71) 1st Quartile 0.000 12.050 -0.024 0.067 0.000 -0.099 0.703
Median 0.022 12.815 0.023 0.238 0.027 0.027 1.080
3rd Quartile 0.109 13.400 0.063 0.457 0.162 0.182 1.701
SD 0.149 0.878 0.134 0.247 0.398 0.326 10.542
Philippines Mean 0.031 13.124 -0.070 0.399 0.019 -0.320 3.651
(68) 1st Quartile 0.000 12.786 -0.177 0.181 0.000 -0.727 0.419
Median 0.000 13.253 0.012 0.346 0.000 -0.229 1.329
3rd Quartile 0.000 13.715 0.050 0.554 0.000 -0.044 2.805
SD 0.090 0.748 0.227 0.260 0.083 0.326 9.069
Taiwan Mean 0.110 12.293 0.098 0.227 0.014 0.220 3.289
(112) 1st Quartile 0.000 11.628 0.005 0.048 0.000 -0.195 0.704
Median 0.000 12.396 0.060 0.158 0.000 0.080 1.250
3rd Quartile 0.208 13.224 0.174 0.351 0.000 0.461 2.517
SD 0.158 1.185 0.292 0.224 0.054 0.694 6.932
Thailand Mean 0.113 11.201 0.011 0.464 0.288 0.202 10.162
(16,605) 1st Quartile 0.000 10.139 -0.035 0.103 0.000 -0.087 0.843
Median 0.000 11.094 0.022 0.423 0.000 0.029 2.188
3rd Quartile 0.042 12.131 0.100 0.831 0.242 0.254 9.520
SD 0.251 1.240 0.239 0.359 0.582 0.761 16.440
UK Mean 0.380 11.824 0.275 0.448 0.833 0.189 1.849
(71,573) 1st Quartile 0.103 10.890 0.027 0.137 0.133 -0.103 0.574
Median 0.321 11.902 0.138 0.396 0.451 0.009 1.035
3rd Quartile 0.602 12.800 0.422 0.756 1.920 0.211 1.744
SD 0.317 1.239 0.435 0.334 0.796 0.759 4.018
Outlying observations more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed from the
sample before these statistics are calculated. The data relates to the total period examined. The variable
definitions are provided in Table 4.8 on page 72.
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Specific Variables for (Micro Firms)
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Country (N) LEV SIZE PROF TANG RISK GROW LIQ
Total Mean 0.140 13.964 0.135 0.382 0.450 0.338 2.470
(273,271) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.532 0.014 0.172 0.000 -0.048 0.927
Median 0.000 14.096 0.058 0.354 0.000 0.154 1.320
3rd Quartile 0.234 14.480 0.160 0.562 0.496 0.482 2.172
SD 0.231 0.676 0.261 0.249 0.722 0.753 4.939
China Mean 0.002 13.915 0.196 0.410 0.515 0.382 2.402
(158,030) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.453 0.025 0.211 0.000 -0.066 0.833
Median 0.000 14.056 0.085 0.394 0.000 0.172 1.151
3rd Quartile 0.000 14.462 0.242 0.587 1.920 0.557 1.871
SD 0.024 0.711 0.312 0.240 0.850 0.822 5.335
Japan Mean 0.366 14.055 0.024 0.332 0.275 0.244 2.598
(68,656) 1st Quartile 0.128 13.679 -0.003 0.142 0.046 -0.031 1.217
Median 0.367 14.143 0.018 0.298 0.246 0.156 1.713
3rd Quartile 0.582 14.496 0.053 0.489 0.453 0.386 2.673
SD 0.260 0.582 0.095 0.226 0.234 0.495 3.651
Korea Mean 0.300 13.907 0.096 0.354 0.406 0.478 2.857
(24,162) 1st Quartile 0.090 13.453 0.044 0.127 0.000 0.021 1.046
Median 0.279 13.974 0.083 0.295 0.177 0.197 1.493
3rd Quartile 0.484 14.414 0.138 0.549 0.452 0.543 2.478
SD 0.229 0.647 0.124 0.262 0.601 0.933 5.663
Malaysia Mean 0.051 14.179 0.110 0.195 0.195 0.278 1.909
(50) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.897 0.031 0.017 0.000 -0.112 1.086
Median 0.006 14.235 0.064 0.102 0.010 0.032 1.294
3rd Quartile 0.034 14.502 0.160 0.374 0.085 0.238 1.637
SD 0.105 0.411 0.252 0.211 0.522 0.998 2.692
Philippines Mean 0.061 14.185 0.022 0.320 0.025 -0.129 2.807
(390) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.819 0.003 0.129 0.000 -0.340 0.882
Median 0.000 14.314 0.036 0.276 0.000 -0.080 1.457
3rd Quartile 0.032 14.689 0.086 0.469 0.000 0.095 2.534
SD 0.130 0.614 0.172 0.245 0.083 0.390 5.516
Taiwan Mean 0.146 14.141 0.054 0.293 0.033 0.204 1.282
(156) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.818 0.006 0.088 0.000 -0.173 0.738
Median 0.103 14.266 0.026 0.225 0.000 0.036 0.977
3rd Quartile 0.253 14.595 0.067 0.465 0.006 0.414 1.301
SD 0.153 0.598 0.139 0.252 0.075 0.706 1.578
Thailand Mean 0.104 13.538 0.070 0.348 0.139 0.446 3.829
(1,608) 1st Quartile 0.000 13.100 0.009 0.085 0.000 0.030 0.852
Median 0.005 13.640 0.055 0.248 0.003 0.252 1.245
3rd Quartile 0.149 14.242 0.114 0.563 0.148 0.558 2.133
SD 0.168 0.937 0.165 0.305 0.327 0.855 9.455
UK Mean 0.270 14.129 0.087 0.374 0.618 0.153 2.004
(20,219) 1st Quartile 0.071 13.741 0.012 0.085 0.047 -0.066 0.898
Median 0.218 14.265 0.063 0.275 0.214 0.032 1.269
3rd Quartile 0.429 14.618 0.153 0.625 0.856 0.205 1.899
SD 0.228 0.634 0.190 0.323 0.768 0.577 3.912
Outlying observations  more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed from the 
sample before these statistics are calculated. The data relates to the total period examined. The variable 
definitions are provided in Table 4.8 on page 72.
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Specific  Variables (Small Firms)
Chapter 5 Results 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
Country (N) LEV SIZE PROF TANG RISK GROW LIQ
Total Mean 0.159 15.322 0.130 0.432 0.403 0.428 2.354
(156,222) 1st Quartile 0.000 15.062 0.013 0.212 0.000 -0.032 0.884
Median 0.000 15.370 0.052 0.413 0.005 0.155 1.252
3rd Quartile 0.286 15.764 0.138 0.632 0.418 0.502 2.007
SD 0.241 0.633 0.267 0.265 0.686 0.948 4.943
China Mean 0.008 15.215 0.199 0.447 0.417 0.583 2.437
(83,365) 1st Quartile 0.000 14.995 0.019 0.247 0.000 -0.030 0.818
Median 0.000 15.302 0.074 0.432 0.000 0.260 1.149
3rd Quartile 0.000 15.704 0.234 0.632 0.000 0.708 1.867
SD 0.045 0.710 0.335 0.249 0.790 1.102 5.549
Japan Mean 0.397 15.438 0.034 0.418 0.285 0.233 2.585
(31,541) 1st Quartile 0.153 15.133 0.005 0.208 0.046 -0.011 1.123
Median 0.414 15.420 0.026 0.404 0.253 0.157 1.582
3rd Quartile 0.622 15.789 0.059 0.610 0.469 0.360 2.530
SD 0.270 0.474 0.075 0.251 0.245 0.452 4.107
Korea Mean 0.385 15.283 0.083 0.468 0.285 0.421 2.252
(8,270) 1st Quartile 0.147 15.051 0.022 0.174 0.000 -0.013 0.689
Median 0.395 15.300 0.063 0.469 0.119 0.146 1.157
3rd Quartile 0.598 15.667 0.121 0.733 0.388 0.451 1.823
SD 0.264 0.580 0.141 0.309 0.452 0.946 5.418
Malaysia Mean 0.070 15.446 0.094 0.263 0.246 0.111 1.667
(72) 1st Quartile 0.000 15.164 0.020 0.049 0.000 -0.133 1.037
Median 0.002 15.494 0.069 0.209 0.022 0.089 1.267
3rd Quartile 0.107 15.926 0.155 0.443 0.148 0.275 1.935
SD 0.112 0.659 0.148 0.228 0.563 0.361 1.069
New Zealand Mean 0.154 15.730 0.065 0.260 0.314 0.164 2.237
(62) 1st Quartile 0.000 15.412 0.027 0.061 0.000 -0.084 1.099
Median 0.034 15.699 0.073 0.197 0.000 0.037 1.602
3rd Quartile 0.273 16.167 0.150 0.467 0.226 0.199 2.071
SD 0.205 0.385 0.169 0.234 0.646 0.697 2.960
Philippines Mean 0.088 15.360 0.070 0.292 0.031 0.134 2.750
(1,899) 1st Quartile 0.000 15.069 0.008 0.100 0.000 -0.069 1.000
Median 0.000 15.516 0.043 0.232 0.000 0.103 1.303
3rd Quartile 0.126 15.925 0.106 0.436 0.000 0.283 2.059
SD 0.148 0.793 0.164 0.236 0.096 0.414 6.190
Taiwan Mean 0.194 15.677 0.046 0.398 0.052 0.243 1.403
(207) 1st Quartile 0.032 15.409 0.001 0.226 0.000 -0.093 0.921
Median 0.190 15.766 0.028 0.400 0.000 0.040 1.149
3rd Quartile 0.294 16.059 0.088 0.551 0.072 0.312 1.514
SD 0.155 0.505 0.147 0.225 0.087 0.762 1.107
Thailand Mean 0.148 15.154 0.043 0.467 0.197 0.526 3.896
(419) 1st Quartile 0.000 15.052 -0.007 0.125 0.000 0.016 0.644
Median 0.011 15.327 0.030 0.472 0.007 0.269 1.068
3rd Quartile 0.285 15.770 0.092 0.749 0.262 0.575 2.046
SD 0.201 0.950 0.156 0.332 0.382 1.037 10.135
UK Mean 0.271 15.503 0.057 0.407 0.547 0.227 1.878
(30,387) 1st Quartile 0.084 15.181 0.011 0.141 0.048 -0.052 0.926
Median 0.231 15.507 0.051 0.356 0.186 0.039 1.258
3rd Quartile 0.418 15.872 0.105 0.636 0.594 0.198 1.830
SD 0.217 0.469 0.129 0.300 0.730 0.804 3.386
Outlying observations  more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed from the 
sample before these statistics are calculated. The data relates to the total period examined. The variable definitions 
are provided in Table 4.8 on page 72.
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Firm Specific Variables (Medium Firms)
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Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics for the firm level variables (both the dependent 
and independent) for the full sample and for each country individually. The subsequent 
tables (5.3, 5.4 and 5.5) show the same descriptive statistics but for each subsample of 
micro small and medium firms individually.
35
 
Table 5.2 shows that there is substantial variation in leverage ratios between companies 
across different countries. China reports the lowest mean debt ratios (0.004) and Japan 
reports the highest (0.426). Of the remaining countries, the UK and Korea have higher 
mean debt levels. Japan, Korea and the UK also have the highest standard deviation for 
leverage, demonstrating high levels of in-country variation of leverage. Japan has the 
most developed bond markets, followed by Korea which may explain why these 
countries have higher debt ratios. Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show the same information as 
Table 5.2 but for micro, small and medium firms individually. The debt ratios are 
highest in Japan, the UK and Korea in all three subsamples and China consistently has 
the lowest debt ratios. 
Tables 5.2-5.5 shows that a significant proportion of SMEs from some countries 
(China, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand) have no debt in their capital 
structures. Romano et al. (2001:286) suggest that “Small family businesses and owners 
who do not have formal planning processes in place tend to rely on family loans as a 
source of finance” thus suggesting that they choose to avoid debt finance. The go on to 
say that small firms in particular tend to rely on equity finance provided by the owner 
and the owners family members. As the smallest SMEs; micro firms make up over half 
the sample this could explain why a significant proportion of the observations have no 
debt at all in their capital structures. 
This means that for a large proportion of the data, the dependent variable is zero.
36
 
When a significant proportion of the observations have the same value (zero) for the 
dependent variable, this often reduces the variation in debt levels. For example, China 
                                                 
35
 In order to further reduce the effect of outliers, like Table 5.1 and the following analysis, preliminary 
regression models were used to calculate residual values in order to exclude outlying values. Outlying 
observations of more than two standard deviations from the mean of the residuals are removed prior to 
the calculation of descriptive statistics which again, explains the reduced number of observations when 
compared with the tables presented in Chapter 4. 
36
 In order to ensure that the large number of observations with zero for the value of the dependent 
variables does not adversely affect the empirical results, robustness tests are conducted using the tobit 
model. This is discussed and the results are presented in Section 5.5.1. 
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has the highest proportion of observations with no debt (over 75%) and the lowest 
standard deviation (0.037) whereas Japan has less than 25% of firms with no debt and a 
much higher standard deviation of 0.329. 
Although some other countries have a significant proportion of SMEs without debt 
(Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), Chinese firms are unusual as very few SMEs 
have any debt at all (less than 25%). This is particularly relevant as Chinese firms make 
up a significant proportion of the data. Wu et al. (2008) investigate SME financing in 
China and argue that despite the Chinese government lifting barriers for SMEs to 
encourage their development, they still have difficulty obtaining external finance. They 
say that the majority of SMEs are privately owned in China. However, privately owned 
SMEs are often discriminated against when attempting to obtain external finance when 
compared to state owned enterprises. They suggest that this is because the largest banks 
in China are also state owned and they are more willing to lend to state-owned 
enterprises. This suggests that Chinese SMEs will find it particularly difficult to obtain 
external finance and are more likely to rely on finance from the owner/manager or 
through private equity investments, often from other family members.  
Additionally, Hillier et al. (2010) also report that when Chinese firms become listed, 
their initial public offerings are usually significantly under-priced. This may suggest 
that Chinese SMEs aim to become listed as soon as they can so they can obtain external 
finance from financial markets, despite having to under-price their initial offering of 
their shares. 
Table 5.2 also shows that Chinese firms have a comparatively high proportion of 
tangible assets (mean 0.405) but very low debt levels (mean 0.004). This is consistent 
across all three subsamples. This is inconsistent with prior capital structure literature 
usually finds a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage.
37
  
Additionally, Chinese SMEs have one of the highest profitability ratios of all countries 
in the full sample and across all three subsamples. This could also contribute towards 
                                                 
37
 Referring to Appendices 5 and 7, it can be seen that contrary to expectations, tangibility is negatively 
related to leverage in China in the full sample and small firms. Chen (2003) finds a positive relationship 
between leverage and tangibility but examines the capital structure of Chinese listed firms. The 
relationship between tangibility and leverage is often stronger in private firms (Goyal et al., 2011) than it 
is in listed firms. Thus, this finding is unusual but could be explained by the difficulties that Chinese 
SMEs encounter when obtaining external finance. 
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explaining why these SMEs have such low debt levels. The pecking order theory 
suggests that firms will use internal cash (profits generated) before borrowing. If 
Chinese firms apply the pecking order theory and are often highly profitable, then this 
suggests that they are less likely to require external finance. 
These tables also show that throughout the subsamples, the UK has the highest level of 
firm risk. Additionally, the UK also has relatively high debt levels which could result in 
more firms from the UK getting into financial difficulties but could also indicate firms 
from the UK take on debt in order to generate growth. The growth figures for the UK 
across all subsamples are all below average which suggests that even though these firms 
are borrowing and have comparatively high levels of firm risk, they are not 
experiencing high growth rates. 
In the full sample and throughout the subsamples, Japanese firms have high leverage 
ratios (mean 0.426) and low profitability (mean 0.011). This is accompanied by 
comparatively low levels of growth (mean 0.222) and risk (0.308). These characteristics 
of Japanese firms indicate that they may try to minimise the level of risk associated 
with the projects they choose and therefore, reduce the level of firm risk in order to 
ensure they meet the servicing requirements of their debt. They likely use the majority 
of their profits to do so which leaves little excess internal finance to fund growth.  
This table also shows that Thai SMEs have very high liquidity ratios (mean 9.412) 
compared with 2.988 which is the mean of the full sample). This means that they have 
much higher amounts of current assets compared with current liabilities. This suggests 
that Thai SMEs do not make use of financial bootstrapping techniques as described by 
Holmes et al. (2003). This may differentiate Thai SMEs and the way they finance 
themselves from SMEs in other countries. The next subsection discusses the univariate 
tests performed and their results. 
Comparing the leverage ratios in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, the SMEs with the highest 
leverage ratios are micro firms (mean 0.214) and small firms have the lowest leverage 
ratios (mean 0.140). This order (micro firms with highest leverage ratios, followed by 
medium firms and small firms with the lowest) is not consistent throughout the sample, 
for example Korean micro firms have the lowest leverage ratios in Korea (mean 0.278) 
and leverage ratios increase in small firms (mean 0.300) and are higher still in medium 
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firms (mean 0.385). However, Thai micro firms have the highest leverage ratios (mean 
0.380) and these decrease as firm size increases (small firm’s mean 0.270 and medium 
firm’s mean 0.148). 
Looking at the profitability ratios, these are lowest in micro firms (mean 0.079) and 
slightly higher in small and medium firms (means 0.135 and 0.130). These figures 
indicate that small and medium firms, on average, are almost twice as profitable as 
micro firms. As micro firms also have the highest leverage ratios, a large proportion of 
their profits will likely to be used to make interest payment. This appears to limit their 
growth as micro firms also have the lowest growth rates (mean 0.214) compared with 
small (mean 0.338) and medium (mean 0.428) firms. 
5.2 Univariate Tests 
This section describes the results from a series of univariate tests carried out on the data 
prior to the multivariate analysis. Firstly, tests are carried out to establish any 
significant relationships between leverage and the independent variables for the full 
sample and each subsample. Then, the Levene test and t-tests are used to establish 
whether there are differences in the leverage ratios between countries and between size 
categories. 
5.2.1 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients 
Table 5.6 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the leverage ratio and the 
independent variables for the full sample and each subsample.
38
 The information in this 
table provides an indication of how the cultural dimensions and the control variables 
will behave in the multivariate analysis that follows.  
Table 5.6 shows some evidence there is a negative relationship between Embeddedness 
and Hierarchy and leverage (coefficients -0.433 and -0.505 respectively). This provides 
some support for H2 and H3. However, Table 5.6 shows that there is also a negative 
relationship between leverage and Mastery which is against the expectation of H1 (-
0.499). 
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 This table is repeated in Appendix 4 using the Spearman correlation coefficients. 
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Table 5.6 Pearson correlation coefficients between the leverage 
ratio and the independent variables 
Independent Variable LEV 
  Full Micro Small Medium 
EMB -0.433 -0.367 -0.557 -0.500 
HIER -0.505 -0.437 -0.627 -0.575 
MAST -0.499 -0.422 -0.623 -0.564 
SIZE -0.248 -0.265 0.118 0.169 
PROF -0.235 -0.208 -0.260 -0.253 
TANG 0.099 0.123 0.062 0.138 
GROW -0.064 -0.026 -0.052 -0.107 
LIQ -0.049 -0.082 -0.023 -0.053 
IND 0.471 0.419 0.519 0.473 
RISK 0.180 0.237 0.059 0.100 
LEGTRA 0.119 0.044 0.198 0.258 
BDMK 0.457 0.411 0.545 0.452 
STPRO 0.195 0.211 0.142 0.186 
All reported values are significant at the one per cent level. The variable definitions 
are provided in tables 4.8 and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. 
Beyond this, some evidence that the control variables may affect different subsamples 
differently is shown. For example, size is negatively and significantly related to 
leverage in micro firms (coefficient -0.265). This would be expected based on the 
rationale that small firms borrow in order to establish themselves and as they start to 
grow and generate profits they repay their debts and decrease their debt levels. For 
small and medium firms, size is positively related to leverage (0.118 and 0.169 
respectively). This is more in line with the trade-off theory and suggests that as firms 
grow they increase their debt capacity and make use of the benefits of debt.  
Profitability, tangibility, liquidity, risk and industry all behave as would be expected 
based on prior capital structure literature. Profitability is negatively related to leverage 
(coefficient -0.235) as is liquidity (coefficient -0.049). Industry and tangibility are both 
positively related to leverage, as is risk (coefficients 0.471, 0.009 and 0.180 
respectively). Growth is negatively related to leverage (coefficient -0.064) which is 
unexpected and more in line with prior studies’ findings on listed firms than SMEs.  
5.2.2 T-tests 
T-tests are performed to determine whether the means of two sets of data are 
significantly different to each other. These tests are appropriate for this study because 
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they determine whether there are significant differences in leverage ratios between size 
categories and countries. When performing t-tests, it must first be established whether 
the two samples being compared have equal variances. When t-test statistics are 
calculated it is usually assumed that the variances are equal unless the calculation is 
altered to account for unequal variances. In order to test for equal variances, the Levene 
test is used. This is a robust method of assessing the equality of variances in two or 
more samples (Levene et al., 1960). It tests the null hypothesis that the variances of the 
two samples are equal. If the Levene test statistic is greater than 1.96 and p<0.05 then 
the t-test is conducted based on unequal variances. If p>0.05 then the t-test is performed 
based on the assumption that the two samples could have equal variances.  
Table 5.7 shows the results of the Levene and t-tests when testing for leverage 
differences across countries. Most of the results for the Levene test show that the 
samples have different variances (p<0.01). There are three exceptions. When the 
Philippines and Taiwan are compared, the significance level is lower (p<0.05) and 
when New Zealand is compared with Taiwan and the Philippines the test results are 
insignificant (Levene’s test statistic 0.03 and 1.24 respectively).  
Most of the t-test results show that the samples from each country are different to those 
in the remaining countries although, there are a few exceptions. When the leverage 
ratios in Taiwan and Thailand and New Zealand and the Philippines are compared there 
are no significant differences found between these samples (t-statistics of 1.48 and 0.68 
respectively). The remaining tests show there are significant differences between 
leverage ratios across countries providing evidence that institutional effects play a role. 
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Table 5.7 Results of the Levene and t-tests when testing for differences in leverage ratios between countries. 
  China Japan Korea Malaysia New Zealand Philippines Taiwan Thailand 
Japan 
393,442.70*** 
  
            
(560.00***)             
Korea 
503,157.40*** 11,966.12*** 
  
  
 
  
 
  
(300.00***) (156.62***)   
 
  
 
  
Malaysia 
669.31*** 125.94*** 141.41*** 
  
        
(7.47***) (49.69***) (26.19***)         
New 
Zealand 
1,791.72*** 36.80*** 11.69*** 38.36*** 
  
  
 
  
(6.08***) (18.02***) (8.12***) (2.71***)   
 
  
Philippines 
27,697.16*** 914.38*** 426.87*** 34.21*** 1.24 
  
    
(25.70***) (87.21***) (40.88***) (4.82***) (0.68)     
Taiwan 
7,935.39*** 155.74*** 45.11*** 46.79*** 0.03 6.24** 
 
  
(18.71***) (29.03***) (9.44***) (9.58***) (2.89***) (7.37***) 
 
  
Thailand 
205,835.35*** 282.73*** 3,045.00*** 73.54*** 18.12*** 462.28*** 75.73***   
(62.66***) (82.53***) (23.57***) (15.70***) (4.08***) (18.08***) (1.48)   
UK 
361,523.11*** 3,458.11*** 4,602.70*** 105.92*** 23.19*** 621.70*** 96.59*** 85.86*** 
(340.00***) (86.31***) (57.07***) (35.67***) (12.14***) (59.19***) (17.38***) (46.83***) 
Levene's robust test statistic and t-statistic (in parentheses) when testing for differences in leverage ratios between countries. T-test results shown in italics are 
performed based on the assumption that the two samples compared may have equal variances. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Reflecting back on Table 5.2, it can now be said that Japan has the highest leverage 
ratios (mean 0.426), followed by the UK (mean 0.340) and Korea (0.302) and the 
leverage ratios in these countries are significantly different to the leverage ratios in all 
other countries (p<0.01). Taiwan (mean 0.189), New Zealand (mean 0.126), Thailand 
(mean 0.104) and the Philippines (mean 0.103) are those countries with some 
insignificant results which could indicate that either, the leverage ratios could be similar 
or that these results could be coincidental based on lower numbers of observations.
39
 
Finally, Malaysia (mean 0.073) and China have the lowest leverage ratios (mean 0.004) 
and also have significantly different leverage ratios to all other countries. These results 
confirm that leverage ratios differ between countries and further suggest that 
institutional factors may indeed play a role in determining the capital structure of 
SMEs. 
Table 5.8 provides the results of the same tests as Table 5.7 when testing for differences 
in leverage ratios between size categories. 
Table 5.8 Results of the Levene and t-tests when testing 
for differences in leverage ratios between size 
categories 
  Micro Small 
Small 
48,640.36***   
(202.88***)   
Medium 
27,073.88*** 192.57*** 
(163.23***) (19.33***) 
Levene's robust test statistic and t-statistic (in parentheses) when 
testing for differences in leverage ratios between size categories. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Prior literature usually finds a positive relationship between size and leverage (e.g. 
Michaelas et al., 1998; Degryse et al., 2012) so the expectation would be that micro 
firms have the lowest debt ratios followed by small firms and medium firms would have 
the highest. However, looking back at Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 the mean debt ratio is 
highest in micro firms (0.284), lowest in small firms (0.140) and medium firms have 
                                                 
39
 Both the Levene’s test statistic and t-statistics are sensitive to the number of observations in the 
samples. Lower numbers of observations could result in insignificant test statistics even when samples do 
not have equal variances. This could explain why insignificant results were found in tests using New 
Zealand and Taiwan. 
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slightly higher ratios (0.159) than small firms.
40
 These test results confirm that these 
differences are statistically significant (p<0.01 for all t-tests) and shows why each size 
category must be tested individually as well as collectively. If leverage ratios are 
significantly different between size categories then the capital structure determinants 
may affect each group differently and the effect of culture may not be consistent across 
size categories. 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis Results 
This subsection presents the results of the multivariate analysis, describing the results of 
the regression models in relation to the hypotheses proposed in Section 3.5. The test 
results using the techniques and the model described in Sections 4.8 and 4.9 on the full 
sample and the three subsamples are found in Table 5.9.  
Referring to the full sample, Table 5.9 shows that Embeddedness is negatively related 
to leverage with a coefficient of -0.264 (p<0.01). Hierarchy is also negatively related to 
leverage (coefficient -0.213, p<0.01). Mastery is not found to have significant 
relationship with leverage. Based on these findings there is no evidence in support of 
H11, that Mastery is positively related to leverage so on this occasion the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, sufficient evidence is found in support of H21, 
that Embeddedness is negatively related to debt levels and H31, that Hierarchy is 
negatively related to debt levels. In these cases there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypotheses. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Levene’s test and t-tests are performed to determine whether there are statistically significant 
differences in leverage ratios between the size categories in each country and the results of these tests are 
shown in Appendix 9. New Zealand is not included in these tests as the number of observations of micro 
and small firms is very low and would not provide a good basis for comparison. This appendix shows 
that within each country the results differ and are partially influenced by the number of observations in 
each sample. The results for China, Japan, the UK and Korea all show significant differences between the 
three size categories. The tests on Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines often have insignificant results 
but these countries are those with the fewest observations. Intuition would suggest that the insignificant 
test results found in these countries are caused by the lower number of observations rather than similar 
leverage ratios. 
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Table 5.9 Dependent variable: Total Debt to Total Assets (LEV). 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
EMB -0.264*** -0.304*** -0.337*** -0.251*** 
  (-7.78) (-5.57) (-6.89) (-6.30) 
HIER -0.213*** -0.175** -0.163*** -0.235*** 
  (-4.43) (-2.52) (-2.64) (-3.81) 
MAST 0.081 0.089 0.073 0.334** 
  (0.72) (0.55) (0.49) (2.05) 
SIZE -0.009 -0.025 0.015 0.015 
  (-1.16) (-1.62) 0.82 -0.85 
PROF -0.131*** -0.249*** -0.039 -0.038 
  (-3.24) (-4.38) (-0.74) (-0.73) 
TANG 0.221*** 0.234*** 0.173*** 0.199*** 
  (5.33) (3.94) (3.15) (3.92) 
GROW 0.006 0.010 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.62) (0.61) (0.01) (-0.02) 
LIQ -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.002 
  (-2.98) (-3.47) (-0.47) (-0.87) 
RISK 0.053*** 0.089*** 0.030 0.034 
  (3.67) (3.79) (1.39) (1.51) 
IND 0.035 0.058 -0.060 0.147 
  (0.43) (0.58) (-0.59) (1.50) 
LEGTRA 0.024 0.066** 0.047 0.062** 
  (0.89) (1.96) (1.50) (2.18) 
BDMK 0.138*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.165*** 
  (5.13) (4.52) (4.53) (5.53) 
STPRO -0.045*** -0.033 -0.068*** -0.085*** 
  (-2.84) (-1.58) (-3.56) (-4.00) 
CONS 1.591*** 1.682*** 1.515*** 0.360 
  (3.93) (3.53) (2.91) (0.60) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.474 0.425 0.561 0.569 
Wald Chi Sq. 312.85*** 200.86*** 123.65*** 155.75*** 
Highest VIF 4.78 4.50 4.86 4.25 
Mean VIF 2.18 2.10 2.03 2.00 
No. of Obs. 864,929 429,761 273,271 156,222 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 
4.8 and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The control variables used in the multivariate analysis are divided into two categories: 
firm level and institution level. There are three institution level variables included in the 
model: legal tradition, standardised enforcement and protection of finance providers 
and bond market development. Again, referring to the full sample, legal tradition is an 
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insignificant determinant of capital structure. However, the bond market development 
and standardised enforcement and protection of finance providers are both significant at 
the one per cent level (coefficients of 0.138 and -0.045 respectively). The coefficient for 
bond markets is positive which is expected based on prior literature (De Jong et al., 
2008; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). If bond markets are well developed, then the 
cost of debt is more competitive. This is expected within the bond market itself. 
However, to be competitive when providing debt finance, banks may also reduce their 
cost of debt. Banks are the primary source of external finance for SMEs so if their debt 
is priced more competitively, then SMEs will be able to afford to have more debt in 
their capital structures. 
The variable used to capture standardised enforcement and protection of finance 
providers is negatively related to leverage (with a coefficient of -0.045, p <0.01). As 
protection of finance providers and the enforcement of that protection increases, SMEs’ 
debt levels decrease. This suggests that SMEs are more cautious when their finance 
providers have more power to take action against them in the event of non-payment of 
interest. The competing theory that this relationship should be positive because lenders 
may be more willing to lend if they feel better protected is not found to be true in this 
instance. 
Table 5.9 also shows the coefficients and the significance levels for the firm level 
variables: size, profitability, tangibility, growth, liquidity, risk and industry. 
Profitability is negatively related to leverage (coefficient -0.131, p<0.01) which is in 
accordance with the pecking order theory and prior literature (e.g., Sogorb-Mira, 2005; 
Degryse et al. 2012). Tangibility is found to be positively related to leverage 
(coefficient 0.221, p<0.01) which is also expected based on the findings of prior 
literature (e.g., Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Degryse et al., 2012) but this finding is 
more in agreement with the trade-off theory suggesting that SMEs may apply both 
theories simultaneously. 
Liquidity is found to be negatively related to leverage (coefficient -0.003, p<0.01) 
which suggests the application of the pecking order theory. Although there is limited 
empirical evidence which tests liquidity as a capital structure determinant this result is 
expected based on the findings of Deesomsak et al. (2004) and De Jong et al. (2008). If 
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firms have more internal cash, which is what high liquidity suggests, firms will use this 
internal cash before seeking external finance in the form of debt. 
Risk is found to be positively related to leverage (coefficient 0.053, p<0.01). Some 
studies which test this SME capital structure determinant find a positive relationship 
(e.g., Michaelas et al., 1998; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006), although this is not 
conclusive (Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009 find a negative relationship and Cassar and 
Holmes, 2003 find risk is insignificant). A positive relationship suggests that SMEs 
follow the pecking order theory and issue debt once internal finance has expired and do 
not apply the trade-off theory because if they did, a negative relationship between 
leverage and risk would be found. 
Table 5.9 also shows that size, growth, and industry are insignificant determinants of 
the capital structure of SMEs. This is inconsistent with several prior studies (e.g. Cassar 
and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2000) and unexpected. These findings prompted further 
investigation. De Jong et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2004) both find that the 
relationship between each capital structure determinant and leverage varies between 
countries. Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the results of random effects models with the 
firm level factors as independent variables and the leverage ratio (LEV) as the 
dependent variable for each individual country. Appendix 5 relates to the full sample 
and the subsequent appendices are for micro, small and medium firms. These 
appendices confirm that the relationships between these variables are not consistent 
across countries and the methods used to generate the results presented in Table 5.9 do 
not account for this variation which is why size, growth and industry
41
 are all found to 
be insignificant.
42
 
                                                 
41
 Appendix 5 shows that size is a significant determinant of capital structure (p<0.01) in all countries 
except New Zealand (p<0.05) and Malaysia (insignificant) but this relationship is positive in China, 
Korea, New Zealand, Philippines and Taiwan and negative in Japan, Thailand and the UK. Growth is 
found to be a significant determinant of SME capital structure in six countries (p<0.01). Half of these 
countries have a positive relationship between growth and debt (Korea, Thailand and the UK) and the 
other half have a negative relationship (China, Japan and Taiwan). The relationship between leverage and 
industry is also mixed. Some countries report a positive relationship (China, Japan and the UK), Korea 
reports a negative relationship and in the remaining countries report an insignificant relationship.  
42
 The findings presented below, in Section 5.5.4 show that capital structure determinants can affect long 
and short term debt differently. As some determinants are more likely to be associated with short term 
debt and others long term debt, combining both types of debt in the leverage ratio used as the dependent 
variable may also be partially responsible for the finding that some firm level control variables are 
insignificant. 
Chapter 5 Results 
 
 
 
 
107 
Table 5.9 also shows the Wald statistic
43
 for the model. The higher this value is the 
greater the prediction power of the model. A Wald statistic of 312.85 which has a p-
value of less than 0.01 indicates that the model has a high level of prediction power. 
The corresponding adjusted R
2
 value for the model (0.474) also suggests that this is the 
case. This figure indicates that the model explains almost half of the variation in capital 
structure despite there still being a significant element of the capital structure of SMEs 
unexplained by these determinants.  
This table also shows the mean and highest VIF figures.
44
 Prior literature suggests that 
for a model to be stable and reliable the highest VIF figure for any independent variable 
should be no more than five (Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012) although 
Ding et al. (2005) suggests this figure should be no greater than 10. The highest VIF 
figure for any variable in the regressions presented in Table 5.9 is 4.78 and the mean 
VIF is 2.18 when the full sample is tested. This confirms that the use of the stratified re-
sampling method has solved the multicollinearity issues caused by the uneven number 
of observations from each country (see relevant discussion in Section 4.7).
45
 
The results for the subsamples are also shown in Table 5.9. The results show that the 
cultural dimensions have a similar effect even across the separate subsamples. In all 
three subsamples, Embeddedness is negatively related to leverage (the coefficients are -
0.304, -0.337 and -0.251 for micro, small and medium firms respectively, p<0.01). 
Hierarchy is also negatively related to leverage in the subsamples. One per cent 
significance level is attained for small and medium firms (coefficients being -0.163 and 
-0.235 respectively), while for micro firms, five per cent significance is attained 
                                                 
43
 The Wald Statistic in a linear model after transformation is essentially the F-statistic. It is used to test 
the hypothesis that one or more of the independent variables’ regression coefficients are not equal to zero. 
It has an asymptotic chi-square distribution and the degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent variables in the regression model (Wooldridge, 2013). The Wald statistic is accompanied by 
a corresponding p-value which refers to the probability of attaining the given Wald statistic if in fact there 
is no relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. 
44
 It is not possible to calculate the VIF figures for the bootstrap procedure using stratified sampling. 
Thus the VIF figures are calculated manually. This is done by, first, randomly selecting a sample like 
those used by in the bootstrap (e.g., for tests ran on the full sample, the observations from 50 randomly 
selected firms from each country were selected). Then, this small bootstrap sample was used to generate a 
regression model from which VIF figures were calculated and collected. This process was repeated 100 
times for each model. Once all VIF figures were collected, the mean highest VIF figure was calculated, 
as was the mean average VIF figure and it is these values which are presented in Table 5.9. 
45
 In order to further confirm this, Appendix ten is a correlation matrix showing the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the bootstrap stratified samples. The figures in the correlation matrix are calculated in the 
same way as the VIF figures presented in Table 5.9 except that only ten repetitions are used to calculate 
the mean correlation coefficient.  
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(coefficient being -0.175). Mastery is insignificant in micro and small firms but is 
positively related to leverage ratios in medium firms at the five per cent level 
(coefficient being 0.334). This provides some evidence that H1 is supported by the 
results of the empirical analysis for these firms. However, these test results provide 
further strong evidence that H2 and H3 are supported by the results of the analysis and 
should be accepted. 
The test results show that bond market development has a positive and significant 
relationship with capital structure in all three size categories (p<0.01). The variable 
which captures standardised enforcement and protection of finance providers is 
negatively related to leverage (p<0.01) but only in small and medium firms. This 
variable is insignificant in determining the capital structure of micro firms. On closer 
inspection of Table 5.9, it can be seen that the effect of this variable increases (both in 
terms of the coefficient and the z-statistic) as firm size increases. This suggests that 
SME managers of larger SMEs are more concerned about legal action if their firms 
enter into financial difficulties than the managers of smaller SMEs. The variable 
capturing legal systems is insignificant in small firms but indicates that micro and 
medium firms in countries with civil/common legal systems (Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Thailand and the UK) are more likely to have higher leverage ratios at a five per cent 
significance level. 
Like the results for the full sample, size, growth and industry are also insignificant, for 
the three subsamples, despite the findings of prior literature. Tangibility is positively 
related to leverage in all three subsample at the one per cent significance level. 
Profitability is only significant and negative when tested in micro firms and is 
insignificant in small and medium firms. Similar results were found when considering 
risk and liquidity. These variables were only found to be significant in micro firms (risk 
has a positive coefficient and liquidity has a negative coefficient) but not in small or 
medium firms. 
5.4 Discussion of Findings 
Very little evidence in found to support H1 that Mastery should be positively related to 
leverage based on the value items Capable, Ambitious, Daring and Choosing own 
Goals. This hypothesis is developed based on the well-established connection between 
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risk and SME capital structure (Michaelas et al., 1998; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 
2006) and cross-cultural differences in risk perceptions (Palmer, 1996; Bontempo et al., 
1997; Renn and Rohrmann, 2000). However, as very little evidence is found in support 
of this hypothesis, this connection between SME capital structure and the Mastery 
dimension does not appear to be significant. 
On reflection, this can probably be explained by the following. Mastery as well as 
containing the value items above, contains the value item independent. Independence 
can be a very important factor to an SME owner/manager (Shane et al., 1991). Vickery 
(1989) argues that managers may have a more cautious attitude towards their business 
operations in order to maintain their independence. As debt is accompanied by debt 
covenants which may result in input from external finance providers (Nini et al., 2009), 
SME managers with high Mastery values may prefer to avoid this and opt to have lower 
levels of debt as a result. If this is the case, it provides a conflicting argument regarding 
the effect of Mastery on capital structure and could explain why this dimension was 
found to be mostly an insignificant capital structure determinant. 
When testing the subsamples, Mastery is found to be an insignificant determinant of 
capital structure in micro and small firms but significantly (p<0.05) positively related to 
leverage in medium sized firms. If a manager’s need for independence plays a role in 
capital structure, this could explain this finding. Perhaps, the manager’s need for 
independence balances out the effect of the more daring and ambitious traits found 
within the Mastery dimension indeed. However, a manager’s need for independence 
may be more prominent in small firms and diminish as firm size increases. As firms 
increase in size, the need for independence diminishes whilst the increased risk 
tolerance remains. This could explain why evidence was found of a positive 
relationship between Mastery and leverage in medium firms but not small and micro 
firms. 
Much more conclusive evidence is found in support of H2 which predicts a negative 
relationship between Embeddedness and leverage. This hypothesis, like H1, is based on 
the connection between risk and SME capital structure (Michaelas et al., 1998; Nguyen 
and Ramachandran, 2006) and cross-cultural differences in risk perceptions (Palmer, 
1996; Bontempo et al., 1997; Renn and Rohrmann, 2000). It is expected that 
Chapter 5 Results 
 
 
 
 
110 
Embeddedness, which includes the value items Security, Preserving Public Image and 
Self-Discipline would lead to a more cautious business approach by SME managers and 
will therefore, take on less debt. 
The evidence found provides strong support for this hypothesis and confirms that 
Embeddedness captures an element of risk tolerance and risk is capital structure 
determinant. This finding suggests that managers in cultures with high Embeddedness 
values have low debt levels in their SMEs because they value the security and longevity 
of their firm. Security could be a particularly relevant value item as SMEs are often 
family firms where the firm is the sole source of income for the family. If this is the 
case, it is reasonable to find that this dimension lowers risk tolerance.  
Additionally, the results found suggest that those cultures with high Embeddedness 
scores value close relationships. This is based on the value items Preserving Public 
Image, Reciprocation of Favours and Respect Tradition. SMEs are often dependent on 
a small number of relationships (Kinnie et al., 1999). SMEs in a country with a high 
Embeddedness score place even greater value in these relationships. The manager is 
likely to be concerned that if the firm takes on high debt levels and enters into a period 
of financial difficulties, these relationships may be jeopardized, causing irreparable 
damage to the firm. 
Hierarchy is also found to be significantly negatively related to leverage. This provides 
evidence in support of H3. This shows that the value items in the Hierarchy dimension 
(Wealth, Social Power and Authority) capture the level of control individuals require in 
certain circumstances and that this level varies between cultures (Hofstede, 1980; 
Schwartz, 1994). Additionally, the level of control an SME manager requires can affect 
that SME’s debt level (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Nini et al., 2009) because 
when SMEs take on debt they are obliged to comply with debt covenants (Berlin and 
Mester, 1992; Chava and Roberts, 2008). In the event of non-compliance debt providers 
can exert the control they receive through covenants and play an active role in corporate 
governance (Nini et al., 2009). Combining these ideas, this study, finds evidence that 
through managerial control, culture affects SME capital structure. 
As SME managers are usually in close proximity to the daily operations of the firm 
(Torres and Julien, 2005) and the personal wealth of the manager is often tied to the 
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success of the firm (Ang, 1991), it is reasonable to conclude that managers prefer to 
remain close to the daily operations of the firm in order to protect their own personal 
wealth. To what extent this is true may well depend on the cultural values of the 
manager. These findings show that the effect of culture on the managerial level of 
control required could result in two possible extreme scenarios: one where the manager 
wants to maintain complete control and severely limits external influences and one 
where the manager is prepared to relinquish control in order to pursue business 
objectives which require more finance than the manager can provide, although any 
given culture could be anywhere on a scale between the two extremes. 
The findings of the present study confirm that culture does affect the capital structure of 
SMEs. This supports the findings of Gleason et al. (2000) and Sekely and Collins 
(1988) who both report that there is a relationship between culture and the capital 
structure of listed firms. Beyond the fact that their findings do not refer to private firms 
or SMEs in particular, these two studies are limited in that they only establish a link 
between culture and capital structure. They do not investigate which cultural 
values/dimensions affect capital structure and in which direction. 
The present study develops hypotheses in a similar way to Chui et al. (2002) who look 
at listed firms only. However, although Chui et al. (2002) use Schwartz’s 1994 cultural 
dimensions they develop their hypotheses based on the wider dimensions Self-
enhancement and Openness to Change rather than individual dimensions. They test 
Mastery and Hierarchy combined as one cultural influence and Conservatism.
46
 Like 
the present study, they develop hypotheses based on how they predict the value items in 
each of these dimensions will manifest in manager behaviour regarding capital 
structure.  
They find that Conservatism is negatively related to leverage for several reasons. They 
argue that countries with high Conservatism scores value harmonious working 
relationships, leading to a greater level of concern for stakeholders. The desire for 
security leads to greater protection of employee welfare and a greater emphasis on 
financial stability. These cultures also value public appearance which means that the 
cost of bankruptcy is higher for the manager.  
                                                 
46
 As discussed above, Conservatism is nearly identical to Embeddedness in Schwartz’s 2008 dimensions. 
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All of these ideas contribute towards the hypothesis that Conservatism is negatively 
related to debt (Chui et al. 2002). Although some of the ideas are similar to those 
developed in this study, Chui et al. (2002) do not discuss risk which is the connection 
between culture and capital structure in the present study. The present study builds on 
the ideas developed by Chui et al. (2002) and uses issues specific to SMEs (e.g., the 
importance of relationships with stakeholders to SME survival and the increased 
possibility that the firm will be a family firm). The results of the present study reflect 
those found by Chui et al. (2002) when testing Conservatism/Embeddedness on listed 
firms and confirm that this dimension is associated with lower levels of debt even in 
SMEs. 
The second dimension Chui et al. (2002) test is Mastery and Hierarchy combined or the 
so-called Self-Enhancement dimension. Like the H3 in the present study Chui et al. 
(2002) predict that firms in countries with high Self-Enhancement scores will have a 
greater internal focus of control leading to a greater avoidance of being bound by debt 
covenants and therefore lower debt. They also predict that these countries will place a 
greater emphasis on individual success and bankruptcy will be seen as a personal 
failure. This leads to the finding that the Self-Enhancement dimension is negatively 
related to debt. 
This present study contributes to the study of culture and capital structure by splitting 
the Self-Enhancement dimension into Mastery and Hierarchy and testing them 
individually. Whilst Mastery is generally insignificant, Hierarchy is negatively related 
to leverage. This is interpreted as SME managers preferring to maintain full control and 
avoiding debt covenants which is similar to the ideas that Chui et al. (2002) use to 
develop their hypothesis. It is expected that although control may be an issue for the 
managers of listed firms, it will be a much more significant issue in SMEs because the 
manager is often a major shareholder (McConaughy et al., 2001) whose personal 
income is dependent on the firm. 
One implication arising from the findings of this study is the following. It is shown that 
cultural values can affect debt levels positively or negatively within SMEs. SMEs are 
mostly dependent on debt financing during start up or periods of rapid expansion 
(Holmes et al., 2003). If in some countries, cultural values dictate that SMEs take on 
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low levels of debt, then this could limit the SMEs chances of succeeding during its 
start-up period and restrict their ability to capitalise on growth opportunities. The 
opposite will be true in countries which have cultural values which indicate that SMEs 
will have higher debt levels. During start-up and periods of potential rapid expansion, 
the SME managers will be more likely to borrow in order to ensure that their SME 
succeeds during start-up and to capitalise on growth opportunities available. This does, 
however, increase the firm’s bankruptcy risk and if the firm is not as successful as it 
predicts can have serious ramifications for the longevity of its operations. 
Finally, this study establishes that culture, after controlling for several other factors, 
plays an important role in determining the capital structure of SMEs. This adds, not 
only to prior literature which look at this relationship in listed firms (Sekely and 
Collins, 1988; Gleason et al., 2000; Chui et al., 2002) but to literature which has looked 
at culture as an important determinant of several managerial and regulatory decisions. 
The link between culture and debt levels in SMEs is one managerial decision among 
many in which culture plays a role. For example, tax compliance (Tsakumis et al., 
2007), auditor choice (Hope et al., 2008), earnings management (Nabar and U-Thai, 
2007) and financial reporting (Zarzewski, 1996; Ding et al., 2005) are all affected by 
the culture in which the firm operates. If a better understanding of the effect of cultural 
values on not only capital structure, but on all managerial decisions in all types of firms 
is developed, then managers may be better able to understand differences in firms 
across countries which could enable smoother cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
5.5 Robustness Tests and Further Analysis 
This subsection describes the tests carried out in order to confirm that the methods used 
and the results found in the analysis provided above are robust. In the first set of 
robustness tests, the tobit model is applied to the data (Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Beck 
et al. 2008). In the second set, lagged asset values are used as the denominator when 
computing ratios used as independent variables (Degryse et al., 2012). Thirdly, 
Hofstede’s cultural values are used as an alternative to Schwartz’s cultural dimensions 
(Licht et al., 2007). Finally, further sensitivity tests are conducted looking at long term 
and short term debt ratios. 
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5.5.1 The Tobit Model 
The tobit model is used as an alternative to the OLS model in the multivariate analysis 
above. The tobit model is designed to be used when the dependent variable has a 
limited range of values. In the present study, the dependent variable is a debt ratio 
which cannot be below zero. This model is particularly appropriate as the tobit model is 
also appropriate for corner solution responses. This means that a nontrivial proportion 
of the data has a value of zero for the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2013). This is 
the case for the data used in the present study. Table 5.2 shows that the median leverage 
value for the full sample is zero. This shows that over half the data has zero as a 
dependent variable. This is largely due to the disproportionate number of observations 
in each country. China has the highest number of observations in the sample and the 
lowest debt ratios
47
 which means that a significant proportion of the data has zero as the 
dependent variable.  
Because the distribution of the dependent variable is uneven (there is a greater number 
of observations either equalling zero or close to zero), this indicates that the dependent 
variable is not normally distributed. This suggests that any inference from an OLS 
model may be limited as one of the underlying assumptions for OLS is that data must 
be normally distributed.
48
 The use of an OLS model for this data is appropriate but OLS 
may predict negative fitted values leading to negative predictions for the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2013). Thus the tobit model is applied in conjunction with the 
clustered, stratified resampling method used in the main analysis. The results are shown 
in Table 5.10.  
The results in Table 5.10 are similar to the results in the main analysis (shown in Table 
5.9). They show that Embeddedness and Hierarchy are significantly, negatively related 
to leverage. Like in Table 5.9, they also show that Mastery is positively related to 
leverage at the five per cent significance level. However, unlike the results in Table 5.9, 
the tobit model shows a negative relationship between Mastery and leverage for Micro 
firms at the five per cent level which is contrary to expectations.  
                                                 
47
 In Table 5.2 it can be seen that over 75% of the observations from China have no leverage and China 
makes up approximately 40% of the data. 
48
 In the main analysis, the independent variables are winsorised hence accounting for a slightly non-
normal distribution.  
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Table 5.10 Results of Multivariate Analysis using the Tobit Model 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
EMB -0.605*** -0.741*** -0.583*** -0.435*** 
  (-10.14) (-9.38) (-8.79) (-6.49) 
HIER -0.717*** -0.848*** -0.553*** -0.565*** 
  (-8.26) (-7.57) (-6.40) (-6.48) 
MAST 0.106 -0.489** 0.061 0.460** 
  (0.67) (-2.17) (0.32) (2.33) 
SIZE -0.008 -0.021 0.038 0.056* 
  (-0.61) (-0.90) (1.19) (1.83) 
PROF -0.279*** -0.324*** -0.298** -0.335*** 
  (-3.76) (-3.85) (-2.50) (-3.02) 
TANG 0.329*** 0.323*** 0.327*** 0.290*** 
  (5.17) (3.66) (4.14) (4.15) 
GROW 0.019 0.020 0.012 0.006 
  (1.17) (0.79) (0.52) (0.35) 
LIQ -0.008** -0.008** -0.007 -0.012 
  (-2.40) (-2.29) (-0.68) (-1.08) 
RISK 0.132*** 0.181*** 0.119*** 0.090*** 
  (5.17) (4.68) (3.28) (2.63) 
IND 0.068 0.118 -0.038 0.158 
  (0.58) (0.76) (-0.27) (1.28) 
LEGTRA 0.123** -0.040 0.196*** 0.162*** 
  (2.27) (-0.57) (3.87) (3.45) 
BDMK 0.302*** 0.259*** 0.323*** 0.288*** 
  (8.18) (4.88) (7.76) (7.66) 
STPRO -0.191*** -0.215*** -0.204*** -0.182*** 
  (-8.78) (-7.38) (-8.29) (-7.10) 
CONS 4.437*** 8.064*** 3.496*** 0.997 
  (6.72) (11.16) (4.19) (1.10) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.677 0.565 0.864 0.841 
Wald Chi Sq. 439.75*** 518.46*** 313.02*** 253.11*** 
Highest VIF 4.78 4.50 4.86 4.25 
Mean VIF 2.18 2.10 2.03 2.00 
No. of Obs. 864,929 429,761 273,271 156,222 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in tables 4.8 
and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The z-statistics and the coefficients reported when using the tobit model for the cultural 
dimensions tend to be higher than the OLS model, indicating that if cornered responses 
are accounted for, the effect of culture may indeed be greater than the OLS model. The 
tobit model also reports significant results for a number of the control variables which 
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are insignificant when using the OLS model. This could indicate that some of the 
insignificant results found in Table 5.9 are not solely due to differing coefficients 
between countries and the relatively small samples used in the bootstrap. It may be 
partially due to not accounting for cornered responses in the main analysis. Despite this, 
using the tobit model has demonstrated that the results reported in Table 5.9 with regard 
to the hypotheses tested are robust to potential model misspecifications. 
5.5.2 Lagged Asset Values 
The second set of robustness tests uses the lagged value of total assets as a denominator 
when calculating the control variables for size, profitability and tangibility. This method 
is used in prior relevant studies (e.g. Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Brav, 2009; Psillaki and 
Daskalakis, 2009; Degryse et al., 2012) to ensure that there is no endogeneity problem 
in their empirical analysis. If endogeneity is present in one or more of the explanatory 
variables, then those variables are either correlated with the error term, either due to and 
omitted explanatory variable, measurement error or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Simultaneity occurs when at least one independent variable in a multiple regression 
model is determined jointly with the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2013). More 
broadly speaking, a loop of causality may exist within the model. Using lagged 
variables can break this loop and if there are endogeneity issues within the model, then 
the model results when using lagged values will be different to the main analysis. If the 
results remain similar, then endogeneity is not an issue within the model. The results of 
this additional analysis are shown in Table 5.11 below.  
The results in Table 5.11 are very similar to that shown in Table 5.9. They show that 
both Embeddedness and Hierarchy are both significantly negatively related to leverage. 
Some weak evidence that Mastery is positively related to leverage in medium firms is 
also shown.  
The results for the remaining control variables are also very similar to those reported in 
Table 5.9 for both the lagged control variables and the variables which do not include 
lagged values. In fact, when one compares the two tables side by side, the z-statistics, 
significance levels and the reported coefficients are very similar in both tables so it can 
be concluded that the results presented in Table 5.9 are not affected by any serious 
endogeneity issues. 
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Table 5.11 Results of Multivariate Analysis using Lagged Asset 
Values 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
EMB -0.324*** -0.348*** -0.355*** -0.272*** 
  (-8.69) (-4.83) (-7.66) (-7.02) 
HIER -0.177*** -0.150* -0.153** -0.219*** 
  (-3.34) (-1.75) (-2.53) (-3.84) 
MAST 0.031 -0.038 -0.013 0.336** 
  (0.25) (-0.20) (-0.08) (2.24) 
SIZE -0.006 -0.016 0.017 0.018 
  (-0.65) (-0.76) (0.94) (1.05) 
PROF -0.076** -0.166*** -0.023 -0.016 
  (-2.32) (-2.65) (-0.52) (-0.42) 
TANG 0.146*** 0.175*** 0.104** 0.101*** 
  (3.93) (2.74) (2.45) (2.67) 
GROW -0.022 -0.021 -0.013 -0.014 
  (-1.41) (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.76) 
LIQ -0.003** -0.004** -0.001 -0.002 
  (-2.50) (-2.42) (-0.43) (-0.65) 
RISK 0.039*** 0.067** 0.023 0.025 
  (2.60) (2.34) (1.06) (1.19) 
IND 0.036 0.037 -0.068 0.170* 
  (0.42) (0.27) (-0.66) (1.82) 
LEGTRA 0.027 0.042 0.009 0.059** 
  (0.89) (0.93) (0.30) (2.07) 
BDMK 0.144*** 0.159*** 0.136*** 0.169*** 
  (4.74) (3.18) (4.14) (5.77) 
STPRO -0.054*** -0.042* -0.068*** -0.087*** 
  (-3.31) (-1.72) (-3.34) (-4.29) 
CONS 1.950*** 2.289*** 1.935*** 0.381 
  (4.44) (3.61) 3.53 (0.67) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.487 0.433 0.581 0.575 
Wald Chi Sq. 242.69*** 123.60*** 135.22*** 143.20*** 
Highest VIF 4.91 4.76 5.13 4.37 
Mean VIF 2.29 2.26 2.20 2.13 
No. of Obs. 715,838 344,733 234,952 129,902 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 4.8 
and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
5.5.3 Hofstede’s Cultural Values 
Hofstede’s cultural values as discussed in Section 3.1 (page 38) are used in a third set of 
robustness tests as an alternative method of quantifying culture. These cultural values 
are used in several prior studies which look at the relationship between culture and a 
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number of managerial or regulatory decisions (e.g., Gray, 1988; Tsakumis et al., 2007; 
Nabar and U-Thai, 2007; Hope et al., 2008; Chakrabarti et al., 2009). Hofstede’s 
cultural values capture different aspects of culture when compared to Schwartz’s 
cultural dimensions, although some similarities do exist. These robustness tests are 
carried out using Power Distance (as an alternative to Hierarchy), Individualism (as an 
opposite alternative to Embeddedness) and Masculinity (as an alternative to Mastery).
49
 
Table 5.12 shows the nation scores for Hofstede’s cultural values. 
Power Distance exhibits similar characteristics to Schwartz’s Hierarchy dimension. It 
evaluates the distance between employers and subordinates and how subordinates view 
disagreements with their superiors so, in part, this value captures a hierarchical system 
where subordinates respect the power that those above them have. Also, Schwartz 
(1994) says that Power Distance is positively related to Conservatism (or in his 2008 
dimensions, Embeddedness). Based on this, a negative relationship between Power 
Distance and leverage would be expected. 
Individualism has similar characteristics to Schwartz’s Autonomy dimensions. The 
Autonomy dimensions are opposite Embeddedness which has a negative relationship 
with leverage. A high Individualism value represents a culture where within a firm, 
employees normally work individually as opposed to working as a collective group 
where the firm takes responsibility for the actions of the collective. This cultural value 
is directly connected to the agency theory. Agency costs are expected to be higher in 
cultures with high individualism values because this value suggests that managers are 
more likely to satisfy their own objectives before thinking of shareholder wealth and the 
longevity and success of the firm. As debt can reduce agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) it would be reasonable to find a positive relationship between 
Individualism and leverage. 
Mastery and Masculinity both represent similar aspects of culture. A high value in 
either Mastery or Masculinity represents a culture where people are ambitious, assertive 
and independent which results in an aggressive, competitive working environment. 
                                                 
49
 China is not included in Hofstede’s original cultural values but Hofstede (2001) provides estimated 
figures for several countries including China so the values for China are estimations. The fourth of 
Hofstede’s cultural values; Uncertainty Avoidance is excluded as it has a strong relationship with bond 
market development, causing multicollinearity issues. The fifth cultural value later added by Hofstede 
and Bond (1988) (Confucian Dynamism) does not have values for all of the countries in the sample. 
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Schwartz (1994) finds that these two measures of culture are positively correlated so it 
would be reasonable to expect them to have a similar effect on capital structure.  
Table 5.12 Hofstede's Cultural Values 
  PD INDM MASC 
China 80 20 66 
Japan 54 46 95 
Korea 60 18 39 
Malaysia 104 26 50 
New Zealand 22 79 58 
Philippines 94 32 64 
Taiwan 58 17 45 
Thailand 64 20 34 
UK 35 89 66 
Hofstede's cultural values: PD, Power Distance; INDM, 
Individualism; MASC, Masculinity 
 
Table 5.13 Descriptive Statistics for Hofstede's 
Cultural Values 
Sample (N)   PD  INDM MASC  
Full Mean 63.21 38.15 72.08 
(864,616) 1st Quartile 54 20 66 
  Median 60 20 66 
  3rd Quartile 80 46 95 
  SD 16.39 24.13 17.65 
Micro Mean 59.55 41.84 73.71 
(429,246) 1st Quartile 54 20 66 
  Median 54 46 66 
  3rd Quartile 80 46 95 
  SD 15.54 24.50 19.55 
Small Mean 68.26 31.54 70.60 
(273,057) 1st Quartile 54 20 66 
  Median 80 20 66 
  3rd Quartile 80 46 66 
  SD 14.89 19.92 16.09 
Medium Mean 64.96 38.84 70.23 
(156,438) 1st Quartile 54 20 66 
  Median 80 20 66 
  3rd Quartile 80 46 66 
  SD 18.28 26.84 13.89 
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Table 5.13 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample and each of the three 
subsamples with reference to Hofstede’s cultural values. Here it can be seen that, of the 
three cultural values, Individualism has the greatest standard deviation of 24.13 
indicating greater within sample variation than the other two cultural values. The values 
for Masculinity may appear somewhat perplexing as 66 is the value for the first, second 
and third quartile in small and medium firms and the value for the first and second 
quartiles in micro firms and the full sample. This is because the value for Masculinity is 
66 for both the UK and China
50
 and these two countries combined make up over fifty 
per cent of the data.  
Subsequently, the robustness tests are carried out by repeating the same method used in 
the main analysis and using the same control variables. The results are presented in 
Table 5.14 and reveal the following. 
There is a negative and significant relationship between Power Distance and leverage. 
Additionally, there is a positive relationship between Individualism and leverage as 
expected. The results for the Masculinity value were mixed. This value is similar to 
Schwartz’s Mastery dimension so based on the hypotheses developed in Section 3.5 a 
positive relationship between this value and leverage would be expected. However, 
very little evidence was found in support of H1 in the main analysis. Hence, if little 
significant evidence for this cultural value when conducting these robustness tests is 
found, it would not be surprising. Table 5.14 shows that indeed this is the case and very 
little evidence of a relationship between Masculinity and leverage is found. There is 
some weak evidence of a negative relationship between leverage and Masculinity, 
contrary to expectation but this is only at the ten per cent significance level in the full 
sample and the sample of medium firms. 
Despite only finding weak evidence of a relationship between Masculinity and debt 
ratios, there is strong evidence showing a relationship between Power Distance and 
Individualism and leverage. Based on this, these robustness tests also find a relationship 
between culture and the capital structure of SMEs demonstrating that regardless of the 
measure of culture, culture is still related to leverage. 
                                                 
50
 Aside from the fact that Hofstede’s cultural values are somewhat outdated, this was a contributing 
factor as to why Schwartz’s cultural dimensions were chosen for the main analysis. 
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Table 5.14 Robustness test results using Hofstede's Cultural Values 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
PD -0.002** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 
  (-2.20) (-2.94) (-6.88) (-3.25) 
INDM 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
  (4.57) (2.82) (1.97) (2.62) 
MASC -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.004* 
  (-1.69) (-1.20) (-0.38) (-1.93) 
SIZE -0.010 -0.025 0.016 0.015 
  (-1.31) (-1.46) (0.83) (0.85) 
PROF -0.132*** -0.249*** -0.039 -0.038 
  (-3.32) (-4.23) (-0.73) (-0.71) 
TANG 0.222*** 0.234*** 0.173*** 0.198*** 
  (5.42) (4.04) (3.22) (4.01) 
GROW 0.006 0.010 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.64) (0.59) (0.00) (-0.03) 
LIQ -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.002 
  (-2.92) (-3.56) (-0.51) (-0.98) 
RISK 0.053*** 0.089*** 0.030 0.034 
  (3.74) (4.07) (1.39) (1.62) 
IND 0.037 0.059 -0.059 0.149 
  (0.51) (0.62) (-0.61) (1.56) 
LEGTRA -0.144*** -0.098* -0.114** -0.139*** 
  (-3.23) (-1.76) (-2.38) (-2.81) 
BDMK 0.196*** 0.199*** 0.143*** 0.196*** 
  (7.85) (5.63) (4.41) (5.90) 
STPRO -0.042*** -0.015 -0.057*** -0.039*** 
  (-4.07) (-1.18) (-5.02) (-3.21) 
CONS 0.370*** 0.521*** 0.387 0.203 
  (3.29) (2.75) (1.55) (0.76) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.475 0.425 0.561 0.569 
Wald Chi Sq. 332.41*** 206.29*** 435.90*** 190.12*** 
Highest VIF 2.87 4.43 4.65 4.21 
Mean VIF 1.62 2.13 1.96 2.00 
No of Obs. 864,764 429,734 273,270 156,203 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 4.8 and 
4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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5.5.4 Further Testing: The Relationship between Culture and Long and Short 
Term Debt 
Prior literature indicates that short term and long term debt are affected by the capital 
structure determinants in different ways (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Hall et al., 2004). 
In order to add depth to the results provided in Table 4.9 and explore the relationship 
between short and long term debt and culture further testing is conducted. These tests 
use the debt ratios of short term debt over total assets and long term debt over total 
assets. These ratios are also used by Hall et al. (2004) who compare the effect of the 
capital structure determinants on long and short term debt.   
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 show the results for these additional tests using the independent 
variables described earlier. However, the dependent variables for each table changes to 
the long and short term debt ratios. 
These tables show that Embeddedness is negatively related to long and short term ratios 
and Mastery is generally insignificant except when testing short term debt in medium 
firms where a positive relationship is found. The most noticeable difference between 
these two tables is that Hierarchy is only a significant determinant of short term debt 
and is an insignificant determinant of long term debt in all tests. These tests also show 
that there is some weak evidence that Mastery is negatively related to long term debt 
levels in micro firms which is contrary to expectations. 
The key issue highlighted by these tests is that culture affects long and short term debt 
levels differently which is not unlikely given that the other capital structure 
determinants also affect long and short term debt differently (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; 
Hall et al., 2004). The question is then why the cultural dimensions affect these two 
types of debt in different ways.  
Embeddedness is significantly negatively related to both short term and long term debt 
providing further evidence that H2 is supported. It also suggests that the reasoning 
behind H2 is meaningful as this hypothesis is based on the connection between 
Embeddedness and risk and cross cultural differences in acceptable risk levels. This 
could apply to both long and short term debt in the same way so finding similar results 
is not surprising.  
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Table 5.15 Dependent Variable: Short Term Debt to Total Assets 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
EMB -0.145*** -0.172*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
  (-8.94) (-6.56) (-5.40) (-5.69) 
HIER -0.094*** -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.149*** 
  (-4.25) (-3.18) (-3.03) (-5.07) 
MAST 0.058 -0.035 0.067 0.235*** 
  (1.01) (-0.50) (0.92) (2.80) 
SIZE -0.002 -0.009 0.003 0.004 
  (-0.42) (-1.28) (0.41) (0.52) 
PROF -0.014 -0.033 -0.004 -0.006 
  (-0.76) (-1.23) (-0.17) (-0.21) 
TANG 0.006 0.009 0.006 -0.003 
  (0.34) (0.37) (0.26) (-0.12) 
GROW 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.03) (0.09) (-0.17) (-0.04) 
LIQ -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 
  (-6.74) (-7.58) (-1.50) (-1.53) 
RISK -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.07) (-0.30) (0.07) (0.08) 
IND -0.011 0.001 -0.014 -0.023 
  (-0.29) (0.03) (-0.33) (-0.47) 
LEGTRA 0.004 -0.031** 0.001 0.017 
  (0.28) (-2.01) (0.08) (1.23) 
BDMK 0.006 -0.017 0.007 0.024* 
  (0.52) (-1.03) (0.51) (1.72) 
STPRO -0.026*** -0.020** -0.026*** -0.045*** 
  (-3.10) (-2.05) (-2.56) (-3.68) 
CONS 0.777*** 1.347*** 0.543** 0.120 
  (4.04) (6.23) (2.22) (0.40) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.232 0.200 0.282 0.299 
Wald Chi Sq. 225.20*** 298.20*** 64.46*** 91.67*** 
Highest VIF 4.78 4.50 4.86 4.25 
Mean VIF 2.18 2.10 2.03 2.00 
No of Obs. 857,500 427,964 272,103 155,471 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 4.8 
and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.16 Dependent Variable: Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
  Full Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
EMB -0.151*** -0.162*** -0.154*** -0.095*** 
  (-5.71) (-3.57) (-5.30) (-3.30) 
HIER -0.040 -0.026 -0.011 0.008 
  (-1.05) (-0.48) (-0.23) (0.18) 
MAST -0.067 -0.208* -0.089 -0.099 
  (-0.77) (-1.71) (-0.77) (-0.97) 
SIZE 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.006 
  (0.73) (1.61) (0.70) (0.61) 
PROF -0.058** -0.093** -0.021 -0.019 
  (-2.44) (-2.56) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
TANG 0.173*** 0.180*** 0.132*** 0.165*** 
  (5.62) (3.98) (3.25) (4.79) 
GROW 0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.40) (0.43) (-0.01) (-0.04) 
LIQ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.14) (-0.18) (0.10) (-0.12) 
RISK 0.034*** 0.060*** 0.017 0.014 
  (4.42) (4.23) (1.48) (1.29) 
IND -0.002 0.039 -0.053 0.077 
  (-0.04) (0.49) (-0.73) (1.19) 
LEGTRA 0.022 -0.003 0.033* 0.041** 
  (1.20) (-0.12) (1.65) (2.09) 
BDMK 0.129*** 0.111*** 0.130*** 0.119*** 
  (6.00) (3.67) (5.13) (5.47) 
STPRO -0.018 -0.010 -0.022 -0.009 
  (-1.54) (-0.70) (-1.51) (-0.62) 
CONS 0.906*** 1.289*** 0.888** 0.585 
  (3.07) (3.52) (2.34) (1.57) 
Adj. R Sq. 0.379 0.321 0.473 0.474 
Wald Chi Sq. 162.21*** 131.52*** 71.06*** 79.90*** 
Highest VIF 4.78 4.50 4.86 4.25 
Mean VIF 2.18 2.10 2.03 2.00 
No of Obs. 862,084 430,561 270,607 154,542 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in tables 4.8 and 
4.9 on pages 72 and 75. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Hierarchy’s relationship with leverage appears to be less straightforward. Its 
relationship with short term debt is as expected by H3. This suggests that this 
dimension increases the level of control required by managers which indicates lower 
levels of debt in SMEs. However, the insignificant relationship between Hierarchy and 
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long term debt levels is not expected. This may be because the firm’s long term debt 
levels could be under a certain level of control from the lender. Long term debt is more 
difficult to obtain and requires greater screening of the borrower (Cassar and Holmes, 
2003) so levels of long term debt may be partially determined by the finance provider 
because the lenders screening process may prevent SMEs from borrowing as much long 
term debt as they would like. This may restrict the managerial choice regarding long 
term debt and the influence of culture in this instance. 
In contrast, short term debt is easier to obtain without extensive screening by the lender. 
This means that the decision behind short term debt levels in firms is more in the hands 
of the manager and less the lender, particularly as short term debt could be in the form 
of short term loans or overdrafts which could be from multiple lenders. 
The decision to take on long term debt requires a greater commitment from the SME. It 
is often taken in larger amounts and considered a greater financial commitment than 
short term debt so would require greater managerial deliberation than short term debt. 
This could indicate that managers are more likely to enter into a long managerial 
thought process. The managers of SMEs often lack managerial knowledge or 
experience regarding issues such as capital structure so may see this as an appropriate 
time to obtain professional advice (Ang, 1991). This could lead to the manager acting 
outside their normal behaviour, which reflects their cultural values. In contrast, short 
term debt does not require the same financial commitment as long term debt and may 
be viewed as a lesser commitment. This could indicate that, the decision to take on 
short term debt is more likely to be influenced by the manager’s cultural background 
than a long period of managerial forethought. 
There are also some notable differences in the control variables between long and short 
term debt. Firstly, tangibility, bond market development and, to a certain extent, 
profitability are all significantly related to long term debt but not to short term debt. 
Additionally, the enforcement of legal systems and liquidity are related to short term 
debt but not with long term debt.  
A positive relationship between long term debt and bond market development is 
expected as bonds are generally long term debt. There is some weak evidence that there 
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is a positive relationship between bond market development and short term debt in 
medium firms but generally this variable is insignificant as a determinant of short term 
debt. No relationship is expected as bond markets are not generally a source a short 
term debt, particularly for SMEs.  
Tangibility is also significantly positively related to long term debt but not to short term 
debt. This finding is supported by Lemmon et al. (2008) who suggest that firms borrow 
long term debt and use fixed assets as collateral to reduce the cost of this debt. This is 
particularly true of SMEs as they suffer from higher levels of asymmetric information 
(Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). 
For the full sample and micro firms, profitability is found to be negatively related to 
long term debt at the five per cent significance level but this is not the case for short 
term debt. Cassar and Holmes (2003) say that long term debt has greater screening 
requirements than short term debt. This could indicate that when SMEs try to obtain 
long term debt, they are required to provide much more detailed information regarding 
the firm’s financial position and predicted future cash flows. Profitability would likely 
be an aspect of the firm which a lender of long term debt would consider. However, the 
screening process for short term debt is not expected to be as invasive and a provider 
may not feel obliged to collect as much financial information on the firm, so these short 
term debt providers may be more likely to lend to a less profitable firm. The same could 
also be said for risk. Risk is found to be a determinant of long term debt for the full 
sample and micro firms, but not for small and medium firms. Again risk is likely to be 
considered by providers of long term debt as part of their screening requirements, but 
the same might not apply where short term debt is considered. 
Liquidity is negatively related to short term debt at the one per cent significance level 
for the full sample and micro firms. This finding is also expected. Firms with high 
levels of short term debt tend to be less liquid. The use of short term debt suggests that 
the firm does not have immediate access to cash for any particular need and as short 
term debt tends to be more expensive, it may be that SMEs with liquidity problems tend 
to borrow in the form of short term loans in order to meet their immediate obligations 
whilst waiting on cash inflows. This being the case no relationship between liquidity 
and long term debt would be expected, which is what Table 5.16 shows. 
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Finally, the variable which captures the strength and efficiency of a country’s legal 
system is negatively related to short term debt at the one per cent level in all tests, 
except micro firms where only a five per cent significance level is attained. This 
variable is insignificant in all tests with the long term debt ratio as the dependent 
variable. This would also seem reasonable. If a country has a strong efficient legal 
system then firms that default on their financial obligations are more likely to be taken 
to court or pressed into bankruptcy by their creditors. This suggests that firms in 
countries where this is the case avoid short term debt because they are more likely to 
face legal action in the event of non-payment of interest. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter begins by presenting descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis. These tables show leverage ratios vary between countries and size categories. 
This observation is supported by the results of the univariate tests presented in Section 
5.2. The results of the univariate tests show there are significant differences in capital 
structure between countries and between micro, small and medium firms within SMEs. 
The descriptive statistics also show that a significant proportion of the SMEs in the 
sample have zero for the dependent variable. The tobit model is used as a robustness 
test to ensure that the large number of observations without debt does not adversely 
affect the results of the empirical analysis.   
The results of the multivariate analysis show that Embeddedness and Hierarchy are both 
significantly negatively related to debt levels in SMEs which provides support for two 
of the three hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. These results are robust to model 
misspecification, endogeneity issues, and the measure of culture as indicated by the 
robustness tests presented in Section 5.5  
The negative relationship found between Embeddedness and debt levels indicates that 
national culture influences the capital structure of SMEs through the manager’s view 
and perception of firm risk which varies across cultures and can affect debt levels 
within SMEs. These results suggest that the acceptable level of risk varies across 
cultures and within cultures which are risk adverse, SMEs will have lower debt levels. 
The negative relationship found between Hierarchy and debt levels indicates that 
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national culture influences the capital structure of SMEs through the manager’s need for 
full control over his firm. These results suggest that the level of control required varies 
between cultures and an element of control is given away when taking on debt, thus 
suggesting that culture where managers prefer to maintain full control will have lower 
debt levels. Very little evidence was found to support the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between Mastery and debt levels. This could be explained when one 
considers that this dimension exhibits characteristics which suggest that the manager 
may have a relatively high risk tolerance and may also be very independent and thus, 
prefer not to rely on external sources of finance and to avoid being constrained by debt 
covenants. 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that national culture does influence the 
capital structure of SMEs. These results contribute to prior literature by finding a 
determinant of the capital structure of SMEs which has not yet been examined. This 
capital structure determinant differs from those traditionally tested as it is not a measure 
of any financial characteristics or performance of the firm. This capital structure 
determinant, although not limited to, is directly related to managerial behaviour and 
personal preferences, and could contribute towards explaining why two identical firms 
from institutions with similar financial and legal characteristics have different capital 
structures.  
National culture affects all the firms in one country in the same way so any implications 
arising from this study are on a country level. Being aware of the relationship between 
cultural values and capital structure contributes to our understanding of why SMEs in 
some countries have higher debt levels than those in others. The findings of this study 
could provide vital information for practitioners whom operate in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. As SMEs play such an important role in any given economy, these 
findings may also have wider implications for countries as a whole because the effect of 
culture will be consistent throughout all SMEs in any given cultural area.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the Research Project  
The present study investigates the relationship between the capital structure of SMEs 
and national culture. It uses Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions to quantify culture in 
order to enable empirical analysis. The hypotheses use the Embeddedness, Hierarchy 
and Mastery dimensions and connect them to the capital structure of SMEs through risk 
and control issues which both vary between cultures and influence capital structure. 
These hypotheses are tested using a sample of nine countries from 2006-2010. The 
countries in the sample span three continents and consist of China, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and the UK and the total 
number of observations is almost 900,000.  
The data has very low numbers of observations from some countries and very high 
numbers from other countries which causes false multicollinearity issues. As a result, 
the empirical analysis uses a stratified re-sampling method. The results found confirm 
that the capital structure of SMEs is influenced by national culture. More specifically, 
high scores for Schwartz’s Embeddedness and Hierarchy are both significantly 
negatively related to leverage.  
The finding that Embeddedness is negatively related to leverage shows that cross-
cultural variations in the level of risk which is acceptable to SME manager/owners can 
result in different levels of debt in different countries. If the level of risk accepted by 
the manager is low then these results indicate that the SME will have lower levels of 
debt in order to try and prevent the firm from entering financial difficulties and to try 
and ensure that it continues to trade and provide and income for the manager/owner. 
Similarly, the finding that Hierarchy is negatively related to leverage suggests that 
variations in the level of control required by a manager can also result in differing 
levels of debt between countries. In countries where managers require a high level of 
control, they will have less debt in their SME’s capital structure in order to prevent 
giving control away to debt providers. In countries with a low Hierarchy score, 
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managers do not have the same control requirements and are more willing to issue debt 
as the level of control that is given to debt providers is acceptable to the manager. 
6.2 Contribution  
The findings of the present study confirm that national culture does influence the capital 
structure of SMEs through the manager’s approach to risk and control issues within the 
firm. This finding is important because prior literature, when considering the capital 
structure determinants of SMEs (e.g., Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; 
Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012), examines 
the effect of capital structure determinants which tend to be numerical in nature (e.g., 
firms size) and therefore easily observed or measured. National culture influences the 
way managers behave which is detached from all numerical measurements of the firm 
and its performance or institutional observations regarding available finance or legal 
issues.  
The effect of national culture could explain differences in capital structure which more 
commonly tested capital structure determinants do not. This was tested in listed firms 
by Chui et al. (2002) but the differences between SMEs and listed firms mean that the 
effect of national culture may not be the same across both types of firms. The results of 
this study show that behavioural factors connected to the decision making of the 
managers of SMEs, as a result of their cultural background, can also contribute towards 
the capital structure decision.  
Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions are used to quantify culture in this study. These 
dimensions are the most recently developed method of quantifying culture and although 
they are used by Siegel et al. (2011) in a different context, their use in prior literature is 
minimal. This study develops three hypotheses which link risk and control in the 
context of SMEs to both capital structure and cultural dimensions and uses individual 
cultural dimensions to test each hypothesis.  
6.3 Implications 
Developing understanding of SME behaviour towards debt is very important to 
practitioners from a cross-border mergers and acquisitions perspective. The effect of 
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national culture on capital structure could explain previously unexplained differences in 
the capital structure of SMEs from different countries. Maloney et al. (1993) investigate 
the effect of capital structure on project selection including mergers and acquisitions. If 
acquiring firms are more aware of what can cause differences in capital structure then 
this could aid managers in determining whether any given SME is an appropriate target. 
Additionally, the effect of national culture on SME capital structure should be 
consistent across all SMEs in the same country. SMEs make up 99% of firms across the 
world and play a very important role in any economy (Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Van 
Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). Additionally, Korjczyk and Levy (2003) find a 
connection between the capital structure of larger firms and macroeconomic conditions. 
Thus, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that this connection may also exist for 
SMEs. It may be that the effect of culture on the way that SMEs behave towards debt 
could have wider implications for macroeconomic performance as a whole. 
Countries where cultural values indicate that SME managers use less debt may find that 
when growth opportunities present themselves, managers are less able or willing to take 
advantage of growth opportunities because growth projects often require large amounts 
of finance, which SMEs usually have to borrow to obtain (Michaelas et al., 1999). This 
could result in them experiencing lower levels of growth. However, these SMEs could 
also be less likely to face bankruptcy because they have lower levels of debt. If all of 
the firms within the same country are more likely to have low growth rates but also 
more likely to have low numbers of firms going bankrupt, then this could suggest that a 
country’s economy, as a whole could be more stable and have reduced fluctuations 
between periods of expansion and contraction. 
In contrast, in those countries with cultural values which are associated with higher debt 
levels, SME managers are more likely to feel comfortable borrowing in order to take 
full advantage of any growth opportunities available to them. As a result, they may be 
more likely to enter into financial difficulties, should one of their growth projects fail, 
and face bankruptcy. The large role that SMEs play in any economy combined with 
potentially higher growth rates combined with potential higher numbers of firms 
entering into financial difficulties suggests that when managers of SMEs behave this 
way towards debt, it could play a role in more extreme fluctuations between periods of 
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expansion and contraction in the economy of these countries. 
This suggests that the effect of culture on the capital structure of SMEs, collectively, 
could play a role in determining the economic cycles within a country. Although further 
testing is required, if this is the case, this could result in much wider implications for 
financial markets and international investment. Often, countries which have more 
turbulent economic cycles are more likely to be seen as high risk investment 
opportunities and visa-versa to outsiders, suggesting that the effect of cultural values on 
the capital structure of SMEs may affect, not only their own economy but could attract 
or deter international investment from other countries. 
6.4 Limitations of the Study 
The most prominent limitation of the study is the use of cultural dimensions to quantify 
culture. Schwartz (2008:4) views “culture as a latent, hypothetical variable that we can 
measure only through its manifestations”. This statement advocates that measuring 
culture is subjective and although one can record actions, measuring and recording the 
thought processes behind these actions is impossible. Both Hofstede and Schwartz 
attempt to quantify culture by measuring the importance of certain values. They 
independently conduct surveys which focus on one particular subsample of people. 
Hofstede uses respondents from one multi-national company and Schwartz surveys 
university students and school teachers. The use of one particular group of respondents 
could be beneficial to the study because it acts as a control for differing responses due 
to an individual’s personal circumstances but it could also be argued that using different 
groups of respondents could produce different results. 
This criticism particularly applies to Hofstede’s dimensions as the company he 
surveyed was a high technology firm whose employees are generally skilled 
professionals (Hofstede, 1980). This firm may only represent a small proportion of the 
general population and this particular sample has an interest in modern technology 
which could represent a bias. Schwartz’s approach appears to have a more 
encompassing group of respondents. These respondents are expected to have a much 
more diverse range of backgrounds enabling the survey to capture the general 
population’s values. 
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Sivakumar and Nakata (2001) criticize Hofstede’s work for reducing culture to an 
overly simplistic conceptualisation with only five separate dimensions. This criticism 
could also apply to Schwartz’s dimensions despite the findings of Ng et al. (2007) and 
Schwartz (2008) who both suggest that Schwartz’s dimensions capture more cultural 
aspects than Hofstede’s cultural values. 
Furthermore, the notion that country can act as a proxy for a culture is widely criticised. 
Schwartz (2006:153) himself discusses using countries as a cultural unit and states 
“Countries are rarely homogenous societies with a unified culture”. Baskerville (2003) 
and Wildavsky (1989) also maintain that there can be many cultures within one nation 
and using country as a proxy cannot fully capture culture. Reflecting on this, Schwartz 
(1994) provides four different values for each dimension for China: China as a whole, 
Shanghai, Hebei, and Hangzhou. He also provides different values for rural and urban 
Estonia and different areas of Israel. This demonstrates that Schwartz himself 
acknowledges this limitation.  
Using dimensions which are based on survey data has the drawback of only dealing 
with a limited number of areas within society. Respondents can only answer the 
questions asked, so any areas relevant to national culture omitted from the survey 
cannot be included in the dimensions. Hofstede’s dimensions only consider four areas. 
There could be a number of equally fundamental issues which have been omitted 
because the survey was limited to these specific areas (Hofstede, 1980). As Schwartz’s 
dimensions cover more areas of societal decision making the effect of this limitation is 
reduced but there could be further aspects of culture which are not yet captured. 
Schwartz (2005) found evidence that suggests Schwartz’s value survey doesn’t 
overlook any major motivationally distinct values but more may be discovered at a later 
date.  
Even if Hofstede’s dimensions were completely accurate, his survey data was collected 
between 1967 and 1973 (Hofstede, 1980). Since then there has been major cultural 
changes across the world so for any measure of culture to remain applicable they must 
be at least tested periodically to ensure their validity. Despite this, Schwartz (2008) 
finds that the available literature indicates that changes in cultural value orientations are 
very slow, even in the presence of major institutional changes.  
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The present study uses Schwartz’s 2008 cultural dimensions in the main analysis but 
also uses Hofstede’s cultural values in one of the robustness tests. The results were 
consistent suggesting the risk arising from this limitation is reduced to the minimum 
extend possible. 
The data used is also subject to limitations which in turn, limits the ability of the study 
to investigate the relationship between culture and capital structure. The data has large 
numbers of observations from some countries and few from others. This means that 
there is an increased possibility that the data from the countries with few observations 
may not accurately represent the population of SMEs from that country. The method of 
empirical analysis (i.e., using bootstrapping with stratified sampling) minimises the 
effect of this limitation of the data. 
There is also a significant proportion of the observations which have no debt. This 
could have an adverse effect on the empirical results. However, when the results of 
robustness tests using the tobit model are compared with the results of the main 
multivariate analysis no significant differences in the conclusions of the study arise.  
A further limitation of the present study is that the empirical analysis assumes that the 
coefficients of the firm specific control variables are the same across countries. 
Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8 show that this is not the case and this assumption leads to 
several of the control variables appearing insignificant in the main analysis when they 
do play an important role when it comes to a country level analysis. 
Chui et al. (2002) acknowledges that accounting data collected from different countries 
is prepared using different accounting rules and although databases try to correct for 
this, they are not always completely successful. Chui et al. (2002) used a sample of 
listed firms but the present study uses SMEs. It is more likely that there are greater 
differences across countries between SME financial reports than listed firms so this 
limitation is likely to be more prominent in the present study. The effect of this 
limitation is minimized by Bureau Van Dijk which has developed a uniform format, 
which is a realistic representation of company accounts globally. Although this does not 
eradicate the effect of these differences, this renders them comparable and reduces the 
effect of financial reporting differences, even in SMEs. 
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6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research in this area could include several avenues. To further improve the 
present study, the indirect effect of culture on SME capital structure could also be 
considered. De Jong et al. (2008) looks at both the direct and the indirect effects of 
institutional level capital structure determinants so a similar type of empirical 
investigation could be conducted using the cultural dimensions.  
The present study also looks at culture as a determinant of short and long term debt use 
within SMEs separately in Section 5.5.4. Future research could explore this further, 
considering a more diverse range of sources of finance such as trade credit or leases. 
A further study into the capital structure of SMEs could investigate the relationship 
between institutional capital structure determinants and the capital structure of SMEs. 
Very little research has been done in this area. The majority of cross country studies do 
not look at institutional variables, they only consider each country separately. Thus, 
further investigation into creditor rights, shareholder rights, corruption, judicial 
efficiency, bond market development, stock market development, macroeconomic 
conditions and tax systems could be conducted. It would also be interesting to see if 
private and public bond and stock markets have different or any effects on the capital 
structure of SMEs.  
One way in which the capital structure of SMEs could be affected, which is not 
accounted for in this study, is by the willingness of banks to provide finance. Because 
banks are usually the sole source of external finance to SMEs, the amount of debt in a 
SMEs capital structure is limited to what banks will provide them with. This prompts 
the question: how much of an SME’s decision to take on debt is at the discretion of the 
manager and how much is dependent on the maximum amount of debt that banks will 
provide? And, is the banks’ decision affected by national culture? 
The present study examines the link between culture and SME capital structure. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, several prior studies have examined a range of managerial 
decisions in connection with culture. However, these studies focus on listed firms only. 
Due to the differences between the features of SMEs and listed firms the issues that 
connect some managerial decisions to culture could be different between the two types 
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of firms. This justifies the need for further investigation. Additionally, there are some 
managerial decisions for which national culture has not been tested as one of their 
determinants. For example, it would be interesting one to examine the potential 
relationship between cash holdings within firms (listed, private or non-listed SMEs). 
More specific to private firms, one could examine the effect of culture on the decision 
of a firm to become listed on a stock exchange.  
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I 
Appendix 1 Gray’s Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Professionalism; high Individualism and low Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Power distance. If a country has the cultural values that result in a high professionalism 
ranking then you would expect the country to allow for a certain amount of professional 
judgement and rely less on statutory control. 
Hypothesis 2: Uniformity; high Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance and low 
Individualism. Countries with these values would be expected to value more uniform 
accounting practices between firms as opposed to allowing a certain amount of 
flexibility where firms can choose reporting policies depending on their individual 
circumstances. 
Hypothesis 3: Conservatism; high Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance and low 
Individualism and Masculinity. This would represent a culture that takes a more 
cautious approach to accounting practices as opposed to a more optimistic, riskier 
approach. 
Hypothesis 4: Secrecy; high Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance and low 
Individualism and Masculinity. Secrecy as opposed to transparency in a country would 
prefer the confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure to those which are closely 
involved with its management as opposed to an open and more public approach. 
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II 
Appendix 2 Spearman Correlation Coefficients for the Independent Variables 
  EMB HIER MAST SIZE RISK PROF TANG GROW LIQ IND LEGTRA STPRO BDMK 
EMB 1.000                         
HIER 0.965 1.000 
          
  
MAST 0.829 0.945 1.000 
         
  
SIZE 0.176 0.218 0.253 1.000 
        
  
RISK -0.355 -0.355 -0.323 -0.113 1.000 
       
  
PROF 0.145 0.166 0.170 -0.021 -0.067 1.000 
      
  
TANG 0.040 0.041 0.036 0.111 0.025 0.008 1.000 
     
  
GROW 0.088 0.099 0.106 0.168 0.017 0.114 -0.077 1.000 
    
  
LIQ -0.051 -0.067 -0.075 -0.045 -0.011 0.063 -0.346 0.024 1.000 
   
  
IND -0.693 -0.740 -0.719 -0.307 0.251 -0.237 -0.033 -0.075 0.110 1.000 
  
  
LEGTRA -0.509 -0.601 -0.686 -0.116 0.235 0.082 0.023 -0.111 -0.097 0.243 1.000 
 
  
STPRO -0.884 -0.841 -0.715 -0.128 0.286 -0.137 -0.021 -0.102 -0.007 0.568 0.510 1.000   
BDMK -0.472 -0.477 -0.417 -0.115 0.095 -0.291 -0.065 0.044 0.204 0.582 -0.252 0.317 1.000 
Variables are as described in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. 
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III 
Appendix 3 Tables Showing the Distribution of Excluded Observations 
by Country  
Full Sample No of Obs. Per cent 
 
Micro No of Obs. Per cent 
China 233 0.70 
 
China 36 0.17 
Japan 21,829 65.99 
 
Japan 14,936 70.08 
Korea 1,090 3.30 
 
Korea 488 2.29 
Malaysia 1 0.00 
 
Malaysia 0 0.00 
New Zealand 1 0.00 
 
      
Philippines 52 0.16 
 
Philippines 3 0.01 
Taiwan 10 0.03 
 
Taiwan 5 0.02 
Thailand 1,587 4.80 
 
Thailand 1,306 6.13 
UK 8,276 25.02 
 
UK 4,540 21.30 
Total 33,079 100 
 
Total 21,314 100 
       
Small No of Obs. Per cent 
 
Medium No of Obs. Per cent 
China 332 3.10 
 
China 407 6.10 
Japan 5,918 55.20 
 
Japan 2,213 33.15 
Korea 992 9.25 
 
Korea 653 9.78 
Malaysia 0 0.00 
 
Malaysia 0 0.00 
      
 
New Zealand 14 0.21 
Philippines 20 0.19 
 
Philippines 117 1.75 
Taiwan 15 0.14 
 
Taiwan 24 0.36 
Thailand 161 1.50 
 
Thailand 43 0.64 
UK 3,283 30.62 
 
UK 3,205 48.01 
Total 10,721 100 
 
Total 6,676 100 
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IV 
Appendix 4 Spearman Correlation Coefficients between the leverage 
ratio (LEV) and the Independent Variables 
 
  LEV 
  Full Micro Small Medium 
EMB -0.699 -0.596 -0.801 -0.746 
HIER -0.723 -0.620 -0.817 -0.769 
MAST -0.6738 -0.526 -0.807 -0.747 
SIZE -0.180 -0.221 0.117 0.182 
PROF -0.268 -0.222 -0.315 0.282 
TANG 0.073 0.135 -0.134 0.069 
GROW -0.058 -0.007 -0.041 -0.136 
LIQ 0.041 -0.129 0.084 -0.028 
IND 0.631 0.562 0.677 0.615 
RISK 0.460 0.446 0.432 0.526 
LEGTRA 0.240 0.133 0.283 0.420 
BDMK 0.547 0.530 0.615 0.365 
STENF 0.525 0.483 0.494 0.568 
All reported values are significant at the one per cent level. All variables are as described 
in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. 
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V 
Appendix 5 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country 
  China Japan Korea Malaysia New Zealand Philippines Taiwan Thailand UK 
SIZE 0.003*** -0.048*** 0.050*** -0.006 0.080** 0.015*** 0.020*** -0.020*** -0.054*** 
  (29.86) (-93.23) (51.76) (-0.81) (2.48) (3.50) (2.26) (-8.16) (-65.27) 
PROF -0.005*** -0.146*** -0.231*** -0.063 -0.081 -0.065*** -0.148*** -0.108*** -0.282*** 
  (-19.34) (-77.43) (-48.13) (-1.37) (-0.80) (-3.13) (-3.14) (-10.85) (-100.13) 
RISK 0.002*** 0.866*** -0.007*** 0.020 0.012 0.973*** 0.750*** 0.277*** -0.025*** 
  (34.93) (611.50) (-6.75) (1.19) (0.59) (44.28) (5.74) (74.00) (-23.71) 
TANG -0.001*** 0.088*** 0.301*** 0.218*** -0.064 -0.036** 0.030 0.076*** 0.251*** 
  (-3.44) (34.78) (79.99) (5.19) (-0.64) (-2.15) (0.59) (7.82) (59.60) 
GROWTH -0.000*** -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.035* -0.001 -0.029*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (-3.30) (-5.33) (7.80) (0.04) (-1.68) (-0.11) (-3.12) (3.54) (8.57) 
LIQ -0.000*** -0.005*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.009* -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 
  (-7.29) (-75.57) (5.85) (-0.34) (1.86) (-5.72) (-3.28) (-3.51) (-13.14) 
IND 0.180*** 0.040*** -0.287*** 0.114 0.302 -0.042 0.017 0.028 0.043*** 
  (63.63) (5.98) (-37.27) (1.59) (1.08) (-1.60) (0.17) (1.24) (3.85) 
CONS -0.031*** 0.817*** -0.397*** 0.086 -1.144** -0.115* -0.084 0.340*** 1.058*** 
  (-25.94) (105.04) (-30.22) (0.78) (-2.28) (-1.79) (-0.63) (12.00) (88.56) 
R Squared 0.027 0.675 0.229 0.188 0.035 0.474 0.172 0.324 0.122 
No. of Obs. 371,102 295,386 74,843 193 119 2,497 519 20,142 133,207 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Outlying values of more than two standard deviations from the mean are excluded prior to testing. Variables are as described 
in Table 4.8 on page 72. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 6 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Micro Firms 
  China Japan Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand UK 
SIZE 0.000 -0.080*** 0.063*** -0.017 0.005 0.042** -0.026*** -0.083*** 
  (0.40) (-83.92) (35.59) (-0.66) (0.80) (2.04) (-8.56) (-48.91) 
PROF 0.001*** -0.146*** -0.213*** -0.105 -0.018 -0.007 -0.111*** -0.273*** 
  (-11.18) (-60.14) (-34.14) (-0.68) (-1.35) (-0.09) (-10.42) (-81.57) 
RISK 0.000*** 0.856*** -0.015*** 0.063 1.004*** 0.379 0.275*** -0.039*** 
  (11.63) (435.03) (-10.17) (1.26) (298.28) (0.85) (69.30) (-25.95) 
TANG 0.000 0.106*** 0.276*** 0.173*** -0.005 -0.086 0.077*** 0.286*** 
  (-0.61) (29.65) (52.66) (2.03) (-0.35) (-0.80) (7.29) (48.56) 
GROWTH 0.000*** 0.000 0.006*** -0.019 0.001 -0.055* 0.012*** 0.015*** 
  (7.72) (0.07) (5.69) (-0.33) (0.55) (-1.87) (3.84) (10.87) 
LIQ 0.000*** -0.006*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001 -0.005* -0.001*** -0.003*** 
  (-2.70) (-59.76) (5.58) (-0.20) (0.87) (-1.63) (-3.79) (-7.96) 
IND 0.004*** 0.093*** -0.408*** 0.258* 0.121 -0.201 0.029 0.039** 
  (22.40) (8.30) (-40.19) (1.63) (1.01) (-0.98) (1.21) (2.30) 
CONS 0.002 1.178*** -0.512*** 0.200 -0.044 -0.291 0.407*** 1.382*** 
  (0.59) (90.77) (-22.50) (0.60) (-0.51) (-1.05) (11.89) (66.99) 
R Squared 0.009 0.591 0.204 0.191 0.651 0.146 0.322 0.133 
No. of Obs. 128,938 183,174 40,766 71 71 117 17,911 76,113 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Outlying values of more than two standard deviations from the mean are excluded prior to testing. 
Variables are as described in Table 4.8 on page 72. New Zealand is excluded from this table as there are insufficient observations. * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 7 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Small Firms 
  China Japan Korea Philippines Taiwan Thailand UK 
SIZE 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.056*** 0.009 0.017 -0.003 -0.034*** 
  (10.98) (2.83) (24.24) (0.81) (0.78) (-0.45) (-7.59) 
PROF -0.004*** -0.178*** -0.236*** 0.002 -0.063 -0.115*** -0.385*** 
  (-10.79) (-43.74) (-24.96) (0.06) (-0.92) (-3.64) (-39.96) 
RISK 0.002*** 0.906*** 0.002 1.018*** 1.212*** 0.401*** -0.010*** 
  (20.12) (371.00) (1.12) (15.93) (6.10) (29.40) (-4.25) 
TANG -0.001*** 0.027*** 0.341*** -0.037 -0.126* 0.120*** 0.184*** 
  (-3.08) (8.52) (55.54) (-1.23) (-1.76) (5.21) (18.04) 
GROWTH 0.000 -0.0001068 0.003*** -0.006 -0.022** -0.007 0.011*** 
  (0.23) (-0.14) (2.60) (-0.38) (-2.06) (-1.28) (4.17) 
LIQ 0.000*** -0.006*** 0.001*** -0.003** -0.021** 0.001 -0.003*** 
  (-4.88) (-47.62) (2.98) (-2.18) (-2.28) (1.64) (-5.43) 
IND 0.136*** 0.034*** -0.220*** 0.009 0.125 0.031 0.109*** 
  (37.87) (5.57) (-19.38) (0.20) (0.88) (0.68) (4.58) 
CONS -0.021*** 0.094*** -0.532*** -0.063 -0.014 0.099 0.786*** 
  (-9.27) (6.41) (-16.41) (-0.38) (-0.04) (0.93) (12.40) 
R Squared 0.020 0.746 0.269 0.386 0.235 0.496 0.112 
No. of Obs. 158,362 74,559 25,154 406 171 1,769 23,502 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Outlying values of more than two standard deviations from the mean are excluded prior to 
testing. Variables are as described in Table 4.8 on page 72. New Zealand and Malaysia are excluded from this table as there are 
insufficient observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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VIII 
Appendix 8 Firm Level Capital Structure Determinants by Country for Medium Firms 
  China Japan Korea Malaysia 
New 
Zealand Philippines Taiwan Thailand UK 
SIZE 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.046*** -0.022 -0.014 0.006 0.026 0.013 0.022*** 
  (12.19) (9.24) (9.60) (-1.02) (-0.17) (0.98) (0.95) (0.88) (5.65) 
PROF -0.009*** -0.219*** -0.315*** -0.080 -0.113 -0.097*** -0.218*** 0.071 -0.404*** 
  (-11.34) (-27.60) (-21.46) (-1.06) (-0.81) (-3.84) (-3.42) (1.13) (-44.16) 
RISK 0.006*** 0.831*** 0.050*** -0.008 0.021 0.903*** 0.626*** 0.309*** -0.005*** 
  (25.53) (199.33) (12.22) (-0.37) (0.82) (31.36) (3.80) (11.82) (-2.71) 
TANG -0.001 0.004 0.281*** 0.229*** -0.060 -0.019 -0.047 0.116*** 0.199 
  (-0.90) (0.81) (26.88) (3.75) (-0.49) (-0.96) (-0.58) (2.69) (26.97) 
GROWTH -0.001*** 0.006*** -0.001 0.002 0.029 0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.001 
  (-3.77) (5.57) (-0.50) (0.06) (0.76) (0.25) (-0.42) (0.25) (0.74) 
LIQ -0.000*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002 0.031*** -0.003*** -0.054*** 0.001 -0.003*** 
  (-5.14) (-32.75) (-6.99) (-0.18) (3.97) (-4.94) (-4.37) (1.11) (-8.31) 
IND 0.252*** 0.065*** 0.030 0.109 0.092 -0.060* -0.206 0.099 0.097*** 
  (42.74) (8.05) (1.44) (1.04) (0.26) (-1.93) (-1.33) (1.20) (6.07) 
CONS -0.059*** -0.074*** -0.431*** 0.345 0.304 0.030 -0.051 -0.152 -0.074 
  (-10.37) (-2.74) (-5.86) (1.04) (0.24) (0.33) (-0.12) (-0.67) (-1.25) 
R Squared 0.046 0.702 0.267 0.235 0.074 0.374 0.226 0.313 0.125 
No. of Obs. 83,772 33,754 8,932 72 76 2,016 231 462 33,592 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Outlying values of more than two standard deviations from the mean are excluded prior to testing. Variables 
are as described in Table 4.8 on page 72. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 9 Results of Levene’s Test and T-tests when testing for 
Differences in Leverage Ratios across Size Categories in each country 
China 
 
Japan 
  Micro Small 
 
  Micro Small 
Small 
404.19***   
 
Small 
12,467.48***   
(10.30***)   
 
(105.34***)   
Medium 
6,252.84*** 4,492.29*** 
 
Medium 
6,772.55*** 12.09*** 
(35.41***) (29.52***) 
 
(81.55***) (6.01***) 
       
Korea 
 
Malaysia 
  Micro Small 
 
  Micro Small 
Small 
23.22***   
 
Small 
3.50*   
(16.51***)   
 
(1.57)   
Medium 
272.20*** 421.55*** 
 
Medium 
1.38 1.22 
(34.81***) (23.98***) 
 
(0.92) (0.91) 
       
Philippines 
 
Taiwan 
  Micro Small 
 
  Micro Small 
Small 
1.64   
 
Small 
0.00   
(0.93)   
 
(1.85*)   
Medium 
5.72** 0.33 
 
Medium 
0.12 0.20 
(1.85*) (1.66*) 
 
(3.77***) (2.48**) 
       
Thailand 
 
UK 
  Micro Small 
 
  Micro Small 
Small 
132.17***   
 
Small 
267.40***   
(5.17***)   
 
(23.59***)   
Medium 
28.82*** 0.87 
 
Medium 
2,035.54*** 490.08*** 
(0.99) (1.83*) 
 
(42.26***) (9.28***) 
Levene's robust test statistic and t-statistic (in parentheses) when testing for differences in leverage ratios 
between size categories. T-test results shown in italics are performed based on the assumption that the 
two samples compared may have equal variances. No tests are performed on New Zealand as the number 
of observations in micro and small firms is too low. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 10 Correlation Matrix Showing Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for the Variables in the Bootstrap 
Samples 
  EMB HIER MAST SIZE PROF TANG GROW LIQ IND LEGTRA RISK BDMK STPRO 
EMB 1.000 
           
  
HIER 0.326 1.000 
          
  
MAST -0.345 0.525 1.000 
         
  
SIZE -0.024 -0.152 0.007 1.000 
        
  
PROF -0.097 0.011 0.118 -0.086 1.000 
       
  
TANG -0.115 0.084 0.092 0.016 -0.036 1.000 
      
  
GROW -0.028 0.090 0.136 0.031 0.090 -0.059 1.000 
     
  
LIQ 0.101 0.123 -0.054 -0.136 0.004 -0.105 -0.037 1.000 
    
  
IND -0.232 -0.292 -0.321 -0.195 -0.047 0.002 -0.035 0.075 1.000 
   
  
LEGTRA -0.187 -0.403 -0.315 -0.124 0.049 0.040 -0.069 0.049 0.176 1.000 
  
  
RISK -0.222 -0.031 0.124 -0.128 0.048 0.032 0.014 -0.021 0.016 0.169 1.000 
 
  
BDMK -0.059 -0.005 0.077 -0.199 -0.121 0.000 0.029 0.016 0.270 -0.400 -0.019 1.000   
STPRO -0.658 -0.327 0.332 0.058 0.113 0.046 0.007 -0.182 0.076 0.296 0.174 0.138 1.000 
Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression models. Variables are defined in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 on pages 72 and 75. These values are 
calculated manually based on the mean correlation coefficient from 10 randomly selected bootstrap samples 
 
 
